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Abstract
Since the 1980s regional policy has played an increasingly important role in the 
political agenda of the European Union. Influenced by these external policies 
and by particular political and social circumstances internally, Greece has 
gradually introduced reforms in order to update its domestic system of regional 
and local government. Accordingly, during the 1990s an elected first and second 
tier of local government was created in Greece.
The new regional and local government reforms have affected Greek society in 
many ways, ranging from economic development to the promotion of local 
cultures. The aim of the thesis is to examine these reforms and the increasing EU 
structural funds in relation to issues of ethnicity and ethnic/religious minorities. 
The focus is on the Muslim minority that inhabits the region of Western Thrace, 
which is the only officially recognised minority population in Greece.
The study is divided into three main parts. The first part looks at the issues of 
regional and local government both in the European Union and more specifically 
in Greece. The second part focuses on the Muslim minority itself, examining the 
recent history of the area and the political and educational issues affecting the 
Muslim minority. The final part embraces the main points of the thesis whilst 
concentrating on the issues that directly relate to the new local government 
reforms and the local society.
The main purpose of the thesis is to contribute its findings to our understanding 
of regionalism and minorities as the European Union expands while reflecting 
the experiences from the area of Western Thrace in Greece.
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INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate and explore the way successive 
European regional policies and growing structural funds affect the Muslim 
minority of the Greek region of Western Thrace in relation to the Greek 
national-state. The idea of a regional Europe is an old one. But it was not until 
the 1980s that it played a considerable role in the political agenda of the 
European Union. European integration was thereafter promoted on two levels: 
integration between the member states - ’the Europe des Patries' - on the one 
level, and integration among the various regions on the other - 'the Europe of 
Regions'. The relationship between these national and sub-national levels of 
government within the EU raises questions and opens up suggestions for new 
economic planning and new ways of governance and social policy. Further, the 
complexity of the issues surrounding the interaction between the region, the 
nation-state and the European Union encourages new interest in the study of 
nationalism, minority status and citizenship.
The introduction of new policies promoted by the 'Council of Regions' 
within the European Union has led to changes in the structure of governance in 
many member states. Greece is a vivid example of such political/governmental 
restructuring under EU influence. One of the most centralised member-states, 
Greece resisted decentralisation. The reason behind this opposition lay in the 
strong feeling of vulnerability to external threat, a feeling which became more 
intense during the last decade in the Balkan Peninsula. From the Greek point of 
view a decentralised state is a weak state. However, under the new EU 
directives, pressure was exerted for regional restructuring and the gradual 
introduction of increased powers for regional authorities.
The European Union as an entity is by no means a unified polity. The 
member states differ in many dimensions ranging from economic situation to 
cultural patterns. Although a closer analysis may present common historical 
references that influenced the future development of the European states and
12
their population, it should be noticed that they influenced each country in 
separate ways. In addition, Europe has recently experienced two World Wars 
that created hostilities and alliances among European states. Inevitably, any 
attempt at greater unity leads to questions of identity: that is, a new European 
identity, if  such a term is possible, or new national identities within the new 
European reality. "Unity in diversity" characteristically is the slogan promoted 
by the Council of Regions (CoR). Local, ethnic and national identities have to 
adapt in response to the new situation on all three levels: regional, national and 
European.
This last issue becomes more complicated in the case of ethnic, linguistic 
and religious minorities (whose definitions will be fully explored in a separate 
chapter) that reside in the EU member states. If we take into consideration that 
minorities are sections of the population that either deviate from or fail (partly or 
fully) to complete or be part of nation-state building, closer European integration 
presents new challenges both in terms of their position in society and for a 
common European identity. Moreover, in many cases minorities inhabit 
particular regions of member states that can benefit as a whole from the 
'principle of subsidiarity and proximity' promoted by the European Union 
regional policies.
Greece again represents a challenging example for the study of regional 
policy and minorities in the new European reality. Greece, as a country is 
relatively homogenous as far as its ethnic population is concerned, for it also 
shares, to a large extent, a common language and a common Greek Orthodox 
religion. There are two reasons given by Rozakis for this high degree of 
homogeneity: historical circumstances and a government policy that aimed to 
homogenise all aliens (Rozakis 1996: p.97). However, minorities still exist in 
Greece. The largest of these, and the only one officially recognised and 
protected by international agreements, is the Muslim minority of Western 
Thrace.
13
The region of Western Thrace is a unique case in the European Union for 
two main reasons. It is the first region with an official Muslim minority to be 
part of the EU and second, it is one of the EU's poorest regions. Further 
characteristics increase the region’s noteworthiness and the resulting problems 
and challenges that it faces contribute to a very complex situation. 
Geographically, the region occupies a strategically important position at the 
comer of the European Union and its European borders. In ethnic terms the 
region can be considered as multi-ethnic, with Greeks forming the majority of 
the population, the rest comprising a grouping of Turks, Pomaks and Rom. In 
terms of religion there is a split between Greek Orthodoxy and Islam. Finally, 
and most importantly, the region borders Turkey, the country with which the 
Muslim minority associates and mostly identifies. It also happens to be the 
traditional enemy of Greece. To an extent it could be argued that Western 
Thrace is the area where Greek and Turkish nationalisms are tested.
Bearing the above comments in mind, this thesis examines how the 
deepening European regional policies and enlarged structural funds affect the 
Muslim minority in Western Thrace in relation to the Greek national-state. The 
belief, supported throughout this study is that although the thrust of such EU 
policies is based on economic and political grounds, we need to pay greater 
attention to the social and cultural dimensions and the needs of the Muslim 
minority population itself.
To achieve this task the present study focuses on four main questions 
that the following chapters will attempt to answer. The first question addresses 
the extent to which structural changes in national and sub-national levels of 
government have been brought about by EU regional policy, especially in the 
case of highly centralised states such as Greece. The second covers the belief 
portrayed in relevant academic literature that greater regionalism and increased 
powers for local government promotes higher participation, direct democracy, 
centralisation/decentralisation and centre/periphery relations. In particular, in 
what ways has this been achieved in Western Thrace and what are the benefits 
for the local Muslim minority population? The third concerns what has already
14
been stated, that Western Thrace’s experiences increased both Greek and 
Turkish nationalism, a feeling mostly fuelled by the geographical location and 
historical circumstances of the region. So, do the European Union and the 
regional policies promoted by its institutions bring a new challenge to the area of 
Western Thrace? The final question considers to what extent we can talk about a 
European Social Regional Policy; in the case of Western Thrace, a social policy 
that takes into consideration the sensitivity of the issues and problems faced by 
the Christian majority and Muslim minority populations.
In short, as will be analysed in the succeeding chapters, changes in the 
political behaviour of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace have occurred, 
especially during the 1980s and early 1990s. These changes were mainly 
triggered by a greater mobilisation of the minority members largely in terms of 
ethnicity, with the gradual replacement of the Muslim religious identity by an 
ethnic one. These changes can be observed in both forms of political 
representation and matters of education for the Muslim minority. It is not 
coincidental, as will be further elaborated that these changes in Muslim minority 
attitudes were brought about at the same time that closer European Union 
integration was achieved and regional policies and funding were promoted 
within Greece.
1. Structure of Thesis
1.1 Parti
In order to articulate the above points and address the aforementioned questions 
the thesis is divided into three main sections. The three chapters forming Part I 
focus on the issue of Regional Policy in Greece and Europe, with emphasis on 
the region of Western Thrace. The first introduces the concepts of region, 
regional policy and local government. The prime emphasis of this section is to 
explore the social and cultural meanings of the above terms, although the 
economic and political dimensions will also be taken into consideration. In 
addition to clarifying the definitions of these concepts for the particular case
15
study, the chapter focuses on the three issues most often mentioned in the 
literature on regional policy: aspects of democracy in regional government, 
arguments for and against centralisation/decentralisation, and the relation 
between centre/periphery. These three issues will be tested in preparation for the 
case of the Muslim minority in Part III of the thesis.
The second chapter explores the issue of regional policy in Greece. The 
chapter provides background information on the regional concept in Greece and 
shows how prepared the Greek state is for the implementation of such policies. 
The effectiveness of such new policies points to a system of interaction among 
the local officials as well as to the ability of the local administration to process 
and implement policy. The cultural particularities and the strength of the civil 
society are therefore also the subject of this section. Concepts such as “cultural 
dualism”, “clientelism” and “lack of administrative transparency” in the case of 
Greece are considered as obstacles for regional restructuring that have 
implications for Christian/Muslim relations in the area of Western Thrace. These 
are fully elaborated in Part III. Finally, the chapter compares the regional 
inequalities within Greece in terms of the geographical distribution of 
population, wealth, health and culture.
The third chapter deals with the European dimension of regionalism and 
regional policy. The European Union with its Council of Regions is the driving 
force behind regional structural change and regional development funding in 
most of its member-states. The function of this chapter is to examine the 
regional restructuring foundations set by the European Union and their purpose 
and impact on its member-states’ civic societies on one hand and on the Union 
as a whole on the other. Again, as in the previous chapter, particular emphasis is 
placed on the EU’s economic regional restructuring, as the majority of its 
policies involve the economic advancement of the underdeveloped regions. Here 
consideration is given to the social regional policies and their impact on the 
population that inhabit the regions. The chapter includes a brief historical 
background of the establishment and function of the Council of Europe during 
the different periods of the EU’s development, together with the examination of
16
the Council’s contemporary structure, aims and achievements, especially on 
issues of culture, identity and ethnic relations. Finally, the chapter focuses on the 
differences between Eastern and Western European concepts of regionalism and 
how these differences are bridged, if indeed they are, by a common European 
Union Regional policy.
1.2 Part II
The second part of the thesis focuses directly on the area of Western Thrace and 
the Muslim population that inhabits the region. The historical existence of 
Western Thrace as a region is relatively short, starting in 1923 when it became 
part of Greece. Nevertheless, the region did experience a wealth of historical 
events and movements of population and cultures in the years prior to this date. 
Today, as already stated, the region faces a complex of issues ranging from low 
economic performance to the mixed ethnic/religious population.
The first chapter examines the issue of national, religious and ethnic 
minorities and their role in the nation building process in Greece. The first two 
decades of the twentieth century are of particular relevance as it was during this 
time that minorities acquired their legal status in the Balkan Peninsula. 
However, the way minorities are accommodated is an ongoing process closely 
connected to the civil and cultural perceptions of ‘Greekness’. Tracking the 
process by which identities change from the beginning of the 20th century until 
the present day contributes to the theoretical framework of this section.
The second chapter gives an historical insight into the region in relation 
to the Muslim minority from 1923 to today. The first section provides general 
information on the area portraying the geographic and demographic 
characteristics and second, the ethnology of the people, with statistics on the 
fluctuation of the population. The second section examines four historical 
periods that are significant for both the Christian and Muslim populations: an 
overview of the two Balkan Wars which led to the signing of the Lausanne 
Treaty; the years immediately following the Lausanne Treaty; the period from
17
the early 1930s to the 1970s and finally the recent decades from the 1970s which 
are marked by ethnic self-consciousness.
In addition, observations from 1923 to the present day reveal a shift in 
the local Muslim elite from the “Old-Muslim” tradition attached to the old 
Ottoman Empire's theocratic values to a “modernist” attitude more in contact 
with modem Turkish nationalism. This change is important as it colours the 
attitudes, perceptions and demands of the Muslim minority. In short, it 
highlights the transformation of a religious to an ethnic identity.
The next two chapters focus on education and politics, the two issues 
identified in the problems expressed by the Muslim minority members. 
Although both chapters focus on the core issues, they also show aspects of the 
life and society of the Muslim community, from family life to the position of the 
Muslim women.
In the third chapter education is observed to be a significant feature of 
every modem state, playing an important role in the formation of a common 
national identity above any other ‘sub-identity’ based on class, locality, religion 
or language. It can often be seen that educational issues feature prominently in 
political agendas. The chapter examines three main aspects of the Muslim 
minority’s education: the legal framework and the limitations it places on 
Muslim minority education in Greece, the present structure of Muslim education 
at primary and secondary level, and particular problems faced by the Muslim 
students. Significant factors are poor linguistic skills, compounded by 
bilingualism, trilingualism and the very low level of education in the Muslim 
community in general.
The final chapter of Part II examines Political Movements in Western 
Thrace. A close examination both of the development of local political 
movements and parties and the electoral behaviour of the population highlights 
comparisons between the Christian and Muslim population. A milestone in the
18
political life of the Muslim minority was the formation of two ethnically based 
parties -  of brief duration -  whose main agenda was ethnic self-determination.
The chapter firstly examines the historical issues surrounding ethnic 
minority voting behaviour, especially in the geographical area of the Balkan 
Peninsula. Secondly, patterns of Muslim electoral behaviour are divided into 
two periods each reflecting the ideology of the local Muslim elite at the time, 
that is, the ‘Old Muslim’ tradition that can be identified from the 1920s to the 
end of the Second World War and a more “modernist” motif visible in 
contemporary electoral behaviour of the Muslim minority.
1.3 Part III
The third part of the present study encapsulates the concepts expressed in the 
two previous sections in a context of a regional social policy. It is the belief of 
the thesis that in the short term, the restructuring of regional policy in Greece 
has created grievances as local and ethnic identities have had to readjust and 
reorganise under the new circumstances. Major changes in the Greek 
administration, aimed at breaking down clientelism (only to a certain extent, 
given the historical realities of Greek politics and society), and at strengthening 
civic society, are themselves efforts often met by local opposition (Papoudaki, 
1999 p.62).
In the long term, however, these current changes are advantageous for 
the local population, especially the Muslim minority as it benefits financially 
from the new incentives introduced in the area, and politically as the changes 
increase Muslim participation. Although until recently the Muslims always 
participated in local politics and elected Muslim representatives, the very 
centralised character of the Greek system of governance meant declining 
participation, a situation which is in the process of change.
Looking closely at these changes, Part III takes the main concepts of Part 
I, that is, regionalism and democratic representativeness, effects of
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centralisation/decentralisation and relations between centre and periphery, and 
examines their applicability in the case of Western Thrace. Further, it considers 
future benefits for the Muslim minority which may occur as a result of greater 
regional power. An important development in the relationship between 
regionalism and the Muslim minority is the transferral of the issues that concern 
the minority from the Foreign Ministry to the governmental area that also deals 
with regional/local government issues -  the Ministry of Interior.
To conclude, my belief is that this study can contribute to an original 
examination of the effects of greater regionalism in Greece on the Muslim 
minority. Hopefully, these findings will contribute to our understanding of 
regionalism and minorities over the long term as the European Union expands. 
Although the thesis touches upon the economic position and political and 
cultural sentiments of the Muslim minority, it must be stated that it is not these 
issues but the Greek governmental regional restructuring and its effects on the 
Muslim community in relation to the Greek majority which are the focus of this 
study.
The subject was approached in this way as most of the other literature on 
the Muslims in Greece has dealt with either the attitudes/values or the national 
consciousness of the population. As the European Union integrates further, it is 
worth examining the evolving connection between the three levels of 
government, the EU, national and local, and the social developments they bring 
to the regions and their populations. Finally, a further important reason that this 
approach was selected to explore the subject in this way was the linguistic 
obstacle of the researcher (a non-Turkish speaker). To study the attitudes, 
underlying values or any forms of consciousness requires that the researcher 
speaks the language of the population studied.
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2. Methodology
Methodologically, the thesis benefited from three types of data collection and 
analysis. A detailed list of all sources is provided in the ‘Primary Sources’ 
section of the bibliography.
The main aim of the thesis was to gather information on the effects of 
European Union regional programmes on the recently created local government 
system of Western Thrace and the ethnically divided local population, with 
particular emphasis on the Muslim minority. For this reason, specific knowledge 
was needed to answer questions on the allocation of structural funds in the 
region and on the problems faced by the local governments at their early stage of 
operation, especially in areas with an ethnically mixed electorate.
Therefore, interviewees with adequate knowledge on the subject of either 
regional policy or the issue of the Muslim minority, or both, were approached 
for their expertise. The choice of experts was made according to three criteria. 
First, to reflect the three levels of government which were represented by 
officials from each of these levels. Under this category elected members of 
primary and secondary local government councils and local MPs were 
interviewed. The second criterion was to acquire the accounts of people that 
dealt with or researched the area. Thus, researchers and journalists were 
included so that they could contribute their experiences. Finally, the interviews 
were drawn from both the Christian majority and the Muslim minority in order 
to represent views from both communities.
The interview questionnaire consisted of open-ended questions where the 
interviewees had the chance to express fully their opinion on the subject. The 
questions were also categorised into three groups: questions on regional policy 
in Western Thrace, questions on the Muslim minority and current issues of 
concern and finally, questions about the influence of the European Union and 
the future prospects of the region. Aside from this basic structure some follow
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up questions were also raised according to the specific conversation. A full list 
of the questions is provided in Appendix 2.
The second method used in this thesis was the study and analysis of 
official documents. The status and situation of the Muslim minority in Western 
Thrace depends largely on the terms and conditions of the Lausanne Treaty and 
subsequent educational agreements between Greece and Turkey. In addition the 
Muslims of the area often appeal to either international bodies or treaties in 
order to communicate the Muslim community’s grievances. Reference to official 
documents by all parties concerned establishes legitimacy for past and present 
demands. For this reason the examination of official documents has provided 
the thesis with a deeper understanding of the historical background and a 
framework for the analysis of the Muslim demands.
In the area of Greek regionalism, local government systems in their 
current form are newly developed. In this area too, official documents were 
studied in order to trace the establishment of these systems and observe their 
functions.
The category of official documentation includes official treaties such as 
the UN Sub-Commission of Minorities Resolution and the Lausanne Treaty, EU 
Directives and Regional Policies, Regional Structural Funds, and secondary 
treaties such as Greek-Turkish educational and cultural agreements. Particular 
Greek laws and articles and Ministry directives concerning both the Muslim 
minority and the issue of Regionalism and regional restructuring were also 
examined. These include the Code of Prefectural Self-Government and the 
Constitution of the First Degree of Local Self-Government. In addition some 
quotations of relevant political speeches were included.
Finally, this thesis benefited from the use of some additional sources to 
support particular sections in order to gather contemporary information on 
economic and political trends in the area of Western Thrace. Such research 
includes official statistics on contemporary issues obtained from the Greek
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Statistical Organisation, the European Union’s Eurobarometer and the US 
Department of State. Statistical information from non-governmental 
organisations such as Helsinki Watch, the Minority Rights Group and Amnesty 
International was also taken into account.
A search was conducted of the official Web-sites of the EU, Greek and 
Turkish governments, local authorities and newspaper archives. These provided 
information on local and national media attitudes, Prime-ministerial and other 
official speeches as well as other relevant information on the economic and 
educational achievements of Western Thrace society. Additional searches on the 
web provided further information on recent regional research, relevant to the 
subject of regional social policy.
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Chapter 1
Theoretical Approach to: Region, Regional Policy 
and Local Government
1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to explore the concepts of region, regional policy and 
local government in order to provide a theoretical base for Part I of the thesis. 
Many of the ideas developed here will be applied first to the analysis of the 
Greek system of regional policy and the structure and role of local government 
and second, to the study of European Union regional policy.
There is a plethora of ways to approach the issues of region and 
regionalism. Most of the literature concentrates on the economic dimension of 
both the region and its relation to either the state or the European and 
international community. Considerable interest comes from the urban 
development scientists who are more concerned with urban-rural planning. To a 
lesser extent, social and political scientists view the region as an historical space 
for social interaction with its own political dynamism (Giddens 1984, Harvie 
1994, Beetham 1996).
The issues discussed in the chapter have been selected on three criteria. 
First, according to the way they relate to the Greek society although a more 
general perspective is provided in order to allow a comparative approach. 
Second, how they relate to the issues that concern the Muslim minority 
population whose issues are considered in Part II. Finally, as a base for the 
general discussion of regional policy and ethnic minorities in Greece.
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The first section of the chapter focuses on the clarification of the terms: 
region, regional policy and local government. The general view adopted, 
especially for the cases of regional and local government, is that definitions vary 
between different countries and different historical traditions. For this reason, a 
short historical background is provided to cover the development of regional 
policy. Here, three approaches are considered: the top-down approach, where all 
attempts at regionalism comes from the centre; the bottom-up approach, where 
regional movements ranging from many ideological backgrounds make their 
demands; and finally, the new regionalism approach, which shows the role of 
the regions in the new world order where the economy tends to be global but, 
more importantly, EU integration becomes closer.
For the case of local government, a typology is provided based on 
Goldsmith’s analysis where the following three types can be distinguished: a. 
the clientelistic/patronage type, which fits the Greek situation; b. the economic 
growth type, examples of which can be found in America and Canada; and c. the 
welfare state type that is more applicable to Scandinavian countries and the UK.
The second section of the chapter focuses on three issues most often 
mentioned in the literature on regional policy. It begins by exploring the concept 
of local government and democracy and considers ways to ‘test’ the democratic 
element of local government. Adopting the four concepts as argued by Beetham, 
this section examines authorisation, accountability, responsiveness and 
representativeness as elements of a democratic local government system.
Next to be focused upon are the arguments for or against 
centralisation/decentralisation which are examined as well as the three types of 
decentralisation: deconcentration, devolution and federalism. In short, centralist 
arguments refer to the need for a general co-ordination, uniformity of services, 
administrative efficiency and modernisation, which can be opposed by the 
traditional regional society. Arguments for decentralisation suggest that as there 
is higher local participation this is a more effective control, which both enables 
parliamentary scrutiny and provides a more democratic procedure. In addition,
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ecology movements argue in favour of decentralisation in the fight to combat the 
environmental pollution produced in highly congested centralised states.
The final concept considered in this section is the relation between centre 
and periphery. The argument here is dominated by the Marxist criticism of the 
development of the capitalist state. Although theories on this issue were 
developed during the 1950s and 1960s they can be of some relevance today as 
regional disparities still exist. This centre-periphery concept is also useful for 
students of nationalism as it is concerned with issue of the national versus the 
local. As it will be seen the arguments of uneven development and regional 
deprivation raised by the application of this concept can contribute ideas in Part 
III of the thesis.
2. Section I: Main concepts of Region, Regional policy and Local government
2.1. Region
Before examining either the concepts of ‘regional policy’ or ‘local government’ 
it is necessary to discuss the notion of ‘region’. As Bourdieu argues, there are 
multiple ways of defining a ‘region’ and the term itself is the object of dispute 
among different disciplines (Bourdieu, 1980: 149-152). Geographers are keenly 
interested in the physical mapping of an area, historians, defining a nation, give 
an account of the historical roots of particular regions. The emergence of 
regional science and the rise of regional movements with their demands for 
regional development have attracted the interest of economists dealing with 
investment, trade, taxes and employment.
Political scientists concentrate their attentions on the organisation of 
people into different political bodies and the function of governments, local and 
national. With the appearance in the 1970s of new types of regional movements 
(see p.29), which set as their priority the search for regional identity, regional 
autonomy or secession, sociologists and social anthropologists became
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interested in the subject of the region. The way regions relate to the nation-state 
is also of interest to students of nationalism and ethnicity.
The concept of ‘region’ not only possesses different meanings across the 
spectrum of academic disciples, but also in the historical traditions of each 
country. There is a general consensus that the term region refers to a space, but 
again the meaning of space varies: economic space, political space, territorial 
space or a space for social interaction (Keating 1998: p .ll) . For Giddens, the 
region has this fundamental spatial quality that does not merely signify physical 
demarcation, but a space where social contact and social action, from family 
relations up to the nation-state, takes place across timespace. He also holds that 
there is ‘a strong degree of regional differentiation in terms of class relationships 
and a variety of other social criteria’ (Giddens 1984: p. 140) between the regions.
For the purpose of this thesis, region has been defined as a geographical 
area with its own institutional, political, economic and social interaction system 
where its historical background, physical environment and ethnic and cultural 
composition shape the forms of social action and contact. As a consequence the 
focus of the succeeding chapters will be on the region of Western Thrace (a 
geographically defined area), and the historical events that have shaped the 
ethnic composition and cultural character of its population. Further attention will 
be given to recent changes introduced by the Greek state to the local government 
system, which have brought a new political and social dimension to 
Christian/Muslim community relations, encouraging, as we shall see in Part III 
of the thesis, closer contact and co-operation whilst nevertheless exposing the 
problems of cohabitation.
2.2. Regional Policy
Regional policy is a particular type of public policy-making process where the 
central government (or central governmental bodies of a state) introduces and 
implements a number of policies concerning the country’s regions. 
(Adrikopoulou 1995: p. 15). The main aim of such intervention is the elimination
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of regional inequalities in order to bring an equality of opportunities and service 
provision to all regions. These policies cover the economic, political or social 
sector; for example, educational reforms or reorganisation of the local 
government system.
The experience of most countries, especially developing ones, shows that 
regional inequalities in the level of development tend to become wider when 
particular intervention policies are not adequately planned by the state. This was 
especially true when, in order to overcome the 1930s recession, Western 
European countries and the USA introduced policies to assist the weaker 
regions. Although national planning at the macro level was normally 
satisfactory, regional planning did not receive adequate consideration. This 
situation started to change as new patterns of regional policies and theories 
started to emerge.
Until the beginning of the 1970s, regional policy in most European 
countries was almost exclusively a national issue and had the character of a 
centrally organised national initiative. Since the mid 1970s, two new trends have 
emerged in the practice of regional policy. Both trends include changes in the 
decision-making processes, in local institutions and administration and the 
implementation of regional policies.
One trend to emerge was the tendency towards decentralisation within 
the national state. Local and regional authorities seeking to develop the internal 
potential of particular regions applied newly acquired ‘local’ policies. 
(Decentralisation and centre-periphery relations will be further examined under 
Part II of the present chapter). The second trend was towards integration at the 
European Union level. The Council of Regions (created in 1991) promoted 
policies for economic and social cohesion aimed at limiting regional inequalities 
in the Union. Due to its importance this supranational level will be examined in 
a separate chapter.
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2.2.1 Short Historical Background o f Regional Policy
It is difficult to discover a historical background for the concept and institution 
of regional policy and local government in Europe. The reason is that the way 
regional and local government developed and evolved depends entirely on the 
geography and history of each country concerned. As Giddens suggests, the 
‘region’ is a universal notion but specific formations compel precise definitions 
(Giddens 1994: pp. 120-143). As will be elaborated further in the following 
chapter, the Greek local government system can be traced from the Ottoman 
style of governance whereas the system developed in Western Europe is based 
more on the feudal past of these countries.1 An important development in the 
shaping and approach towards regional issues are the policies followed by the 
EU, especially with the establishment of the Council of Regions of Europe 
(CoR). The CoR in itself is not a major institution in the EU, but in comparison 
to what previously existed, its creation can be considered as a breakthrough. 
This European dimension will be discussed in detail in a separate chapter.
Although the idea of region is not a contemporary issue,2 regional policy 
as a basic requirement in domestic politics appeared just before and immediately 
after the end of Second World War. Thus, as we have seen during the 1930s, 
governments in Western Europe and America had introduced some regional 
measures for economic recovery. However, even before the 1930s there had 
been some policies relating to the problems faced by less developed regions: for 
example, programmes concerning the use of the land of the Rhine Valley in 
1915, or the South Wales Regional Survey in 1920, and the Doncaster plan in 
1922. However, these policies could only be described as sporadic as they did 
not belong to a general theoretical plan or as part as of national/state policies.
There are three approaches (Keating, 1998: p i2-18) that can be 
distinguished with regard to regional policy. First, the top-down approach 
according to which central governments felt the need to promote regional 
policies in order to minimise disparities among different areas of the state. 
Second, the bottom-up approach, where regional policy emerged from the
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demands of the regions themselves and regional movements drew support from 
all spectrums of the political parties. Third, the new regionalism, where new 
impetus was given to the idea of regional policy and regionalism by a number of 
factors, namely, economic restructuring, state reform, the promotion of the ideas 
of globalisation and European integration.3
‘Top-down approach’:
The emergence of the nation-state during the 19th century attempted to eclipse 
the regions, considering them as obstacles to national unity. Regional culture, 
education and local government were made subordinate to linguistic 
nationalism, social security and military requirements (Harvie 1994: p.37). For 
example, in France, Italy and Spain, various governments tried to eliminate 
regional particularities, and while the German system was based on federation, 
Prussia was dominant.
After the Second World War, in a move towards the modernisation of the 
state administration, western democracies reintroduced the idea of regionalism. 
Disparities among territories were recognised and the years that followed 
witnessed the emergence of regional policies by the central government -  a 
process that intensified during the 1960s. From this period until the 1980s, the 
UK, Belgium, France, Italy and Spain re-established the regions as part of their 
economic growth or, in some cases introduced concessions to cultural minority 
policies (less evident in Franco’s Spain). In their efforts to mobilise, 
governments also sought to win the loyalty of old or newly-emerged local elites 
with the establishment of new regional institutions. Soon, ‘political issues were 
increasingly seen in a regional perspective, producing a politicisation of 
regionalism, which was given further momentum by political mobilisation 
within the territories themselves.’ (Keating 1998: p. 13)
‘Bottom-up’ approach:
In contrast to the reintroduction of regional planning by central governments, 
regionalism as a political movement has taken various forms and been linked to 
ideologies on the Left and the Right. Here, regional movements make demands
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on central governments either in order to preserve regional identities or to fully 
incorporate themselves within the state. According to Keating’s categorisation, 
there are six types of regionalism ranging from the extreme Right to extreme 
Left spectrum of ideology (Keating 1998: p. 14).
Briefly, on the Right, there is conservative regionalism where the 
traditional community resists the homogeneity and secularism of the modem 
state. Second, there is what can be called ‘bourgeois regionalism’ (Harvie, 1994) 
where economically advanced regions react to the archaic bureaucracy of the 
central state. Third, is the technocratic view of a depoliticised region which 
gives a new role to the interest and development of high technology. On the 
Left, there is progressive regionalism, fed by notions of unequal development, 
internal colonialism and ecological questions.
On the extreme Right are regional movements opposing centralised 
policies for regional equality and immigration either internal or external (see for 
example the policies of Lega Norte in Italy). Finally, in areas of strong historical 
traditions separatist regional movements can be found desiring autonomy or 
separation. Examples here can be observed in Northern Ireland, Scotland and the 
Basque country.
The ‘new regionalism’:
Between the 1980s and 1990s regionalism in European countries became current 
once more after its slow-down in the 1960s and 1970s following the economic 
crisis. The reasons for this new trend lie in the restructuring of the economy at 
an international level, to reforms occurring in the government of the states, but 
most important of all, to the European integration. (Keating 1998: p. 18, 
Vergopoulos 1995: p. 125).
It can be argued however that the efforts to globalise the world’s 
economy led to a change in regional development policies. Following the view 
that ‘economic development and the insertion of territories in the world 
economy today depend on specific territorial characteristics’ (Keating 1998:
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p. 16), governments paid more attention to endogenous development or to 
attracting investment linked increasingly to territorial qualities. Second, as some 
decision-making power lies within local authorities today, any introduction or 
change to the procedures of public policy-making process by central government 
has to take into account the issue of locality. Finally, the strengthening of the 
European Union has given rise to demands from regions for their voices to be 
heard as well as those of the central states. This opportunity was given by the 
regional policy introduced and followed by the EU since the 1970s, which 
encourages strong regional mobilisation, as we shall see in a later chapter. 4
2.3 Local Government
The different ways of defining the concept of local government reflects its 
changing role and function across nation states and over time. We can, however, 
arrive at a working definition that can support further arguments on the issue in 
the present thesis. As Harloff argues, despite differences in structure and style, 
all systems of local government are based on common goals. These are: to 
provide those communal services which citizens cannot supply on an individual 
basis, to promote a more even distribution of the burdens and benefits of public 
action and to protect weaker members of the society (Harloff 1987: p.7)
Bearing in mind the above, it can be argued that local government is a 
form or system of administration for small areas ranging from regions to towns 
and villages. Local government is usually conducted through an elected body, 
with self-government involving the administration of public affairs in each 
locality. In most countries, local government is subject to central government 
but it can possess a considerable amount of responsibility and discretionary 
power. In this sense, local government can be perceived as a form of 
decentralisation. (Byrne 1985: pp. 25-37). Furthermore, local government 
cannot be seen merely as a system for the delivery of discrete services: the very 
‘essence of local authorities is their potential to bring together services at the
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local level in the light of local needs and demands’. (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation 1992: p.8)5
Regional policies, as described in the bottom-up approach can be 
implemented by local authorities. In some countries, for example Spain and the 
UK since devolution took place, regional authorities are more powerful 
institutions and they are responsible for large geographical areas. Local 
governments on a smaller scale have a more limited function (Goldsmith 1990: 
p.23).
This was mainly the case for Greece before the introduction of local 
government reforms during the 1990s. As we shall see in greater detail in the 
following chapter, the local government authorities (LGAs) in Greece before the 
reforms were highly fragmented, had minimum responsibilities and finances and 
were under the control of a paternalistic state (Vemey 1994: p. 168). With the 
introduction of regional reforms the Greek state aimed to empower the local 
institutions and give an important political meaning to the regional unit.
For the region of Western Thrace, as will be argued in Part III, these 
institutional changes had an additional impact on the local society. The 
ethnically and religiously mixed population was called upon to participate in the 
process of local policy-making. Despite initial criticisms and weaknesses the 
local society has overall welcomed the new reforms in contrast to a decade 
earlier when ‘... the lack of public interest in increasing the power and 
responsibilities of local government authorities (LGAs) which often appear 
irrelevant to everyday life’ (Vemey 1994: p. 167) was the general view.
2.4 Types of local government systems
As has already been mentioned, there is a diversity of local government systems 
in Europe. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to look closely and 
compare systems of local government, nevertheless a reference to an existing
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typology developed by Goldsmith (Goldsmith 1990: p.23) can act as a basis for 
a theoretical argument on Greece and local government. The comparative 
approach adopted in this typology has been used to clarify further our 
understanding of the Greek society.
Goldsmith adopts the Weberian ‘ideal types’ to categorise the various 
systems of local government. They are ideal types because no individual 
municipality or local government system will fit exactly with any single type but 
will be closer to one particular type then to another so will give an “approximate 
fit”.
There are three types of local government system. First is the 
clientelistic/patronage model. This type of system is based on clientelistic or 
patronage relations between the leader and the people where for example, in late 
19th and early 20th century in America, and until recently in France, Italy and 
Spain, favouritism in exchange for votes at the local level often took place. In 
both Greece and Turkey this system continues to exist despite attempts at 
modernising the administration.
Being historically persistent in modem Greece, clientelism is a relevant 
concept to the present thesis as it has determined the course of regionalism and 
affected the majority/minority relations in the area of Western Thrace. These 
issues are examined in greater detail in a subsequent chapter. Briefly this view 
discussed by Mouzelis (Mouzelis 1995: p. 15) holds that there are three basic 
phases of political development in Greece in each of which the presence of 
clientelistic networks is evident.
The first phase, from the middle of the 19th century to the 1909 military 
coup, was characterised by a small number of local families controlling lower- 
class votes. Political parties were also led by leaders attached to regional 
clienteles. The second phase begun with the election of Venizelos Liberal Party. 
Despite efforts to break-up the local-families’ control by means of greater 
centralisation, clientelistic networks remained in the political life of Greece
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during the interwar period until the end of the military dictatorship in 1974. 
Finally, the rise of PASOK into power after the collapse of the dictatorship 
sought to bring fundamental changes in political organisation and to break-up 
clientelism by replacing traditional patrons with new educated party officials. 
Despite this, however, the concept of clientelism remained in Greek politics 
based on populist forms of organisation where a new type of 
personalistic/particularistic politics was developed.
In the Greek local government system, there is still a strong presumption 
among the population that local politicians are elected in order to deliver 
particular services to particular constituencies or people. This system is well 
rooted in Greek society and attempts at modernisation and moves for greater 
transparency in local government procedures are met with opposition 
(Papoudaki 1999: p.62).
The second type of local government system is the economic 
development model. For the countries that fall under this category, the main aim 
of local government is to promote the economic wealth of the community it 
represents. Local economic growth is paramount and is assisted by services such 
as fire, transport and the police, which provide the foundations for further 
growth. This type of local government can be found in the US, Canada and 
Australia.
There are three main features of such a system: a. a consensus among the 
locally elected officials and business interests, both desiring economic growth; 
b. the use of land or the changing patterns of using the land together with 
economic growth as a prime concern to local governments; c. very little control 
over what kind of capital investment a city attracts, and therefore the source of 
the city’s growth. Prominent examples of this system are the US cities that 
attracted manufacturing investment before and after the Second World War. 
This resulted in their growth being related to the growth of the manufacturing 
industry. A change of capital investment to property, finance and provision of
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services from the manufacturing sector signalled the decline of some cities and 
the growth of others where such capital was invested.
This alliance of business interests and local government systems takes on 
a more extreme form in Canada and Australia. In both countries the 
responsibilities of the municipalities are minimal and any calls for increased 
power have been met with opposition from either the state or provisional 
governments. Consequently, local government has concentrated its efforts on the 
development and use of land at the expense of welfare, equity or redistribution 
issues.
The remaining type of system is the welfare-state model. The local 
government systems of the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Holland and 
Britain are based on the welfare model. After the end of the Second World War 
the prime aim of local government was not only the regulation of land use but 
also the provision of goods associated with the welfare state. All countries under 
this system, with the exception of Germany, have strong centralised 
governments and local governments are used to deliver welfare services such as 
health and income support payments.6
Another aspect of this model is the insignificant power possessed by 
local officials. In the case of Scandinavia, local politicians are excluded from 
direct policy making procedures. In Britain, traditionally, local politicians at the 
periphery are seen to be responsible for Tow politics’, which concern the 
localities, whereas those at the political centre concern themselves with the ‘high 
or national politics’ of economy, defence and foreign affairs.
Finally, the other feature of this model is the existence of locally based 
but nationally organised positions for highly paid professionals7. The purpose of 
such a system in both Britain and the Scandinavian countries is uniformity in the 
provision of services across all the local areas.
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To summarise, the three types of local government systems differ in their 
approach to issues such as uniformity of services, economic development, the 
use of land and the type of services they provide.8 Accordingly, differences in 
their structure, level of power and flexibility to modernise are also apparent. For 
example, in all countries with a third type structure there has been some form of 
reorganisation or replacement of small local authorities with larger ones. The 
more traditional structures of the first and second type have made reform more 
difficult, as will be shown in a later chapter on the case of Greece.
3. Section II: Democracy, Centralisation-Decentralisation, Centre-Periphery
3.1 Local government and Democracy
As has been mentioned above, local government and local government 
organisations provide a range of services to the local community they represent. 
These services such as education, welfare, housing and transport are considered 
central to the social and economic well being of citizens.
Another more important function of local government that has been 
highlighted and discussed in local government literature is the close relationship 
between local government and the promotion of democracy. This is important, 
as we shall see later, because greater democracy invites higher participation 
from all parts of the society in the decision making process. In the case of 
Western Thrace this is highly relevant as the recent regional reforms, which give 
more power to the local authorities, enable the local communities (Christian, 
Muslim or mixed) to have a more political and financial involvement over local 
affairs. (Part III of the thesis, examines the issues of local democracy and the 
Muslim minority in more detail).
The EU and the Council of Regions have also adopted the idea of 
regionalism and democracy. Briefly9, the opening statement of EU regional 
policy is ‘the Council of Europe has always recognised the overriding
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importance of democracy at local and regional level. After all, freedom is a 
neighbourhood issue as well as a national one. Local self-government must meet 
the needs of all Europeans, in towns and villages, central and peripheral regions 
and across borders. The Council took its first step towards local authority 
representation in 1957, and since then its work has extended from Iceland to 
Russia and from Norway to the Balkans’ (webpage:www.europa.org /accessed 
in summer 1999).
At the heart of the argument is the view that local government is a level 
of government closest to citizens and its role is to represent any concerns or 
views of the locality. And as Stoker argues: ‘...local government provides an 
opportunity for political participation and expression that has a pivotal role in a 
democratic political system’ (Stoker 1991: p.l). To explore this view of local 
government and democracy this section considers the features of democracy 
analysed by Beetham at the political level (Beetham 1996: pp.29-40).
As a starting point, it will be accepted that democracy is part of the 
political domain, the sphere of collectively binding rules and policies. Although 
certain individual rights are entailed by the concept of democracy (such as 
freedom of speech, association etc.), the point of reference is still the process of 
collective decision-making.
Next, the concept of democracy, as it belongs to the political domain, 
cannot be confined to the government or governmental decision-making bodies. 
In this way, democracy can either be found or applied to any 
bodies/collectivities/associations where there are common policies and rules to 
be made, and where such decisions can have an important impact on peoples’ 
lives. However, what makes governmental decision-making of special 
importance is that ‘its association (the state) embraces everyone within a given 
territory, that membership and tax contributions are compulsory, that 
disagreement about its rules and policies is correspondingly intense and that the 
institutions for deciding and enforcing these rules and policies are highly 
developed’ (ibid.: p.29). And here lies one of the criticisms of democracy,
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namely how democratic can a system be considered to be when one or two of its 
areas have considerably more power in their decision-making and 
implementation than others.
Lastly, given the political nature of democracy, a democratic system can 
be described as a system of collective decision-making, which is subject to 
control by all members of the association as equals. Therefore, popular control 
and equality can be considered further features or principles of democracy. 
Although both of these principles form a vital part of a democratic system, in 
reality it is only within small-scale organisations that they can be realised. 
Again, the practice of these two principles at the level of local government can 
be as open to criticism as an institution on a larger scale, such as the state.
The above criticisms give rise to the general question as to how 
democratic a system of local government can be. It is useful to consider here 
what Beetham proposes as the four ‘mediating concepts’ as measurements of 
democratic procedures in institutions or government.
The first, authorisation, is key to governmental decision making through 
election by equal voting. This concept of authorisation embodies the idea of 
political sovereignty, in the way that the people constitute the only rightful 
source of political authority and political power.
The second concept is that of accountability, that is the accountability of 
public officials to the people over certain actions and policies followed by them 
while in office. For accountability to work, access to independent information 
about government activities and a guarantee that the electoral process does not 
favour the incumbents10 must be provided. This is particularly important in a 
clientelistic system such that found in Greece.
The third, criterion is that of a responsive government. The idea behind 
this is that governments take continuous notice of public opinion -  the full range 
of public opinion -  when they formulate and implement the law. In practice,
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this translates into the legally recognised right of consultation and access to 
government by all sectors of opinion with an interest in a given policy or piece 
of legislation.
Again the implementation of this concept is problematic, especially on a 
national scale. One way to justify responsiveness is a system of elections but 
elections do not guarantee that the public voice will be heard on every issue and 
would as a consequence need to be supplemented by other institutions and 
procedures. In states comprising an ethnic or religious minority the concept of 
government responsiveness either through elections or institutions can be 
problematic. State institutions or bureaucracy can appear to be either distant 
from ethnic sentiments or rather to be identifying with the interests or ethnic 
sentiments of the dominant group (Smith 1981: p. 191). In addition certain issues 
are conducted in secrecy in cases that concern national interest and security over 
which, consequently, the public is neither informed nor can express any opinion.
Finally, there is the criterion of representativeness. This last concept 
links with the democratic principle of equality, that is both political and 
citizenship equality. In the political sphere for an elected body to be properly 
representative of political opinion entails that all votes should have equal value. 
In the social sphere representativeness means that there is an equal opportunity 
for everyone to stand for public office. For public opinion to be representative 
equal access to the media and government is required, and although the outcome 
cannot satisfy everyone, it guarantees that the procedures followed are fair. In 
practice again, the concept of representativeness can be and has been criticised 
as there are different means of discrimination towards socially disadvantaged 
groups (such as women, ethnic minorities or economically disadvantaged 
population) -  a question that is particularly relevant to the case I shall be 
investigating.
To summarise, a representative democracy means that the elected 
government is popularly authorised, accountable and responsive to its citizens 
and representative of the people. These four criteria are met through competitive
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elections and a variety of other institutions and procedures. In addition, it 
requires the active participation of the citizens who are exercising their rights. 
Only in this way will access to and control of the current government be 
ensured.
There is a criticism of all the listed criteria as well as doubt as to how 
democratic a system of local government is or could be. However, they can act 
as guiding concepts for investigating an initial question: the relationship 
between local government and democracy. Furthermore, the degree of local 
democracy according to the above criteria depends upon the type of local 
government being considered and the role it plays in the community. This will 
differ considerably from country to country according to the structure and 
function of local government which exists within them.
The above criteria will be closely considered focusing mainly on Greece 
but attention will also be given to European regional policy in the appropriate 
chapter in order to draw some connection between democracy at the local level 
and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace. In addition, the concept of 
democracy will be of major importance in Part III of the thesis where the role of 
ethnic minorities in regional policy / local government will be examined.
3.2 Centralisation -  Decentralisation
This is another recurring term in the literature on regionalism or local 
government. The term ‘decentralisation’ has often been used in a loose 
terminological sense, which leads to confusion as to its exact meaning.
There are three types of decentralisation discussed in the literature: 
deconcentration, devolution (executive or legislative) and federalism (Mellors 
1987: p.7). Which of these three types can be applied to different countries is 
dependent on what system of local government they adopt. In the case of Greece 
the term decentralisation, initially, veered more towards deconcentration, a
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policy actively promoted by the PASOK government after it was first elected in 
the 1980s.
Deconcentration refers to the delegation of administrative authority by 
central government to public service officers working locally. However, the term 
does not automatically mean the transfer of political power and therefore, in 
principle, the decision making process can remain with the central authorities.
In contrast, devolution involves some transfer of political responsibilities 
and therefore gives scope for decision making to be passed to the lower level of 
government. This lower level body has the capacity to act as an institution of 
general government, is elected and generally exercises responsibility over 
reasonably large territorial units. The extent of their level of responsibility can 
take two terms: executive-legislative devolution. Executive devolution is where 
the central government defines the broad framework of policies and sets national 
standards but allows the lower tier to implement them. Legislative devolution 
separates the responsibilities of the upper and lower tiers so that instead of 
having joint responsibilities, the central government retains full responsibility 
for policies of national significance (for example, defence) and the lower tier is 
responsible for public policy areas (for example education).
Federalism on (the other hand) is the most powerful form of 
decentralisation. It shares some characteristics of legislative devolution in the 
distinction or responsibilities between the upper and lower level, but, in the case 
of federalism, there is a written constitution, which cannot be amended by the 
central government.
3.2.1 Centralisation
There are several arguments to be considered for and against centralisation. One 
argument often used for centralisation is the need for co-operation. Co-operation 
occurs both at the level of policy-making and its implementation. In this way 
government can ensure the compatibility of its policies so they do not contradict
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one another as well as ensuring they have jurisdiction over all policy areas 
concerned (for example, the Treasury, Home Office etc.)
A second argument is the desire for uniformity in service provision. In 
some areas such as foreign policy, transport, postal service, currency or the 
police service, a degree of uniformity is an important element to the functioning 
of the state. Similarly, uniformity in areas such as in the educational system can 
ensure the coherence of the state as a nation and the desirability of its 
continuation11. In addition, uniformity of welfare provisions (such as health care, 
housing etc) means that there is a generally accepted view that all citizens are 
entitled to equal provisions and that there is the same minimum level of 
provisions everywhere in the country.
Mellors and Copperthware raise a third argument about what they term 
an ‘in-built’ dynamism towards centralisation (ibid. p.7) in modem political 
systems. The central management of the economy, the expectations of the 
electorate and the media’s focus on national news are all sources of this 
dynamism which re-enforces centralisation.
A fourth argument, in defence of centralisation claims that central 
government can provide administrative efficiency as it is better equipped to do 
so. There is considerable doubt as to how local government could provide such 
efficient services.
Finally, modernist critiques argue that the local governments might hold 
more traditional views of society. As a result they might be closed to new ideas 
and regard change with suspicion, adopting narrow or what Byrne (1998: p.31) 
calls ‘parish pump’ attitudes and policies.
Despite all the advantages listed above, centralisation does present 
problems in the way a system functions. First, there is the argument that 
excessive centralisation has the opposite effect and that it becomes inefficient in 
terms of its administration. The bureaucratic machinery becomes too large and
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faces problems of management and co-ordination. The statement that describes 
such a situation perfectly is the one provided by the 1973 Kilbrandon 
Commission on the Constitution reporting on the highly centralised state within 
France as ‘anaemia in the extremes and apoplexy at the centre. (Mellors 1987: 
p.7)
The next problem to arise from such a high level of centralisation is that 
of remoteness. Policies made by central government alone do not necessarily 
apply to local areas. Therefore, there is always a need for the regional offices of 
most departments to either provide particular information relating to the locality 
in question or to find ways of making policy more applicable.
This leads us to the third problem, which connects to the particularities 
of the locality. That includes the needs and resources, which vary from area to 
area in every state in terms of geography (mountainous/seaside), geology 
(natural resources) and population (age, ethnicity or educational level, 
skilfulness). Standardisation or policies of uniformity under these circumstances 
are therefore unattainable goals. The issue of these variations has to be taken 
into account by the decision-makers. This variation among the different 
localities and the potential consequences in policy making will be further 
elaborated in Part III of the present thesis.
3.2.2 Decentralisation
Most arguments in support of the decentralisation of the political system 
coincide with the criticism of centralisation. Therefore, when political and 
administrative authorities are highly centralised the parliament can find it 
difficult to adequately control or scrutinise the actions of the government. In the 
UK for example, the decline of parliamentary scrutiny has been a recurrent 
theme since the 1930’s (Mellors 1987: p.8).
As has been debated in the section on local government and democracy, 
communities that are physically distant from the centre where decisions are
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taken can feel isolated and excluded from democratic procedures. This can also 
apply to socially remote, i.e. socially disadvantaged communities, where their 
voices might be heard better through a member local council than a central 
administration. In addition, a local government will be drawn from the local 
population who possesses local knowledge and a commitment to the local area 
and its people.
Local governments are multi-purpose bodies and can ensure a higher 
degree of co-ordination. That is, they respond to and implement policies from 
more than one central government department and can as a consequence, take a 
more holistic approach to public policies.
Finally, there is the environmental argument for defending 
decentralisation. A highly centralised state, with the associated increases in 
congestion, can create high levels of environmental pollution in particular areas 
which affects not only peoples’ health but also is disastrous for the natural 
environment. The main aim of the ecology movements and the joint regionalist 
movements in the 1960s and the 1970s was to deal with local issues, which they 
argued had been neglected. As Strassoldo (1992: p.35) comments, the defence of 
natural environments is closely connected with the defence of the cultural 
landscape. Ecological issues have also been used in the case of Greece, where 
Athens experiences high pollution levels. Decentralisation was suggested by the 
PASOK government as one solution to the problem.
3.3 Centre-Local relations
In part, the arguments concerning centralisation or decentralisation derive from 
centre-periphery relations and theories that developed accordingly. Most of the 
latter focus on uneven development and derive from the Marxist critique of the 
capitalist state and capitalist development. Despite originating from economic 
analysis, theories of uneven development have had also an impact on the social 
sciences. For regional studies, theories of uneven development were first 
considered during the 1950s and the 1960s when regional policy questions
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began to be raised. However, as regional disparities still exist12, some of the 
issues of uneven development theories can still be considered (Adrikopoulou, 
1995: p.24).
Central to centre-periphery relations is the role of the modem state. 
According to Brass (1985: p.3), there are three broad theories of the modem 
state. First is the view of the pluralist perspective which holds that the state is a 
neutral arena where interest group conflicts -  for example between ethnic, 
economic, gender or ecology groups -  take place. The outcome of these conflicts 
determines the particular policies adopted by the state and its agencies. These 
new policies in turn elicit responses and actions from interest groups. The state 
is, therefore, both a respondent to and participant in the demands of interest 
groups. But one quality of the state important to the pluralist theories is its 
neutrality. That is, the state is neither dominated by nor dominates the interest 
groups.
The second view is the classic Marxist theory according to which the 
state is an arena that functions as an instrument for the promotion of the interests 
of the dominant group. The state acts as a reserve power for the capitalist classes 
to control workers’ resistance, natural resources and the demands in the interest 
of capital and the mling class (Hatzimichalis 1994: p.91). In this view, both the 
central and the local interests have the same function, the preservation of the 
capitalist mode of production.
Finally, there is the view of the state’s role that comes from neo-Marxist 
theories and scholars working on core-periphery and internal colonialism 
questions. Neo-Marxist writers such as Poulantzas and Habermas attribute some 
autonomy to the role of the modem state. The main break with the classic 
Marxist theory lies with the concept of a unified ruling/dominant group. Neo- 
Marxists argue that particular groups, motivated by the wish to retain their 
power, can sometimes act against the interests of the dominant groups in order 
to achieve their objectives.
47
In the same fashion, the concepts of internal colonialism and core­
periphery relations were developed in Marxist thought in order to incorporate 
the role of ethnicity within the modem state. Briefly, in an ethnically diverse 
society, Hechter perceives a ‘cultural’ system of stratification where the core 
regions benefit from better opportunities than the dependant peripheral and 
ethnic regions. High status positions are reserved for people from the core, while 
low status positions are filled by people from the periphery. Hecher’s argument 
is based on a notion of deprived regions populated by ethnic groups different to 
those of the core regions, the former becoming internal colonies.
Naim, again pursuing the economic element, notes an imperialist quality 
to the relations between the centre and ethnically different periphery. The 
uneven development of capitalism means the advancement of some societies 
over others and is itself determined by their unequal relations. The imposition of 
development by the centre -  for its own advantage -  is met with regional 
resistance (for Naim the resistance is nationalist in nature as a reaction against 
14 foreign” domination.
An alternative to the above theories can be found in Gellner’s concept of 
uneven development. For Gellner, uneven development does not derive from 
capitalism but is a product of modernised and industrialised society. It is not 
economics but cultural relations that determine the new social structure of 
modernised society. And it is cultural and not class cleavages that can derive 
from unequal development. As he argues: ‘during the early period of 
industrialisation, entrants into the new order who are drawn from cultural and 
linguistic groups that are distant from those of the more advanced centre, suffer 
considerable disadvantages which are even greater than those of the other 
economically weak new proletarians who have the advantages of sharing he 
culture of the political and economic rulers’. (Gellner 1993, in Smith and 
Hutchinson 1994: p.69)
All these concepts have been criticised: in the case of the plural 
perspective it was their ethnocentrism, for the classical Marxist view lack of the
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complexity, and for the neo-Marxist tradition it was the limits of applicability. In 
terms of explaining the rise of the new regionalism, the first two theories are not 
so relevant as they adopt a top-down approach, and although the plural argument 
accepts the neutrality of the state, it cannot explain why particular groups 
succeed with the help of the state.
On the other hand both the neo-Marxist approach and Gellner’s 
argument that the cultural conflicts resulting from uneven development allow 
room for a fuller explanation of the conflicts within the periphery. Such conflicts 
are not necessarily economic or a direct reflection of the top-down disputes. In 
other words, any conflict, struggle or demand does not necessarily always come 
from the centre.
The above is by way of an introduction to the main arguments 
concerning central-local relations and uneven development. The critical 
consideration of these theories and their relation to the rise of the new 
regionalism, especially regarding the position of ethnic minority groups in this 
new regional concept, will be fully elaborated both in Part III of the thesis as 
well as in the chapter on the European dimension.
4. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to outline and discuss the major issues 
concerning the region, regional policy and local government. The themes that 
have been examined act as a theoretical base for Part II of the thesis on regional 
policy but also reflect the analytical approach of Part III on regional policy and 
minorities. Nevertheless, there are several conclusions that can be drawn from 
this chapter. First, regionalism is an interdisciplinary subject attracting the 
interest of economists, geographers, urban planners, anthropologists and more 
recently, political and social scientists. A new dimension to regionalism is the 
contribution of scholars of nationalism and ethnicity, incorporating the question 
of ethnicity and ethnic relations at the two levels of centre-local relations and 
interregional social interaction.
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Second, the concepts of region, regional policy and local government are 
universal and implemented by most countries. However, there is diversity in the 
historical and cultural roots in each society that has led to the development of 
different regional systems and regional politics. To approach this problem, the 
present study has included a short historical background and a typology of local 
government systems, focusing particularly on EU countries and Greece.
Third, it is often argued that an effective system of local government 
contributes to a more democratic form of national level government. Four 
aspects of ‘democratisation’ were examined: authorisation, accountability, 
responsiveness and representativeness and these will be applied to the case study 
in Part III.
Fourth, the issues of centralisation/decentralisation lie at the heart of the 
regional debate. The chapter has looked at some of the main arguments 
concerning this issue as well as the different forms of decentralisation. This 
debate became relevant during the 1980s especially with the rise of ecological 
movements. As a result of the closer integration of the European Union, regional 
policy became part of the 1990s political agenda of various states. For example, 
we saw in 1997 the introduction of devolution in the UK, and, in the beginning 
of the 1990s the restructuring of the local government system in Greece.
Finally, centre-periphery relations and uneven development were two of 
the themes developed during the 1960s in order to explain regional disparities 
and regional deprivation. The chapter has briefly examined the main theories of 
uneven development especially from the point of view of state-periphery 
relations.
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Notes
1. In the case of Western Europe ‘local self administration dates back to the 
Middle-Ages, and the development of the central bourgeois state has 
institutionalised them...(in south Europe) local experiences were there as 
well, but the development of centralised and authoritarian institutions at the 
level of the central state destroyed most of the local initiatives’ 
(Hatzimichalis 1987: p. 105)
2. Regions pre-exist the nation-state as a form of governance. It was 
nationalism that ‘broke down the various localisms of region, dialect, custom 
and clan and helped to create large and powerful nation-states, with 
centralised markets and systems of administration, taxation and education’ 
(Smith 1998: p .l)
3. In some of the literature globalisation is mentioned as a factor, but as there is 
much debate over this issue, it is more useful to talk about the promotion of 
such an idea.
4. For example the introduction and increase of structural funds for the benefit 
of the regions and not the central state.
5. This last feature is more part of the local government welfare system than of 
the clientelistic or economic growth systems, both of which will be analysed 
in the following section.
6. The only exception in Britain where both health and social security benefits 
are provided by central government departments.
7. A system often criticised as bureaucratic paternalism.
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8. The use of land is a very important issue in Greek local politics and in 
particular in Western Thrace where there is also the issue of the Muslim 
minority
9. More information on the subject of EU regional policy will be examined in a 
separate chapter.
10. In addition, supplementary procedures and institutions should also be 
accountable. This includes: the accountability of non-elected officials to 
elected ones; an independent judiciary to ensure legal accountability and 
uphold the freedoms of speech; associations upon which electoral 
accountability depends; independent accounting offices to ensure financial 
accountability; independent media with commitment to investigate 
journalism, etc.
11. Regional culture, education and local government, once they were made 
subordinate to linguistic nationalism, social security and military 
requirements, slipped away not only from realpolitik but from the academic 
study of politics. (Harvie 1994: p.34)
12. Although under different circumstances, especially with the EU dimension.
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Chapter 2
Regional Policy in Greece
1. Introduction
The issues surrounding centralisation and decentralisation have had an impact 
on Greek politics from long before Greece became a member of the European 
Union. Despite being regarded today as one of the most centralised states in the 
EU, the Greek political past was based on a highly decentralised system of 
governance with local elites having a stronghold on the country’s internal and 
external affairs.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the stages of transition of local and 
central forms of governance in Greece. The rise of clientelism and the 
strengthening of the central state are examined in relation to democratic 
procedures and centre-periphery relations. This is essential if we are to 
understand and explain the developments and problems of Western Thracian 
local politics in relation to the Muslim minority population.
The first section provides a short historical review of regionalism and 
local government in Greece. Although a decentralised form of government was 
inherited from the Ottoman past, a centralist tradition was established with the 
formation of the Greek nation-state in the 1830s and persisted until recently. The 
desire for a strong centre can be attributed to the climate of political and 
territorial insecurity that has featured until even recently in the Balkan Peninsula 
(Vemey 1994: p. 167). The Balkan wars, the Macedonian question, the Bulgarian 
occupation of Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia during the Second World 
War and the turbulent relations between Greece and Turkey were all factors that 
contributed to a strong central government in Greek political history.
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There is another reason that decentralised forms of government were 
discouraged. Clientelism has been a dominant force in Greek political life and 
despite efforts to break it up, this sort of paternalistic networking has persisted in 
the history of modem Greece. Initially a small number of local families exerted 
power by controlling local votes and networks. Gradually these traditional 
patrons were replaced, throughout the 20th century, by increasingly centralised 
forms of political structures which broadened political involvement for more 
sections of Greek society. However, clientelism persisted, merely acquiring a 
more centralised form, indicating a very weak civil society (Mouzelis 1995: 
p. 19). As a result there has never been strong public pressure to bring the central 
decision-making processes closer to the citizens or to open organised channels 
for the promotion of general demands (Vemey 1994: p. 164). Central 
government as the main decision-making mechanism retained its power until 
recently.
The second section of this chapter focuses on the contemporary changes 
in the local government system that took place during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
aim of these rapid transformations was partly to introduce a more efficient 
management of the EU structural funds and partly as an attempt to modernise 
the political system of the country.
Local government in Greece today consists of two elected tiers: the 
municipal and the prefectural, each with an elected council and budget. There is 
a third level of government, the region where a regional director is appointed by 
the state and his/her main responsibility lies in the management of the funding 
allocated to the particular region.
For the area of Western Thrace the changes in the local government 
system have brought a new dimension to Muslim/Christian relations. Although 
these implications are fully examined in Part III of the thesis, we can anticipate 
them by noting that the recent regional changes have created a new electorate 
and new opportunities for closer co-operation between the two groups.
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2. Section I: Historical review of regionalism and Local government in Greece
2.1 Short historical background
Many of the features of the modem Greek local government system originate 
either from the time of the Ottoman Empire or in the 1830s with the creation of 
the modem Greek state (Paraskevopoulos 1999: p. 101). Until the most recent 
government re-structuring, as we shall see later in the present chapter, the 
prefecture, and the first tier of government (municipality and commune) were 
the only two units of the local government system in Greece.
The concept of the commune originates from the Ottoman system of 
governance. Although there are theories tracing the existence of the commune 
system to before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, it was during this 
period that communes were allowed to function as administrative units and it 
was this particular form that was preserved and adapted by the modem Greek 
state \
From the beginning the Ottoman administrative system was based on a 
combination of central government and communal self-government 
(Kontogiorgis 1982: p.33). The communes in Ottoman Greece became a form 
of local government system. Variations in the size and functions of local 
institutions resulted from the geographical and economic conditions of each 
region as well as the special privileges granted by the Sultan to some regions. 
But in general terms, the communes were responsible for the provision of 
services such as education, water and public works, with the maintenance of 
roads being funded mainly by the collection of taxes. The communes were 
headed and administered by local governors elected by the local Muslim 
population. However, the system of electing the local governors soon 
diminished and was replaced by a hereditary post creating rich and powerful 
local elites with influence to central government.
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tilFrom the 16 century onwards the powers of the sultans started to 
decrease, a decline caused partly by the economic expansion of other Western 
European monarchical states (Mouzelis 1978: p.5)2. As a result of this decline, 
the Porte increasingly lost some of its power while local pashas (local 
potentates) gained extra hereditary rights and autonomy at the expense of both 
the state and the peasants of the particular chifliks (areas of land ownership), 
who lost the protection of the central state (ibid. p. 6).
This increasing autonomy and power of the local landed elite came to 
play a major role in the structure of the newly founded Greek state in the 1830s. 
Thus the issue of centralisation-decentralisation became a prominent feature of 
the political agenda, triggering heated debates between the ‘westemisers’ and 
the ‘traditionalists’3. Although the local land-owning class opposed the strong 
centralised state proposed by the westemisers, the latter managed to promote 
their views and led to the development of a central Greek state and 
administration (in the early 1830s). This victory was only relative as the 
traditionalists were still able to use the new system to their advantage and 
safeguard their interests (ibid. p.14)4.
Despite such drawbacks, the institutional framework promoted by both 
Prime Minister I. Capodistrias5 (1828-31) and King Otto (1833-62) was based 
on the notion of a unitary central state with a national army, national educational 
system and common economic policy and planning. The management of local 
affairs was handled by a newly introduced system of prefectural and provincial 
levels of government. Both levels functioned as an extension of central 
government administration over the various regions (sub-national units) and 
were headed by state-appointed prefects and heads of the provinces.
Furthermore, in 1833 the municipality was introduced as a new - first tier 
- unit of local government. Administratively the municipality comprised more 
than one commune. This new system in effect absorbed and replaced the 
traditional communes. The aim of both the prefectural and municipal systems
56
was essentially to restrict the power and autonomy of the local elites 
(Paraskevopoulos 1999: p. 104).
The system of municipalities did not survive in its original form. Instead, 
in an attempt to modernise the system of local government in 1912, Venizelos6 
re-established the communes as part of the first tier level of local self- 
government. As a consequence, the 442 municipalities that existed at the end of 
the 19th century were gradually replaced -although not completely abolished- by
6,000 communes (Makrydemetris 1997: p.66).
Until the recent changes of 1990s, discussed later in the chapter, the first 
tier of local government in Greece continued to be based on the municipality- 
commune system of 1912. This was in contrast to other western European states 
which in seeking to modernise their local government had introduced local 
government reforms during the 1970s (Vemey, Papageorgiou 1993: p.l 10).
The secondary, prefectural level of government on the other hand has 
retained the same general features for almost 150 years. Some of these features 
include the state appointment of the prefect, his/her obligation to scrutinise 
municipal decisions combined with the power to reject them and the 
responsibility to manage the public organisations within the domain. Further, the 
role of the prefect remained the same during this period: namely his/her political 
role continued to be pivotal to the maintenance of the central government power 
(Christophilopoulou 1997: p.39) -  a point which will be highlighted in the 
following sections of the chapter. In this way it can be argued that the prefecture 
which included the prefectural council, became one of the most constant 
institutions of state administration (Makrydemetris 1997: p. 66).
The next important development of the local and prefectural 
governments was the introduction of the 3200/55 law. The traumatic experiences 
of the Civil War in 1946-49 had left a deeply divided Greek society and the 
succeeding post-Civil War governments made great efforts to demobilise the 
population, a large portion of which had been radicalised by the communist-
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dominated resistance of the Second World War (Vemey 1994: p. 168). All the 
policies that followed took this factor into serious consideration.
It should be noted that the short-lived formation of the PEEA (Politiki 
Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleutherosis -  Political Committee of National Liberation), 
also known as the ‘mountain-govemment’, in 1944 proposed a code of local 
self-government as a vital part of public life7. This reflected their ideological 
belief of ‘government by the people’. As PEEA was never recognised as a 
legitimate government, the post-Civil War governments ignored this proposed 
structure for a local government system.
As a result, the general trend towards local government during this 
period was to keep it as weak as possible and gradually increase the level of 
state intervention over local affairs (the top-down approach). The 3200/1955 law 
of prefectural administration sought to reinforce (further) the position of the 
prefect as an extension of central government in all localities. The prefect 
became responsible for issues in his/her area such as education, religious 
matters, economics, industry and commerce, transport and public services, 
agriculture, employment and social welfare. Policies of national importance 
such as defence, foreign or general economic policies were, however, exempt as 
they were the province of central government. A prefectural budget for the 
funding of public services was allocated to each prefecture. Finally, the law 
governing the establishment of prefectural councils ensured the character or role 
of these councils was only advisory.
The strengthening of the prefect’s position affected the status of the 
municipality and the commune, both of which continued to be publicly elected 
bodies of local self-government. Their limited activities such as street cleaning, 
rubbish collection and the care of cemeteries, were subject to central control, and 
all of their decisions had to be approved by the prefect.
Although this arrangement had been in force since 1833, prefectural 
control was most vigorously8 applied during the 1950s and 1960s as a means of
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controlling left-wing mayors (Vemey 1994: p. 169). As a result, the prefect had 
the power to prevent the implementation of any municipal/commune decision 
and to discipline a mayor by imposing a temporary suspension from his/her 
duties (ibid.). The predominant ideology of the post-Civil War governments was 
therefore to establish an ‘apolitical’ local government. To achieve this, the 
succeeding governments tightened the prefectural supervision of local 
authorities (Paraskevopoulos 1999: p. 105).
During the military dictatorship (1967-1974), central state control 
became even tighter. The colonels, as part of their policy of direct control and 
economic development, created a ‘political super-structure which was designed 
to deal more effectively with the rising social discontent’ (Mouzelis 1978: 
p. 128). These changes together with the extreme anti-Communist ideology of 
the dictators penetrated all aspects of Greek society.
In the case of local government, complete state control was imposed. The 
elected local councils were abolished and replaced with government appointed 
mayors (Vemey, Papageorgiou 1993: p.112). As a consequence the slightest 
possibility for left wing or general public opposition to the government was 
effectively eliminated. As will be seen in the following section this highly 
centralised state was to be inherited by the post-dictatorship democratic 
governments.
In summary, therefore, centralisation of the state in Greece was the 
primary desire and objective of Greek governments from the time of the first 
Greek governor Capodistrias. But the highly fragmented, newly established 
Greek state presented a society with deep social divisions that were also 
reflected in the ideological trends at the time. The structure of centralisation and 
local self-government inaugurated in 1833 remained the same in principle until 
the 1970s.
Due to the general political, social and economic climate during these 
years the introduction and the later strengthening of the prefectural institution
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was perceived both as an effective measure for the dissemination of the central 
power and also as a sufficient control over the various localities. Subsequently, 
factors such as political instability, autonomy of the local land-owning elite 
especially in the early years, the outbreak of many wars (i.e. the Balkan, Greek- 
Turkish, the First and Second World Wars and the Greek Civil War, 1946-49), 
the territorial expansion of the Greek state and the military dictatorship have 
contributed to a weak local government system in Greece.
During the last two centuries a top-down, centralist approach has existed 
in the Greek administrative structure. Demands for an increase in the powers of 
the existing first tier or for the introduction of a second tier have been few. 
Instead, the weakening of centre-periphery relations was often perceived as a 
threat to Greek territorial integrity (Vemey 1994: p. 167) and local government 
was seen as standing in opposition to the existing governments.
3. Section II: Contemporary changes in Greek local government system
3.1 1974-1994
The fall of the military dictatorship in 1974 marked the re-establishment of 
democracy in Greece and particular efforts were made to prepare the country to 
be fully integrated into the European Economic Community (EEC). There was 
an evident need for the improvement of economic, political and cultural 
institutions to bring them into line with western European standards.
Local government was one of the areas particularly neglected, as its 
democratic representation had been silent for almost seven years. The post­
dictatorship period brought rapid developments to both the prefectural 
administration and the first tier of local self-government, the municipalities and 
communes. Three phases can be distinguished in this period during which local 
government reforms took place: the period between 1974 to 1981 when a limited 
number of hesitant reforms were introduced; 1981-1994 when rapid changes
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were introduced during a transition period for local government; and finally 
1994 until today when the previous reforms began to materialise.
During the first phase, the new ND government (ND: New Democracy, 
the Greek conservative party) took office immediately after the collapse of the 
dictatorship and stayed in power until 1981. The new government had inherited 
-  as we have seen -  a very weak system of local government. In addition to the 
administrative weakness, the first tier (municipality and commune) had been 
considerably underfunded. This financial crisis also continued through the 
period following the fall of dictatorship. According to Tsatsos, cited in Vemey, 
the state budget attributed to local government was 11% in 1965 but declined to 
6.6% in 1978. By 1981 less than 5% of the state budget went to the first tier. 
Comparing this figure with other EC states, Greek scores are remarkably low: 
Belgium spent 13.9% in 1983, UK spent 33.1% in 1983 and Denmark 70.8% in 
1984 (Tsatsos cited in Vemey 1994: p.169)
Despite this, the government reluctantly proceeded towards 
decentralisation. Although the new constitution of 1975 made provisions for the 
introduction of a new tier in local government, the ND government limited its 
reforms to the reintroduction of the pre-dictatorship system (ibid. p. 168). One 
consequence of this was that the prefect was restored to his/her previous status 
of a ‘quasi-civil servant’, chosen by the government from a list of candidates on 
the basis of specific criteria for their appointment and evaluation 
(Paraskevopoulos 1999: p. 106).
In the case of the first tier, certain reforms were implemented with the 
introduction of a new municipal code in 1980. For some sectors such as welfare 
provisions or cultural facilities, the first tier assumed equal responsibility with 
central state decision-makers (Vemey 1994: p. 170). In addition there was an 
attempt to manage the highly fragmented local government system by allowing 
the voluntary merger of local government units, although few did so (ibid.). 
However, these were but the first steps towards the effective modernisation of
61
local government. In comparison to other EC member states at the time, Greece 
still remained a highly centralised state.
In 1981 two major events came to play an important role in the 
development of the local government system in Greece: entry into the EC whose 
policies were increasingly towards greater regionalism in economic, political 
and administrative levels, and the coming to power of PASOK (the socialist 
party). Decentralisation became a primary objective of PASOK’s agenda and 
formed part of a greater democratisation programme9. The new government 
proceeded with reforms at both the prefectural and first tier levels. In general, 
this phase can be characterised as a transitional period for the rapid changes and 
radical transformations that followed after 1994.
In 1982 the government introduced the 1235/82 law according to which 
the position of the prefect remained a government appointment. In addition the 
prefectural councils (first formed in 1955) were reintroduced and their main 
function, as before, remained advisory10. Their role, however, now also included 
responsibility for the approval of the prefectural budget fund (Vemey, 
Papageorgiou 1993: p .l 12). Another important change took place with regard to 
the composition of the prefectural councils. Instead of being formed of civil 
servants, under the new law membership of the prefectural council consisted of 
local government representatives, two representatives from the Local 
Association of Municipalities and Communes (TEDK: Topikes Enoseis Dimon 
kai Koinotiton), and elected members of professional organisations, agricultural 
co-operatives and labour organisations (Paraskevopoulos 1999: p. 108).
Further modernisation also took place in the first tier o f local government 
which was given the opportunity to form municipal enterprises for more 
effective management of its resources together with an increase in the overall 
budget allocated for local government (Vemey 1994: pl71). Most important of 
all was the abolition of the prefect’s right to intervene in the first tier decisions. 
This was followed by members of the first tier being given the right to 
participate in the prefectural councils. These changes however provided only
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limited autonomy for the first tier as the prefect continued to check the legality 
of their decisions and could as a consequence intervene in municipal or 
communal affairs (ibid.).
During the 1980s the European Community (EC) introduced the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) -  special funds for southern 
Europe. Greece, then still a highly centralised state, was ‘confronted with the 
task of implementing the increasingly complex EU policy based on principles 
such as planning and partnership, which entailed substantial regional and local 
involvement in policy-making and policy implementation (Ioakimidis 1996: 
p.43). The task of further decentralisation therefore became a necessity.
In 1986, under 1622/86 law, to comply with the IMPs a new 
decentralised third level of government -  the regional level - was created, 
consisting of 13 geographically defined regions11. Administratively, the regions 
were headed by a Secretary General appointed (or dismissed) directly by the 
central government. Regional councils were also introduced, their membership 
formed from the prefect of each separate prefecture12 plus one representative of 
the Local Association of Municipalities and Communes in each prefecture 
(Paraskevopoulos 1999: p. 110)
Within the framework of such changes, demands were raised for further 
decentralisation at the prefectural level. Law 1622/86 enabled the creation of an 
elected second tier of local government, the prefectural local authorities, but this 
section was not implemented until 1994. In the meanwhile, a change of 
government took place and a coalition government of ND and Synaspismos 
(Synaspismos: a coalition of the left and progressive forces) was formed in 
1990. Later in the same year ND won the elections outright and the 
decentralisation process stopped13.
The reluctance of ND for further changes in local government can be 
explained by the fact that the party relied on a more traditional clientelistic 
network (based on the appointment rather than election of the prefect). In
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addition ND lacked both support and influence in the first tier of local 
government. (Christophilopoulou 1997: p.52).
Despite these drawbacks, the level of decentralisation achieved during 
the 1980s allowed for greater participation of the local/regional authorities in the 
monitoring of committees and councils. The process of policy-making still 
remained the main role of the central government. The implementation of such 
policies now required a degree of partnership with local government that made 
the latter more active in wider public policy matters. In addition, the 
local/regional authorities were able to form a closer connection with European 
institutions and equivalent local or regional bodies (Ioakimidis 1996: p.42). In 
this respect, it can be argued that the 1980s and early 1990s marked a 
transitional period for the further participation that followed.
To summarise these developments, the following Diagram 1 shows the 
structure of the local/regional government before the introduction of laws 
2218/1994 and 2240/1994, both of which will be examined, in the next section.
64
Diagram 1: Regional and Local Government in Greece prior to laws 2218/1994 and
2240/1994
Regional Level 13 regions
Regional Council Secretary General 
of the Region 
(appointed)
2nd Tier of Local 
Government
54 Prefectures
Prefectural councils 
(appointed and only advisory)
Prefect (appointed)
1st Tier of Local 
Government
457 Municipalities
Municipal Council Municipal
Committee
Mayor
(elected)
5318 Communes
Communal
Council
Chairman of the 
Community 
Council (elected)
Source: Committee of Regions
website: http://195.200.108.36/qrcea4 en.pdf accessed on June 2001
There was only one highly fragmented tier of local government 
consisting of 447 municipalities and 5318 communes. Moreover, despite the 
then-recent reforms for greater autonomy, both units were under the partial 
control of the prefect who had the power to check their decision making process. 
Directly above the first tier stood the decentralised level of prefecture, with 54 
prefectures in total and headed by the state appointed prefect. Finally, the new 
level of regions was introduced, also headed by a state appointed secretary- 
general whose functions were mainly the management of the EC funds such as 
IMPs.
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It can be observed therefore, that by the end of 1980s Greece was still a 
highly centralised state and the steps undertaken to create greater 
decentralisation had been carried out reluctantly. In fact, the entry of the country 
into the EC was the determining factor in all the local government reforms that 
followed. This connection between the Greek decentralisation process and the 
role of the EC will be more fully explored in the following chapter, but, in brief, 
the few changes that were introduced during this period helped prepare the 
ground for the rapid changes that followed during the 1990s.
3.2 From the 1994 to the present day
This period represents the third phase of decentralisation in Greece following the 
fall of the dictatorship. In 1993 PASOK won the elections and proceeded almost 
immediately to introduce a decentralisation programme that from 1994 to 1997 
covered all three levels of local government: region, prefecture and the first tier. 
Diagram 2 fully illustrates a summary of the changes that occurred.
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Diagram 2: Regional and Local government in Greece since laws 2218/1994 and
2240/1994
Regional Level 13 regions
Regional Council Secretary General 
of the Region
2nd Tier of Local 
Government
51 Prefectures
Prefectural
Council
Prefectural
Committee
Prefect
1st Tier of Local 
Government
900 Municipalities
Municipal
Council
Municipal
Committee
Mayor
133 Communes
Communal
Council
Chairman of the
Community
Council
Source: Committee of Regions
website: http://195.200.108.36/qrce en.pdf accessed on June 2001
3.2.1 Second tier o f local government
The first reform the PASOK government introduced involved the formation of a 
second tier of local government (prefectural self-government). As seen above, 
law 1622/1986 was the basis for such reforms but as it was not fully 
implemented, the government additionally introduced laws 2218/1994 and 
2294/1994 to cover the creation of the second tier in local government.
Following the new proposals the existing form of the prefecture was 
replaced by an elected second tier of local government, which consisted of the 
prefect, the prefectural council and the prefectural committees. The prefect and 
the prefectural councils were both elected directly by the local electorate every
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four years, whilst the members of the prefectural committee were elected by the 
prefectural council every two years.
The majority of the functions of the elected prefect and prefectural 
council remained the same as before. All the duties previously undertaken by the 
state appointed prefect such as planning and regional development, agriculture, 
tourism, social welfare and health, transport, culture and education were 
transferred to the newly formed second tier. Excepted were those duties 
connected to the Ministries of National Security and Defence, Economics, 
Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Further, the second tier was enabled 
to make its own decisions on matters concerning its internal structure and 
personnel.
In addition to the development of a second tier in local government, law 
2240/94 introduced a special category of enlarged prefectures (dievrimenes 
nomarchies), one for the region of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace and 
the other for the metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki. The aim of 
these units was to merge groups of prefectures for the better management of 
resources14. As we shall see in a later section of the present chapter, the creation 
of the enlarged prefectures was met with opposition by the Muslim minority in 
Western Thrace who held that it created a Christian population majority and 
thereby excluded the possibility of Muslim representation.
A third development was the abolition of any intervention by the prefect 
regarding the decisions taken by the municipalities or communes. The 
provisions of law 2240/94 abolished the hierarchical relationship between the 
first tier and the previous prefectures. The total separation of any hierarchical 
control between the two tiers was also accompanied by their financial 
independence. Prior to the 1994 reforms the financial function of the prefectures 
had involved the distribution of funds provided by the Peripheral Public 
Investment Programme and the administrative control of the first tier budget. 
After 1994, the funds attributed to the second tier included revenue from taxes, 
various charges, income from property and a specific annual transfer from the
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central state for existing central state functions. A second source of revenue 
derived from loans or specific funds from the EU (Paraskevopoulos 1999: 
pp.l 19-120).
3.2.2 Regional level
As already described the 13 administrative regions were established by law 
1622/1986 as a measure (and EU pre-requisite) for an effective management of 
EU funding. This structure remains the same today and regions function as 
central administrative units for regional planning and development. Following 
the 1994 reforms to the second tier, the region became the only decentralised 
form of state administration.
Law 2503/1997 provided for further development of the regions and as 
in the past the regional secretary was appointed directly by the state as the head 
of each region representing both the state and the government. This however did 
not take the form of control, as had previously been the case with the prefects, 
since the regional secretary had no control or supervisory role over either the 
first or second tiers (Chlepas 1997: p. 129). The regions (as with law 1622/86) 
are also governed by a regional council whose members include representatives 
from the first and second tier of local government, and representatives of 
professional organisations.
3.2.3 First tier local government
The next significant step towards greater decentralisation took place in the first 
tier of local government with the introduction of the ‘I. Capodistrias’ 
Programme in 1997. The programme symbolically carried the name of the first 
governor of the independent Greek state whose vision it was to create the 
administrative organisation of the newly founded Greek state.
The main task of the new legislation was to put an end to the extremely 
fragmented local government. As we can see in Diagram 1, the first tier
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consisted of 457 municipalities and 5,318 communes. As Vemey argues, 
perhaps the greatest obstacle to the development of an effective first tier was its 
extreme decentralisation (Vemey 1994: p. 169). This was also the position 
assumed by the government who argued that under the existing system the first 
tier was unable to fulfil its political, administrative and developmental role. The 
government identified the cmcial need for reform: ‘In order to achieve a more 
rational administrative organisation and to adjust the institutional framework to 
recent experience and the administrative and developmental requirements of 
modem Greek society, one may suggest the specialisation of the specific types 
of primary level local authories’15
Following the approval of the Programme, the new municipalities were 
formed by the merging of communes. The institution of a commune was not 
completely abolished but limited in number. As we can see in Diagram 2 the 
number of municipalities increased to 900 and the number of communes 
decreased to 133. The first tier (municipality and commune) became responsible 
for local affairs, having as its prime objective the social and economic 
development of the inhabitants as well as the protection of their culture. Funding 
for the new municipalities and communes came from three sources: central 
individual resources (CIR), local government (CDLG) and interest-free loans to 
be made to the local authorities (I. Capodistrias Programme 1997: p. 10)
Diagram 2 also highlights the structure of the first tier showing how the 
municipalities are governed by three bodies. The first of these is the municipal 
council, a decision making body, which consists of 11 to 41 members 
(depending on the size of municipality) who are elected every four years directly 
by the electorate. The second is the municipal committee, which consists of two 
to six members and is chaired by the mayor. The main tasks of the municipal 
committee include setting the budget, auditing the end of the year accounts and 
the management and adjudication of all public sales. In addition to this the 
mayor has responsibility for the implementation of decisions taken by the 
municipal council and committee. The mayor is directly elected and required to 
sit in the council meetings but cannot vote for/against any decisions taken.
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The communes consist of two elected elements: the community council 
and the chairman of the council. The community council comprises seven to 
eleven members (depending on the commune’s size) and is directly elected by 
the local electorate for a specific term. As in the case of the municipal council 
the community council is also a decision making body headed by a chair who is 
elected from the council itself. The second element, the chairman of the 
community council, represents the community and implements the decisions 
taken by the community council. The community chairman also heads the unit 
dealing with communal services.
All the new reforms of the two tiers of local government and the regional 
level introduced during the 1990s are still in force today. To recap, the 
devolution process in Greece took its most radical form after 1995. For the first 
time in the history of modem Greece, the introduction of laws 2218/94 and 
2240/94 established a second tier of local government with the prefects and 
prefectural councils directly elected by the populace. For the first tier the above 
laws provided autonomy by abolishing the right of the prefect to intervene. Most 
important, the Capodistrias programme aimed at modernising the first tier by 
reducing its existing fragmentation. Finally, to a lesser degree some changes 
occurred at the regional level. The 13 regions were constituted as the only 
decentralised form of government and the introduction of law 2503/1997 
allowed for some administrative reorganisation while strengthening their role as 
development units.
3.3 Clientelism
Before proceeding to the next section it is worth re-examining the development 
of clientelism in Greek society and the role it played in the structure of local 
government and local politics in general. The term ‘clientelism’ refers to the 
existence of powerful patrons who have the ability to intervene in public affairs 
and as a consequence influence state policy.
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According to Mouzelis, in Greece unlike other western European 
societies, the interaction between the state and interest groups was based more 
on personal grounds than collective ones. Looking at the political development 
of modem Greece, three phases can be distinguished (Mouzelis 1995: p. 18-19) 
during each of which different forms of clientelistic networks have been present.
To recap from chapter 1, the first of these phases began in the middle of 
the 19th century and lasted until 1909. The main characteristic of this period was 
the existence of a small number of powerful families of notables able to 
influence lower class voting. The political parties participating in the system 
were unorganised and led by potentates closely connected to regional clienteles.
The second phase started in the 1909 and lasted until the fall of military 
dictatorship in 1974. The rise to power of the E. Venizelos Liberal Party in 1910 
involved the centralisation of the political structure and broadening out political 
participation in an attempt to break the power possessed by these families. 
Despite these moves the clientelistic character of the Greek political parties 
remained in place throughout this period.
The third phase coincided with PASOK’s rise to power. This was the 
first time that a broad-based ruling party organisation existed whose branches 
reached out as far as small villages. Its existence made a wider membership 
possible whilst at the same time further centralising the party structure. 
Traditional clienteles lost their support as new and educated party members 
gradually replaced them. However, the personalistic/particularistic element in 
Greek politics was strengthened by a more populist form of organisation. This 
situation was not exclusive to PASOK and was also reflected in the structure of 
ND party.
The persistence of clientelism in the Greek society has also influenced 
the development of the local government system. As was highlighted earlier, 
even from the beginning of the modem Greek state centralism was favoured as a 
means of decreasing the local potentates power. Hence the introduction of a
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prefecture in order to extend state control to all local areas, and the formation of 
municipalities as a new unit of local government.
In 1912, Venizelos, as part of his modernisation programme reintroduced 
the unit of commune. Such change brought with it partial decentralisation and a 
considerable fragmentation of the political system at the regional level 
(Makrydemetris 1997: p.66). The power of the local clienteles however persisted 
throughout the century with their continuing influence on both local and central 
administration.
The increasing power of the prefect perpetuated the situation where 
clientelistic networks play an important role. For example, even until 1994 the 
prefect made the decisions concerning the provision of services and the 
distribution of the funds, as they were transferred downwards by the central 
government. Often, prefectures were used as political channels, exerting 
pressure, to cope with local needs (Paraskevopoulos 1999: p. 105). This sort of 
clientelism can be associated with the second phase described above where 
central government bodies also functioned in accordance with the demands of 
the local clienteles. Further, the authority embodied in the prefect (after 1955) 
gave him even tighter control over the first tier as a means of controlling left 
wing local councils. In this situation, the expansion of political clientelism 
became connected to the mechanisms of state repression (ibid.).
The rise to power of PASOK in 1981, did not put an end to the 
clientelistic networks, but merely transferred them from the personal to party 
level. The changes that followed highlight this new trend. With the introduction 
of law 1235/82 prefectural councils were created as intermediate levels between 
the central administration and local interest groups. However, in reality the 
prefectural councils served to strengthen the party organisations as most of the 
local organisations created were controlled by PASOK. As a result PASOK 
succeeded in eliminating ND clienteles (Christophilopoulou 1997: p.49)
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Finally, it can be argued the 1994 reforms followed by the Capodistrias 
programme have led to both the further modernisation of the Greek 
administration system and the gradual reduction of clientelism that is so well 
rooted in Greek society. The resulting distribution of power among the three 
levels of the administrative system is considered by many to be the most 
appropriate for the revival of Greece’s political system.
3.4 Decentralisation and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace.
Issues concerning the Muslim minority of Western Thrace are analysed in detail 
in Part II of the thesis. Furthermore, Part III concentrates on the current issues of 
decentralisation and their effect on Christian/Muslim relations in the area. This 
section therefore can act as a short introduction to these themes.
To give a brief overview, the Muslim minority became part of the Greek 
state when Western Thrace was incorporated into Greece. The Muslim minority 
is composed of three ethnic groups: the Turks, Pomaks and the Muslim Rom. 
Their existence and religious identity is determined and protected by the 
Lausanne Treaty (1923). Increasingly, from the 1960s onwards, Muslim 
demands for self-determination as a ‘Turkish-ethnic minority’ surfaced reaching 
their peak in the beginning of the 1990s.
The highly centralised Greek state left little room for Muslim 
representation and participation within the local society before the introduction 
of the 1994 reforms. Although representation existed at a national level, the lack 
of a second tier of local government combined with the weak first tier had 
deprived the Muslim population of a forum within which to raise their concerns 
or exert their opinion on local affairs. The Christian population on the other 
hand desired such centralisation as for them it represented a means to gain 
greater security, especially from the perceived Turkish threat. This sense of 
centralisation alone serves as an indicator of the tentative situation existing prior 
to the 1994 local government reforms.
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Many of the Muslim minority issues were directly connected with having 
an appointed prefect with the power to approve or dismiss particular decisions or 
demands. To give one example, the appointment of teachers for the Muslim 
minority schools was at the discretion of the prefect. It is therefore interesting to 
note that many Muslim teachers despite being Greek citizens, because they 
received their training and degree in Turkey, used to find it difficult to be 
appointed to teaching positions in Muslim schools of Western Thrace 
(Anagnostou 1999: p.221).
The introduction of the second tier in 1994 was met with much resistance 
from the local society of Western Thrace. Christian opposition was focused on 
the weakening of the state caused by decentralisation and the increased 
possibility for the election of a Muslim prefect in the area of Rhodopi (see the 
relevant literature in Part HI). Conversely the establishment of the enlarged 
prefectures only served to arouse Muslim suspicions that this was just a measure 
to limit Muslim second tier representation.
These were the initial reactions to the proposals. However, the 
establishment of the second tier and the modernisation of the first tier appear to 
have encouraged closer links between the Christian and Muslim communities. 
As we shall see in greater detail in Part III, the interviews that were conducted 
during the summer of 2001 as part of this thesis confirm this trend as both 
Christians and Muslims expressed the view that the multiethnic character of the 
region was an asset for cultural development.
5. Conclusion
The present chapter has concentrated on Greek regionalism from the formation 
of the modem Greek state in 1833 till today. An historical review has revealed 
why such a centralised state developed and how it was that on the eve of the 
country’s entry to the EC, Greece was characterised as the most centralised 
member-state with an old fashioned administrative system.
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In fact the lack of more than one elected local government bodies has led 
to an inability in Greece to receive and effectively manage EC funds. Therefore, 
at the beginning of the 1980’s the government of PASOK in response to the EC 
challenge introduced the first regional reforms and established thirteen 
administrative regions that remain in the same form today.
The 1980s in general became a transformation period between the 
previous era of centralisation and the rapid reforms that were to follow during 
the 1990s. Apart from these regional reforms, further measures were introduced 
for the modernisation of the administrative system, thereby strengthening the 
first tier by the partial abolition of prefectural control, the creation of prefectural 
councils and preparation for the establishment of the second tier.
It was during the 1990s however, that more rapid reforms took place. 
First, a second tier of government was created with the election of prefectures 
and prefectural councils. Second the regions acquired a better defined 
framework and their developmental role was upgraded. Third, with the 
introduction of the Capodistrias programme in 1997, the first tier became a more 
autonomous and more unified level of local government.
As has already been commented, clientelism has been a persistent feature 
in the Greek political system since the 1830s. Although taking different forms, 
from a more personalistic to a more party-oriented force, it was never eliminated 
from the Greek political and social landscape. The reforms that took place from 
1994 onwards aimed at introducing a more modernised western European form 
of administration and the elimination of clienteles. The success or failure of 
these reforms will depend on future political developments.
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Notes
1. There is some controversy over the origins of the Greek commune under the 
Ottoman rule. Some theories argue that the communes are descended from 
the autonomous Greek city or Roman imperial system. Other theories claim 
that the commune system originated in the Byzantine period. Despite the 
integrity of such arguments, the theories have often served the dominant 
ideologies in modem Greece, which had attempted to glorify and Hellenize 
the commune under Ottoman rule, while remaining sceptical of the idea of 
decentralised organisation, (Kontogiorgis 1982: p.75). Another view 
concerning the origins of the Greek commune is highlighted by Zakynthinos 
who held that the Greek commune was developed to serve as a means for the 
people to preserve their religious and national identity under the Turkish 
administration. As Zakynthinos argues ‘for the Greeks of the Turkish period 
the commune was not only an embryonic social and political organism, it 
was also a means of self-presentation’ (Zakynthinos 1976: p.64).
2. The expanded European states in an effort to strengthen their economies 
gained some favourable terms for trading with the Ottoman Empire which 
increased with the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman economy. The new 
agricultural demands, along with the lack of technological advancement, 
further weakened the authority of the Porte while bringing about some 
restructuring in the system of land ownership. As a consequence local 
landowners gained increased power. (Mouzelis 1978: p.5-6)
3. These were the two ideological trends representing the diverse interests of 
the various groups in the newly founded Greek state which were also present 
in pre-revolutionary Greece. The ‘westemisers’ drew their support mainly 
from diaspora intelligentsia and aspired to create an independent Greek state 
structured according to western European standards. Conversely, the 
traditionalists expressed the views of the local land-owning class who after 
the revolution hoped to maintain their previous social position by continuing 
the Ottoman system. The divisions between the two groups were deep and
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permeated in all aspects of Greek society including debates over monarchy, 
land ownership, identity and culture. The modem/traditional conflict is, as 
we shall see in the second part of the thesis, still present as far the Greek 
identity is concerned. For an in-depth analysis of this division, see 
Diamandouros 1983.
4. The traditionalists were also discreetly encouraged by the British and French 
ministers who did not favour the pro-Russian foreign policy followed by 
Capodistrias -see next footnote. (Stavrianos: p.291)
5. Ioannis Capodistrias was the first elected Greek Prime Minister. He was a 
Greek from the island of Corfu but had previously served as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs for the Tsar in Russia. His main aim was to create a strong 
central Greek state. His aspirations however were in opposition to the 
interests of the local elites to the extent that they cost him his life. He was 
assassinated in 1831 by members of a powerful local family (Clogg 1995: 
pp.45-48)
6. Modernisation was not the only reason for the re-introduction of the 
commune system. The municipalities became a stronghold of pro-monarchy 
opponents and evidently posed a threat to Venizelos’ power as a Prime 
Minister (Paraskevopoulos 1999: p. 104)
7. The PEEA was formed in March 1944 and lasted until November of the 
same year. In August 1944, the PEEA voted for and produced a concise 
‘constitution of EAM resistance’ which determined public policy in Greece 
(Papagiannis 1994: p .ll) . Part of this constitution was the code for self- 
government that aimed to lay down the principles of Greek local 
administration. The local government of Greece was to be divided into three 
administrative regions: the municipality-commune on the first tier, the 
province on the second tier and the region on the third. The third tier would 
have acted as a decentralised form of government with PEEA appointed 
regional officials. For the second and third tier of local government, the
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councils and heads would have been elected directly from the people (ibid. 
p. 13). This proposed system bears close similarities to the present system of 
local government as will be seen later.
8. The predominant aim of the post-Civil War governments was the restriction 
of communism both internal and external, which had until then limited any 
efforts made for the reconstruction of the civil society (Clogg 1955: p. 154). 
Local government was but one example of this ideological trend. In 1958 the 
party of the EDA (the United Democratic Left Party) which was supported 
by the outlawed and exiled Communist party, won enough votes to be 
elected as the official opposition party (ibid. p. 162). As a result, local 
government as a body of popular participation -  and potential forum for left 
wing politics - was kept as weak as possible out of fear of the expansion of 
communism.
9. Decentralisation was however not only an objective for the PASOK 
government but was also a requirement of the EC as we shall see in more 
detail in the following chapter. During this time, PASOK opposed Greece’s 
entry to the EC. Commitment to decentralisation was therefore promoted as 
part of the Socialist Party agenda (Vemey 1994: p. 170)
10. The advisory role allows the members of the councils to propose specific 
public sector projects for their constituency and give their opinion on 
cultural and social sector affairs (Vemey, Papageorgiou 1993: p. 112)
11. The thirteen regions included: Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Central 
Macedonia, Western Macedonia, Thessaly, Epims, Ionian Islands, Western 
Greece, Sterea Ellada, Peloponnese, Attica, the Northern Aegean Islands, the 
Southern Aegean Islands and Crete.
12. For example, in the area of East Macedonia and Thrace, the regional council 
would consist of the three prefects from the area of Thrace and the two 
prefects of the area of Eastern Macedonia.
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13. Decentralisation was vital as part of the Europeanization process. The lack of 
a second tier of local government created difficulties for the country’s 
participation in the Committee of Regions (CoR). However, as highlighted 
by Christophilopoulou, an extraordinary coincidence allowed Greece’s 
participation without the requirement for any further changes. The 
translation of the European document refers to representatives of local 
government and regional administration instead of the term ‘regional self- 
government’, which is the exact translation from the English term ‘regional 
authorities’, and the French term ‘collectivites regionales’ 
(Christophilopoulou 1997: p.52). It is worth noting that more traditionalist 
members of both PASOK and ND hesitated with the concept of further 
decentralisation while the more modernist section of both parties supported 
it (ibid. pp.52-53)
14. The enlarged prefectures consist of the president and the council. The 
president is elected directly from the local electorate in the same elections 
for the second tier. The council consists of all the members of the prefectural 
councils (Chlepas 197: p. 126).
15. This quotation is from the official document: ‘Ioannis Capodistrias’ 
Programme, (Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation, 1997: p.2)
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Chapter 3
Regional Policy: the European Dimension
1. Introduction
The following chapter focuses on the way European regional policy has been 
shaped since the establishment of the EEC/EC/EU1. Regional policy and 
regional funding are examined first, with reference to the Greek regional and 
local government restructuring and, second, with regard to the influence these 
have had both on the area of Western Thrace and Muslim/Christian relations. 
Some of the issues raised here are further elaborated in Part III of the thesis.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the 
main events that have occurred during the short history of European integration 
and led to an established regional policy. Although regional disparities were 
recognised at the time of the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the EEC, it was 
not until later that a more comprehensive plan for a European regional policy 
emerged. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) represents this 
more organised effort. As membership increased, the need for further action to 
tackle regional differences became more evident.
It was not until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that the 
Committee of Regions (CoR) was established as one of the main bodies to 
promote the interests of the various regions of the member-states. The CoR was 
accompanied by structural funds, which were distributed to the regions most 
needing modernisation. Although CoR has an advisory role, it has become a 
forum for all the European regions and their policy agendas.
The task of any European regional programme is difficult and has not 
been without its critics given the lack of common regional systems across the
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European member-states. In fact, there is a diversity of regional/local 
government systems ranging from highly centralised systems to federal ones. 
Most countries during the 1990s introduced new systems or added new 
components to their existing regional/local governments in order to manage their 
structural funds in a more effective way.
In Greece, decentralisation can be considered as part of a general 
Europeanization process as show below on page 92. In 1981 Greece entered the 
EC but membership was a controversial issue, and this was reflected both in the 
political parties and in public opinion. Due to international developments 
together with the prospect of Greece receiving generous EC funding, Greek 
political parties became more pro-European as did public opinion.
The modernization of Greek political structures and public 
administration has, however, proved to be a difficult task. The cultural division 
between the modernizers and the traditionalists in the Greek political parties 
(and Greek society in general) has constrained the Europeanization process. 
Decentralisation, which coincided with the wider Europeanization process, has 
taken place in Greece to some extent (see chapter 2) and provided a modernised 
regional/local government. Despite the obstacles and limitations, greater 
regionalism has had positive effects as a system of management and 
administration and as a channel for furthering inter-European/inter-regional 
relations.
For the area of Western Thrace, Greece’s membership of the EU has 
been seen as beneficial by members of the Muslim minority both with respect to 
the Europeanization process and the regional reform that followed during the 
1990s. The European Union represents a new supranational forum for the 
Muslim population, their calls, mainly on the issue of ethnic recognition, 
bypassing the Greek state while raising public and governmental awareness of 
issues relating to Muslims of Western Thrace, across Europe. There is also a 
trend within the Muslim minority (following Greece’s rejections of ethnic 
recognition) to assume a ‘European’ identity in addition to their religious status.
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Finally, the recent regional reforms enabled greater co-operation between the 
Christian and Muslim communities and opened up opportunities for greater 
Muslim participation at the local level.
2. The EU regional policy
The idea of a ‘Europe of Regions’ entered European politics at the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s with the passing of the Single European Act in 1986 and 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The concept of European regionalism and of the 
protection and promotion of regions features, however, from the beginning of 
the formation of the EU (then the EEC) in the 1950s2.
Following the establishment of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) with the Treaty of Rome (1957), regional policy was under consideration 
but there was no specific part in the Treaty dedicated to the issue. The Treaty in 
general (more specifically Article 2) recognised regional disparities and the need 
for the promotion of harmonious development programmes in order to narrow 
the existent gap (Adrikopoulou 1995: pp. 143-144). For this purpose, the 
European Investment Bank (also established in 1957) provided loans to 
modernise the regions that lagged behind.
Further initiatives were introduced when the Commission presented a 
report to the Council in 1969 concerning regional development in Europe. The 
Paris summit of 1972 established the necessity for regional policy as a vital part 
of the further development of the EEC. In the following year the UK, Ireland 
and Denmark were admitted as members. Both the UK and Ireland favoured 
regional policy as a way to cope with de-industrialisation and to counterbalance 
the costs of the common agricultural policy (Garmice, cited in Paraskevopoulos 
1999: p.61).
Following these steps, in 1975, the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) was established as part of a more organised effort to even out the 
regional differences across the member-states. The emphasis remained on
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national regional policies assisted, rather than being replaced by these proposed 
by the European Community (EC). (Adrikopoulou 1995: p. 149). Despite this, 
considerable assistance was given to countries whose GDP was below the 
Community’s average.
The creation of the ERDF can be considered as a further move towards 
the development of EC regional policy. The new structure for regional policy 
within the EU remained more or less the same until the 1990s. That is, the 
ERDF became the EC’s main regional funding body while further measures 
were introduced to bring about better co-ordination between the EC member 
states and regional and local authorities. Extra funds were set aside to assist new 
member states (Bullman 1997: p .ll) .
In the early 1980s a further enlargement of the EU took place with the 
admission of Greece in 1981. In 1985 the EC introduced (via regulation 
2088/1985) the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) to help the 
regions of Greece, Italy and France3. The IMPs were accompanied by substantial 
financial resources (of about 6.6 billion ECUs) that aimed to prepare vulnerable 
economies for the entrance of Spain and Portugal to the EC in 1986.
The establishment of the IMPs was important also for the EC 
regionalization process as it led to the adoption of an integrated approach 
towards regional development. First, the regions of the member states had to 
include comprehensive planning in their development agenda, which in many 
cases had previously been absent. Second, a partnership was initiated between 
the authorities at all three levels: regional, national and the EC. Finally, the 
participation of local officials and interest groups was encouraged in the 
decision-making process for the regional economic and social policies (Bianchi 
1993: p.49).
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2.1 The Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
In 1985 a White Paper was published that defined the programme for the 
completion of the Single Market. Regional policy was once more considered an 
important aspect of the Single Market and was officially established as one of 
the Community’s policies in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 
(Adrikopoulou 1995: pp. 149-150). Article 130 (a-d) of the Single European Act 
states that regional policy is considered part of the economic and social cohesion 
of the European Community. For example, article 130c defines the task of the 
ERDF as to ‘redress the principal regional imbalances in the Community 
through participating in the development and structural adjustment of regions 
whose development is lagging behind in the conversion of declining industrial 
regions (www.cor.eu.int/sqsu/sq_en_intro.html: accessed December 2001).
The three funds allocated to assist regional policy -  the ERDF, the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the guidance section of the Agricultural and 
Guarantee Fund (AGGF) -  were also known as structural funds. All three 
structural funds received significant resources from the period 1987-1993 and 
again for the period up to 1999. In 1993 an additional Cohesion Fund was 
established (Bullman 1997: p. 19).
The new reforms were not limited to the economic sector. In 1989 a 
major reform was introduced which in addition to further economic decisions, 
undertook a general review of the decision making process of EC regional 
policy. These reforms sought to strengthen the three-sided partnership of the 
Community/nation-state/region in drawing-up, financing and monitoring the 
Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) (ibid.).
Moreover, the new reforms aimed to distribute resources according to 
regional geographic position (funding priorities) while the issue of regional 
dimension was also considered. For example major objectives included the 
financing of less developed regions whose GDP was below 75% of the 
Community’s average, for regions in industrial decline, regions with long-term
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unemployment, the employment of young people, the adjustment of agricultural 
structures and the development of the rural areas. Regions rather than the nation­
states constituted the main beneficiaries of the three funds. The introduction of 
the CSFs looked towards long term financing rather than the funding of specific 
individual projects proposed by the member states. This was another indicator of 
the long term approach the European regional policy.
Since the Single European Act, many member states have transferred 
significant sectors of policy-making to the EC, one sector being regional policy 
(Leonardi 1993: p.3). As the aid was passed through to various regions in 
Europe, each of these established a direct representation in Brussels or 
Strasbourg (Bullman 1997: p. 13). In this respect, ‘national governments could 
no longer exclude sub-national institutions, groups or forces from becoming 
entirely engaged within the European integration process’ (ibid.). Over the years 
a number of organisations4 were established that comprised regional or local 
government authorities in different member states in order to promote their 
common interests. In response to this sub-state dimension the EC both 
established the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities in 1988 
(which was involved in structural policy) and also opened EC offices in different 
regions throughout the member states.
Further developments with regard to regional policy followed the Treaty 
on European Union which was part of the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992 and 
which came into force in 1993)5. As part of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Committee of Regions (CoR) was formed as an ‘official response to local and 
regional authorities’ demands for representation within the EU’ (CoR website: 
www.cor.eu.int/sqsu/sq_en_intro.html: accessed December 2001). The
establishment of the CoR6 was supplemented by the creation of the Cohesion 
Fund, which aimed to provide financial aid for the transport and environmental 
infrastructure for member-states whose GNP was below 90% of the EU average. 
The countries that benefited from such funds were Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece (Adrikopoulou 1995: pp. 149-150).
86
At present the CoR consists of 222 members who are appointed every 4 
years by the Council of the European Union. Members can be re-appointed. The 
role of the elected representatives is a) to defend their immediate interests in the 
Community policy-making process and b) to disseminate information about all 
EU activities to the people they represent7 (Paraskevopoulos 1999: p.68).
The establishment of the CoR remains a major breakthrough in European 
regional policy. Although CoR has not yet received any decision-making 
powers, either from the Treaty of Maastricht or from the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
it has promoted more democratic and transparent procedures in the EU decision­
making processes and in the management of the structural funds. At the same 
time CoR has promoted the interests of the less developed member-states and 
their regions in the EU.
The creation of CoR was not only an important step for the EU, it has 
also brought about challenges to the existing structures of government within the 
member states. Despite these developments, a common structure of 
regional/local policy throughout the member-states has yet to be achieved and
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we cannot therefore assume the existence of a coherent third-level of politics 
within EU. Despite obstacles, to a degree, reforms did take place in member 
states, and as we have seen in the previous chapter, Greece introduced new 
reforms to its local and regional government system.
The bringing of third-level politics to the EU political agenda has also 
introduced a new trend for the future development of the EU. A balance between 
EU and nation-state policies can further promote the scope of decentralisation 
and regionalization, enabling a more even development of regional policy within 
the EU while narrowing the gap between the existing and future EU regions.
2.2 EU Regional Policy and sub-national local government systems
Before considering again the issue of coherence in EU regional policy, it is 
important to mention the different approaches towards regional and local
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government system that each member-state has developed throughout its history. 
It can be argued that sub-national institutional structures differ considerably 
from one state to another. Some countries have a full structure of regional 
government organised on sub-regional or provincial levels, such as Spain, Italy 
and France. Other countries are more centralised such as Greece and Ireland 
while in the case of UK, the Conservative government moved towards greater 
centralisation.
A typology of the level of regionalism in each country is analysed by 
Bullman (see table 1)
Table 1: Regional systems o f  government in EU member states
Classic Unitary Devolving Unitary Regionalised Federal
Denmark France Italy Austria
Finland The Netherlands Spain Belgium
Greece Portugal Germany
Ireland
Luxembourg
Sweden
United Kingdom
Source: Bullman (1995:57)
As can be seen in the above table, there are four categories of 
governmental system in the EU. It should be noted that the classification within 
Table I for Greece refers to the system prior to the 1994 local government 
reforms. Likewise, the classification for UK refers to the situation prior to 
Scottish devolution.
The first of the four categories identified in the early 1990s is the classic 
unitary state system where sub-national governments exist only at the local level 
while regional units, where they are present, are only for administrative purposes 
and are subordinate to the central state. The second category consists of states 
that have introduced limited reforms for elected regional authorities above the
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local level, with this regional level enjoying a certain degree of constitutional 
protection and autonomy. In the third category, there is a directly elected tier of 
regional government with constitutional status, authority and legislative powers. 
Finally, there are the federal states where power is shared by the co-existence of 
sovereignties where the regional tier exists in its own right and cannot be 
abolished or reconstructed by the federal government.
Table 1 also depicts the degree of regionalization present within the 
member-states. For example, Greece was the most centralised state in the EU as 
it lacked a second tier of government prior to the introduction of the 1994 
changes. Within the same category, it is interesting to note that Ireland also had 
a very weak sub-national system of government (Leonardi 1993: p.7). This last 
point is an example that regionalism, or lack of it, is directly related to specific 
national-state traditions. Using the case of Greece, as seen in the previous 
chapter, centralisation has been linked to specific circumstances related to the 
development of clientelism and to external relations. Thus, on the eve of EU 
membership, Greece was a highly centralised state. In the same way the UK’s 
regional system (and its devolution) can be argued as being related to the long 
historical circumstances between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.
The same differentiation as to the degree of regionalization in existence 
within these particular areas applies to the second category where the three 
countries concerned each have their own pattern of decentralisation. For 
example, in Portugal devolved government applies only to the islands of the 
Azores and Madeira. Similar examples can be found in most countries (for a 
further discussion on the subject see Bullman 1997: pp.4-7).
Since the early 1990s, states have started slowly to reform their 
regional/local government systems as exemplified by the study of Greece in the 
previous chapter. Regional reforms were introduced in the UK from 1997 
resulting in the creation of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh National 
Assembly and the semi-autonomous Assembly of Northern Ireland. The three
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bodies in addition to the Greater London Authority and the English regions form 
the regional level of government within the UK. Similarly, Sweden also 
strengthened its regional system in 1995 by transferring responsibilities from its 
counties to the directly elected county councils (both at regional level) (Bullman 
1997: p.6).
These are but a few examples of the variety of sub national systems 
existing within EU member states. It should be highlighted that the efforts taken 
by member states to introduce further regulations within their administrative 
structures were, for the main part, to accommodate the new EU regional policies 
and to promote a more effective management of the structural and cohesion 
funds9.
To recap, regional development has been recognised as an issue for 
further development by the EU from the beginning (then EEC). For more than 
twenty years, the only step taken to tackle this was the allocation of specific 
funding for the regions of member states. As the EU started to enlarge, regional 
disparities became more obvious which combined with the growing need for the 
adoption of a more consistent policy. From the middle 1980s the EU has 
strengthened its regional policy and in 1993, with the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Committee of Regions (CoR), accompanied by a specific allocation 
of funds, was established as an advisory body for the promotion of regional 
interests within the EU.
The creation of the CoR and the efforts being made towards encouraging 
European regional development revealed the radically different systems of 
regional government (or its absence) adopted across the member states. This 
unevenness posed an obstacle to the funding and management of resources. As a 
consequence, many national governments proceeded with regional and local 
government reforms in an attempt to manage EU funding. Following this 
restructuring, it can be argued that today, the purpose of the regions in the 
European Community is twofold. First, regions have became areas where 
political, economic and social decisions are discussed and decisions made and
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second, the regions themselves function as actors at the national and EU level to 
promote their specific interests (Keating 1998: p. 18).
It should be noted however, that although the 1990s are viewed by many 
as the era of ‘the Europe of regions’ with the introduction of a multilevel 
government system in the EU, this is also only a period of transition. It is not 
possible to judge the future role of regional/local government in European 
policy-making; but there are two trends sketched out by its sceptics and 
supporters.
There are a number of institutions working for the promotion of stronger 
third level representation within the EU, namely, the Committee of Regions 
(CoR), the Assembly of the European Regions (AER) and various associations 
accompanied by the Regional Information Offices (RIOs) set up in regions to 
directly represent the EU. Despite their establishment, however, as highlighted 
by Jeffery, there is an argument that regional policy within the EU remains weak 
and its future advancement is debatable (Jeffery 1997: pp.206-207).
The major criticism concentrates on the question of how far 
regionalization has taken place and what role regions play in the EU. In general 
it is argued by some sceptics that regional policies in the EU are weak and the 
role of the central state far from diminished. More particularly, the CoR is only 
an advisory body with limited influence for both itself and the regions it 
represents. In addition the existing diversity of regional/local government 
systems across the EU member states becomes an obstacle to CoR’s ability to 
define its identity and scope as an institution. Similarly, the AER has a limited 
role following the establishment of CoR in the Maastricht Treaty. Likewise, the 
RIOs represent the physical presence of the EU in the regions acting as a direct 
link between the two levels (supranational and regional). However, as the 
structural funds are channelled through the central state the region continues to 
be dependent on the national government (ibid.).
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Another criticism disputes the effects of regionalism in general (even in 
their present weak form). In addition to the argument concerning the dangers 
attached to the weakening of the central state (particularly relevant for the study 
of the Greek case), there is a reference to ‘regional centralisation’. This happens 
in larger regions, when after decentralisation, the power of the central state 
simply moves to the regional capital. In this case regional government ceases to 
be near to the people and assumes the role of the central government. Further, 
regionalization has brought about a confusing structure of government in the 
European member states where disputes occur over overlapping jurisdictions 
between the state and the regions (Write 1998: p.46).
Despite these drawbacks, there are some optimistic views on European 
regionalism coming mainly from people involved with the regional institutions 
(Jeffery 1997: p.207). They claim that European regional institutions are recent 
creations only just developing into their future role. Furthermore, until recently 
the role of regions had no recognition as being part of a system of government. 
Despite the weakness of the European institutions, the region has been promoted 
as an alternative and modernised form of government.
Following the introduction of EU funding during the 1980s, a study of 
the regions in European Community10 found that the less centralised states 
showed higher economic and social development. In more centralised states the 
centre and the area around the centre appeared to benefit the most, creating 
centre-periphery disparities. With the decentralisation of both decision-making 
and responsibility it was found that the periphery also benefited (Leonardi 1993: 
pp.267-269). It can be concluded therefore, that the EU regional policies aimed 
at reducing the disparities among the regions both at European and national 
levels.
To summarise, there are arguments both for and against regionalization 
as well as a sceptical view as to the degree that regionalization could potentially 
be achieved. However, rapid developments in this area have only occurred 
within the last decade and while the above criticism has some validity, the
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creation of CoR, as an EU institution has become an important factor in 
promoting regional policies within the EU member-states. The evidence for this 
is prominent in the case of Greece who proceeded to the restructuring of its local 
government system, acknowledged in both relevant literature and the interviews 
of the present study. Essentially, regionalization was promoted by the EU 
regional institutions as an attempt to modernise existing patterns of government 
and to accelerate growth in all geographical parts of the EU as integration grew 
closer. As new institutions and networks are formed throughout the EU, regions 
have tried to crystallise their new identities. Although the central state is still the 
major level of government, the existence of a supra level and the strengthening 
of the regional initiative gives rise to further questions for researchers on 
nationalism and ethnicity. The issue concerning the position of minorities within 
these new structures is but one case of this.
3. Greek Regional Policy: the European Dimension
3.1 Europeanization process
Regional reforms in Greece as we have already seen took place after the 
country’s entrance into the EU. In this context decentralisation/regionalization is 
part of the wider Europeanization process in Greece. Here, ‘Europeanization’ is 
not a mere acceptance of basic EU principles, rather it is the internalisation of 
EU logic and policies and their incorporation into domestic policy. At the same 
time it entails the ability of central governments to set national policies into a 
wider EU context (Ioakimidis 1996: p.33). As a result of this internalisation is 
the redefinition of territorial political relations, the creation of new European 
political networks, the rise of new demands and pressures and new European 
ideological trends and conflicts (ibid.).
Europeanization as a process has featured in Greece from the initial 
preparations for membership of the EC in 1975 and continues to the present day. 
In general terms, EU membership has been a controversial issue in Greece and
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was well reflected in the political life of the Greek society. As seen earlier, 
PASOK emerged as the main opposition party in the late 1970s and later came 
into power in the early 1980s. During the opposition years and early years in 
power, PASOK was against EU membership on the grounds that it believed 
Greece would be forced to assume a peripheral role and as a result would have 
been exploited (Featherstone 1994: p. 159). During this time, the ND party 
became largely pro-European, the Communist Party (KKE) opposed EU 
membership for ideological reasons while the Euro communist party (KKE es) 
was ready to accept EU membership with certain conditions (for example, for 
the promotion of a European labour issue).
During the 1980s the political climate changed as PASOK claimed 
victories in both the 1981 and 1985 elections. Attitudes towards EU membership 
started to take a more positive view. While the ND policy appeared to be 
consistently pro-European, PASOK’s stand also changed after full membership 
took place in 198111. Moreover, PASOK later used EU membership as a symbol 
for its own modernisation (Featherstone 1994: p. 159). Following international 
developments in Eastern Europe and the new philosophy of perestroika, KKE 
also shifted its policy towards a more pro-European approach. KKE-es, which 
has in the meanwhile dissolved, together with some members of the KKE 
established Synaspismos, which continued to support Greece’s membership to 
the EU.
Public opinion also moved along similar lines. Statistics indicated that in 
1981 and 1984 only about 34% of Greeks were in favour of EU membership. By 
1987 this percentage increased to 58% and in 1991, just before the Maastricht 
summit, 73% of the Greek population thought that EU membership was good for 
Greece (statistics from Eurobarometer, highlighted in Featherstone 1994: p. 155).
Despite initial reservations, the Europeanization process is perceived to 
have had a positive ‘modernising’ effect on many aspects of Greek society12. As 
Bendix noted some years ago, the interpretations of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ 
are largely subjective (Bendix 1966). One very important issue closely
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connected with the Europeanization process is that of modernisation, and most 
notably (and of particular relevance to the present thesis), modernisation of the 
political structure and public administration. In other words, as a result of EU 
policies and economic development aid has boosted efforts for administrative 
decentralisation, promoting a more democratic and efficient system of 
government and encouraging opinion towards less statist public policies 
(Featherstone & Yiannopoulos 1995: p. 251).
Modernisation again has proven to be a difficult and controversial task in 
Greek society where elements of the modem and traditional society still co-exist 
(see also chapters 2 and 4). In the restructuring efforts undertaken by the 
political parties, for example, this division has held back the reforming processes 
whilst at the same time allowing for clientelism to remain as a means for 
attracting electoral support. Accordingly, the conflict between the 
Europeanists/modemizers and the traditionalists (who resist change in the name 
of Greekness) has had a limiting effect on Europeanization (Ioakimidis 1996: 
p.44). This is highlighted by Mouzelis who argues ‘the extent to which EU 
integration will affect Greece’s future modernisation and how emerging 
postmodernist attitudes of the young will finally be shaped and institutionalised, 
depends primarily on what will happen within the party system itself (Mouzelis 
1995: p.27).
3.2 EU and Greek Regionalism
Within this wider framework of Europeanization the introduction of regional 
policy and local government in Greece can be seen as forming part of a general 
effort to modernise the system of government. In the middle of the 1980s, the 
Greek government introduced 13 regions as administrative units for the 
implementation of the EU Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs). The 
new regions were not in all cases defined according to their historical geographic 
borders but they were created in order to fulfil this particular role. Western 
Thrace for example, due to its small size, was merged with two prefectures of
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the Macedonian region and thus led to the creation of the region of Eastern 
Macedonia and Western Thrace.
The reality, however, about IMPs proved to be problematic for the 
decentralisation efforts in that at their initial stage most decisions were taken by 
the central government13. This seems to partly justify the point made earlier 
about the weak role of the EU regions in policy making. Yet this is not entirely 
the case, as IMPs have opened the way towards greater decentralisation in 
Greece although the motive remained primarily financial, that is for Greece to 
absorb EU funding. Thus, local agencies (like the EETAA: the Hellenic Agency 
for Local Government and Local development) were given the chance to 
participate in the organisation and implementation of EU funded programmes. 
Furthermore, local control of the IMPs at a prefectural level has shown a greater 
degree of effectiveness than that implemented by the central government 
(Papageorgiou & Vemey 1993: p. 154)
The initial regional transformations did bring some confusion to the 
existing sub-national structures of government. The new role of the regional 
directors has taken some responsibilities from the prefect. As the role of the 
regional directors increased, the role of the prefects started to diminish and the 
prefectures became centres of co-ordination for local investment, keeping only a 
few of their traditional functions. (Christophilopoulou 1997: p. 47).
The EU indicated the need for further decentralisation as, in its view, the 
structural funds programmes were not managed and implemented adequately by 
the Greek public sector. In addition Greece could not participate in the newly 
established bodies such as CoR as the country lacked a second tier of 
government (ibid.). As seen in the previous chapter, both the 1994 reforms with 
the establishment of the prefecture as a second tier and the strengthening of the 
first tier that followed sought to improve the regional situation in Greece. 
Moreover, the extended EU-assisted co-operation of regions among the 
member-states has benefited Greek local government by the specialist 
knowledge it has acquired from European counterparts. Knowledge of this type
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is invaluable in terms of the long-term effects it may have on the political 
culture of the Greek local authorities (Vemey 1994: p. 176).
It can be argued therefore that despite the sceptics’ views, regional 
processes within the EU framework have brought about a revolution in Greece’s 
administrative and public policy system. Although the EU regional system as a 
whole is seen as weak, in the Greek experience the regional/local government 
system has been strengthened. In addition, the view that EU regionalization has 
brought conflict between existing levels of regional/local power with 
destabilising effects is certainly hue for the Greek case as was seen from the 
discussion in the previous chapter and is briefly highlighted here. But what these 
disputes have shown for the Greek case is the need for greater decentralisation. 
In some cases the disputes and competition are still present in Greece,14 but in 
general, as concluded from the present research in the area of Western Thrace, 
both Muslims and Christians have taken a positive view towards both 
decentralisation and the EU regional dimension.
4. The Muslim minority of Western Thrace and the EU regional policy
4.1 Europeanization process and regional reforms in Western Thrace
EU regional policy as part of a wider process of Europeanization in Greece has 
brought changes to many aspects of Greek society. The new regional reforms 
and EU funding are essentially aimed at reducing regional disparities within the 
EU member states and effectively within Greece itself. For the area of Western 
Thrace, Greece’s EU membership has had an additional effect of bringing a new 
dimension to ethnic politics and Muslim/Christian relations. The effects are 
twofold. First, there is the introduction of the Europeanization process itself with 
the establishment of the EU as a supra-national body of politics and authority15 
and, second, there are the new regional/local authority reforms which themselves 
gave a new meaning to local politics (and the local electorate). The two issues,
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as we shall see later, often interconnect. The subject of EU membership and the 
Muslim minority is further examined in Part III of the present thesis.
It has to be noted that the EU as it stands today does not facilitate ethnic 
minority claims. Rather its influence is indirect and, as a supranational body, can 
raise awareness about minority entitlements. In addition to the EU triggered 
regional and local government developments in Greece that benefited local 
democracy and representation for the population of Western Thrace, the EU 
itself has addressed particular issues for minority rights. Namely, the EU Charter 
on Fundamental Rights, which was officially proclaimed in December 2000, 
lays down the equality before the law of all people (Article 20), prohibits 
discrimination on any ground (Article 21), and requests the Union to protect 
cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. The European Commission’s actions 
in the field of external relations are guided by compliance with the rights and 
principles contained in this Charter.
Furthermore it is worth mentioning briefly that the internationalisation of 
the issue of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace was mainly influenced by 
international organisations such as the Council of Europe16 and the European 
Court of Human Rights, as well as the human rights organisation, Helsinki 
Watch. As an example of this, Dr Sadik Ahmet (see Appendix 1), petitioned the 
European Commission of Human Rights in 1995 declaring that Greece had 
violated his right of free expression. The Commission forwarded the case to the 
European Court of Human Rights.
The EU also supports the Council of Europe and the Amsterdam Treaty 
stresses EU support for the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Accordingly, as declared by the Treaty, “the EU has the power to take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination.. .based on sex, race or ethnic 
origin, religion, belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” 
(www.eurona.eu.int/abc/cit en.htm, accessed 24/07/02; see also note 16 of the 
present chapter). The Amsterdam Treaty gave the appropriate powers to the
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European Court of Justice to ensure these rights and freedoms by the European 
Institutions (ibid).
Many Muslims initially felt that the EU was essentially for the benefit of 
only Christians, but increasingly this opinion has changed -  although it should 
be noted that the view still exists among some members of the Muslim 
community who see the EU is a ‘Christian’ organisation. Membership of the EU 
is seen nonetheless increasingly as beneficial to the Muslim population as it 
provides an additional guarantee both for human rights and for the principles of 
progress and democracy at the local level, which are promoted by the European 
environment.
This is also the view expressed in interviews with local Turkish press 
people. On the question of human rights (which is not the main concern of this 
thesis), the editor of a local journal stated that ‘discrimination has stopped 
because of the EU. With the European idea better days (for the minority) will 
come...in terms of human and minority rights’ (Interview, M. Moumin, 
Komotini, 2002). Similarly, another local newspaper editor commented that the 
Commission has played an important role in Greece finally abolishing in 1998 
the controversial Article 19 by exerting pressure on the Greek Foreign Minister 
(Interview, A. Dede, Komotini, 2002). And although the Lausanne Treaty still 
legally defines the Muslim minority’s position, ‘there is a general feeling that 
together with Athens now there is also Brussels’ (Interview, T. Kapza, Xanthi, 
2002).
In fact, the declaration of legal equality and equal citizenship (see also 
p. 133 note 5) and the removal of all restrictions on the Muslims in Greece in 
1991 occurred during the same period of regional restructuring. This is also 
confirmed in the Human Rights Watch report on ‘Positive Steps by the Greek 
State’ on the issue of Muslims in Western Thrace. It is stated that ‘in 1994, to 
bring Greece in line with EU standards, the government instituted the election of 
previously state-appointed provincial governors and municipal councils. In 
meetings with Human Rights Watch, the elected governors appear more open to
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consider the needs and requests of the Turkish minority, upon whose votes they 
depend. More importantly, they recognise the mistake of the past state policy of 
discrimination against the Turkish minority and appear willing to use 
development funds to improve infrastructure in minority regions’ 
(www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991 -05 .htm. accessed July 2001).
The current favourable climate for the position of the Muslim minority in 
Thracian society and the improvement of Christian/Muslim relations are not, 
however, exclusively due to EU integration, as will be seen in later chapters. 
Instead, a combination of factors can be found. This belief is also shared by 
some Muslims: “Progress has been achieved as a result of the promotion of EU 
human rights and regional policies, the democratic forces within Greece and the 
efforts of the Turkish minority itself’ (Interview, M. Moustafa, Komotini, July 
2001).
Throughout the history of the region, Christian/Muslim relations were 
influenced or determined by the general Greek/Turkish state relations, as can be 
seen in Part II of the thesis. Since the second half of the 1990s there has been a 
favourable climate between the two countries. For some Muslims, the European 
Union has played an important role in this improvement: ‘many younger 
generation minority people believe that the European Union opened the road for 
better relations between Greece and Turkey.. .there is the general view that when 
Turkey enters the EU there will be no more problems in Western Thrace’ 
(Interview, H. Moumin, Komotini, 2002).
The current friendly relations between the two countries also feature in 
local press reports, both Turkish and Greek. One example can be found in the 
front-page article on the European future of Turkey in the Turkish weekly, 
Trakya ’nin Sesi, 24/07/2002. Another is an article in the Greek daily, Embros, 
22/7/2002 where the twinning and economic co-operation of the town of the 
Xanthi with the Turkish town of Biga is seen as part of the European orientation 
of the two countries. Also, in an article by N. Kardritzke in Le Monde 
diplomatique, June 2000, entitled ‘Greece’s earthquake diplomacy’, it is
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mentioned that ‘both sides are now actively encouraging relations at the level of 
civil society, which were previously restricted. Almost 130 Greek and Turkish 
non-governmental organisations are involved in this new co-operation. Mayors 
in Eastern and Western Thrace are even in the process of establishing a 
‘euroregion’ on both sides of the Evros/Meric river, a venture that would have 
been unthinkable a year ago’ fwww.mondediplo.com/2000/06/06Greece, 
accessed July 2002)
It was argued, in both interviews and informal conversations that the new 
opportunities presented by the EU have allowed for greater Muslim participation 
in all sectors of Greek society. EU funding has further contributed considerably 
to the upgrading of the area as seen in Part III of the thesis. This development 
has been of particular benefit to the minority population, as much of this 
infrastructure was constructed in areas solely inhabited by Muslims. In general, 
according to the opinion of the Turkish journalist A. Dede, there is a feeling that 
the standards of living of the local population have increased considerably in the 
last ten years mainly due to the EU (Interview, A. Dede, Komotini, 2002).
The recent developments in the area highlight the need for new 
requirements and skills for the local workforce. Established agricultural jobs 
(like the traditional way of cultivating tobacco or traditional farming methods) 
that are the main occupations of the Muslims have started to diminish as more 
intensive farming and agricultural techniques take their place. Under these 
circumstances, although money has been given for the support of agriculture, 
there is an anxiety among the Muslim population that they are not in a position 
to compete and survive in this new situation. This is the main dissatisfaction 
with EU regulations that the local population expresses.
In this respect, the new economic conditions that the Europeanization 
process seeks to impose in order to create a more vital and competitive 
economic environment dictate the need for further vocational training. The lack 
of appropriately qualified Muslims is widely acknowledged, as is the need for 
further education and training for the Muslim community in general. Following
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the recent educational changes made by the Greek government (see chapter 6 for 
more on the issue of education), an increasing number of Muslim students have 
sought to pursue a university education. As a Muslim member of the prefectural 
council stated, “higher education is needed for the Muslims as a means to 
participate in both Thracian society and the CoR” (Interview, E. Hasan, 
Komotini July 2001). And the editor of the monthly cultural/literature journal, 
§afak, expressed the view that more is needed to improve Muslim education. As 
it stands at the moment, minority people do not read a lot due to low levels of 
education: ‘when we can read more then we can become more European’ 
(Interview, M. Moumin, Komotini, 2002).
Clearly, there appear to be benefits for Western Thrace from the Greek 
EU membership. The strengths of the region lie in its geographical position and 
the local diversity of cultures it encompasses (this point is fully elaborated later). 
There is a belief, however, that more emphasis is placed by the EU on the 
economic sector than on the social. As well as the need for better education and 
vocational training, Dr Moustafa suggested that the development of social, 
cultural and ‘discrete’ minority policies for the EU regions could further 
enhance diverse societies like Western Thrace (Interview, M. Moustafa, 
Komotini, 2001).
The need for better information concerning the EU, EU programmes and 
EU process of funding was emphasised in the interviews. Muslims in the area 
have a vague yet positive view of the European Union but lack more particular 
knowledge. And this reflects the fact that it is ‘mostly the young and educated 
people that are more pro-European’ (Interview, H. Moumin, Komotini, 2001). It 
was suggested by Mr Kapza, one of the interviewees, that a greater increase of 
awareness of EU issues through seminars, schools, TV programmes or local 
press would be beneficial for the Muslim population and enable them to 
increasingly feel more European citizens (Interview, T. Kapza, Xanthi, 2002).
The circiilation of more information is also seen as the responsibility of 
the. local press. The editor of Trakya 'nin Sesi, A Dede, (Komotini, 2002) stated
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that his paper tries to keep people informed of EU developments and takes a 
pro-European stance. Examples can be found in the Trakya ’nin Sesi article on 
the EU and EBLUL (30/01/2002); in the same paper, on p. 3, the article on the 
EU and America; and during the World Cup, the article of 03/07/2002 entitled 
‘§erefle §anta’ claims that football is a way of improving the status of ‘us as 
Turks’ in the EU. The journalist/philologist H. Moumin (Komotini, 2002) 
believes that the cultural/literature journal §afak contributes to a more European 
literature especially after the introduction of contemporary articles adopting a 
postmodernist type of literature. The notion of introducing familiarity with the 
European Union and its institutions is the subject of an article by T. Kapza in the 
local paper Gundem, entitled ‘The European Union and its Structure’ (T. Kapza, 
Xanthi, 2002).
Finally, as European integration draws closer, the acquisition of a 
‘European identity’ (rather than national identity) is considered as advantageous 
by a small section of the Muslim society. A study entitled ‘Turkish in Western 
Thrace’ carried out by the Research Centre of Multilingualism for Euromosaic 
in 1997 found that 10% of the respondents felt European, 80% felt Turkish and 
10% Greek (www.uoc.es/euromosaic/web/document/turk/an/el/el.html. 
accessed July 2002).
Although the term ‘European’ has a wide meaning, this percentage is 
perceived as realistic (Interview, T. Kapza, Xanthi, 2002) or one that even 
underestimates feelings (Interview, A. Dede) Komotini, 2002). More 
specifically, it was argued in the interviews that a European identity is perceived 
mainly by young, educated, both male and female Muslims in civic terms 
(European passport, easier access to other EU countries, common human rights). 
In ethnic terms, as in the case of the Greek national identity as we see later in the 
thesis, the identity of the local population is an amalgamation of both Eastern 
and Western elements (Interview, A. Dede, H. Moumin, Komotini, 2002 and T. 
Kapza, Xanthi, 2002).
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Increasing ethnic (Turkish) awareness among the Muslims, as we shall 
see in Part II, did lead to demands for an ethnic (Turkish) recognition at the end 
of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. While the issue proved to be highly 
controversial and a testing ground for both Greek and Turkish nationalism, this 
new trend has emerged among some younger Muslims who are keener to 
assume a ‘European’ rather than Turkish or Greek identity.
Among young Muslim professionals and politicians there is a belief in ‘a 
contemporary European education, which respects ethnic origin, religion, 
language, usage and customs within the framework of the constitution’ 
(Aarbakke 1997: p.39). This would enable the Muslim minority to take control 
of its own education and affairs in general and outside of the Greek-Turkish 
bilateral framework. This is also the claim in the article by Ekrem Hasan in the 
local paper Ileri 05.02.1993 (ibid). Similar views are expressed by Ibrahim 
Onsunoglou who sees a modem European orientation for the Muslim minority, 
for example, in his article on education in the local paper Trakya a nin Sesi, 
30.01.1997 (ibid).
Support for this trend is partial but better education and further 
information can be seen as routes to increasing agreement. (Interview, T. Kapza, 
Xanthi, 2002). Nevertheless, the existence of such a trend cannot be completely 
overlooked as similar patterns can be expected to occur in the future among 
other national minorities especially following a possible EU enlargement. 
Moreover, the regional restructuring of Greece provides new channels for 
Muslim participation in both the local society and the EU regional forums. As 
with their Christian counterparts, Muslim representatives can also share their 
experiences with other EU regions and the other minority populations in them, 
as we shall see further in Part III.
104
5. Conclusion
The increasing awareness of the role of the region as an additional tier of 
government has taken its course over forty years since the establishment of the 
EEC in the late 1950s. Since then, hesitant steps have been taken mainly in the 
form of the EEC’s financial assistance towards reducing regional disparities 
among the existing member states. As more countries join, the need for further 
EEC regional policy has become more evident. However, real developments in 
regional policy occurred during the 1990s with the establishment of CoR after 
the Maastricht Treaty.
The general role of the CoR was to act as an intermediate between the 
various regions and the EU while the introduction of further financial assistance 
via the structural funds aimed at upgrading the regions across Europe with a 
view to bringing about greater equality in future competition. The task of the 
CoR has been limited by the variety of regional and local government systems 
across the EU states, many of which have already proceeded to introduce the 
changes in line with EU expectations.
The introduction of EU regional provisions have been brought criticism 
and approval. On the one hand it has been argued that regionalism is still weak 
and the limited advisory role of the CoR still allows room for central state 
intervention in the regional affairs. In addition, the new regional structures have 
had a destabilising effect as problems of policy jurisdiction have risen. On the 
other hand, a more positive view of EU regionalism has pointed out that these 
are only initial steps and the CoR is only a young institution setting up future 
principles of EU regional policy.
For a highly centralised state like Greece, EU regional policy introduced 
rapid changes in the system of public policy and administration. The 
Europeanization process in general has caused controversy between the 
modernist and traditionalist wings in the Greek political parties. There was
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wider acceptance of the EU integration during the 1990s, a time which also 
coincided with the developments in Eastern Europe and the receipt of increasing 
EU funding. It was during this time that the inability to manage and implement 
the EU programmes was attributed to the weak regional/local government 
system of Greece. In this respect, greater regionalization was desired and 
achieved to a certain degree following the 1990s local government reforms. It 
can be argued therefore that despite the limitations EU regional policy faces, the 
case of Greece illustrates that it has been a driving force for greater 
regionalization.
Finally, the Europeanization process has influenced the attitudes and the 
position of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. The EU (together with 
international institutions), in addition to the promotion of ethnic minority 
policies, also represents an external supranational forum where new identities 
can be formed. The entrance of Greece into the EU, as shown above, has 
provided extra security for the Muslim community. More particularly, increased 
decentralisation has increased democratic procedures, allowed greater 
communication between the Muslim and Christian communities and more 
participation in both local issues and EU regional forums.
It can be argued therefore, that for centralised societies such as Greece, 
the EU regional programmes have been beneficial not only in terms of financial 
assistance but also in the effort to modernise the system of government. EU 
regional policies can also be of influence for local ethnic/religious minorities by 
the provision of a neutral body to which minorities can appeal. Although these 
can be seen as contributory factors for the development of EU regions, the need 
for greater social (rather than simply economic) planning at the regional level 
has been stressed. This last point will be fully elaborated in Part III.
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Notes
1. The European Economic Community (EEC) was created in 1957 with the 
Treaty of Rome. From the beginning of the 1970s the term European 
Community was used. Finally, the European Union (EU) was created after 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
2. The concepts of regionalism/pluralism/federalism have been present in 
European thought from Althusius and natural law philosophy in the 17th 
century, to Proudhon’s anarchist views and the integral federalists after the 
Second World War (see Bullman 1997: p.3)
3. The IMPS were distributed in the following way: 14 regions in Italy, 7 in 
France and 6 in Greece plus an extra one for information and technology for 
the whole of Greece (Bianchi 1993: pp. 68-69).
4. These organisations include: the assembly of European Regions, the Council 
of European Municipalities and Regions (the most important European local 
government lobby), the Association of Regions of Traditional Industry, the 
Association of European Border Regions and the Association of Frontier 
Regions (Bullman 1997: pp.13-14).
5. From the 1st of November 1993 the European Union replaced the European 
Community. However the institutions and policies under the EC became the 
basis for the EU.
6. In general terms, the CoR is an advisory body whose functions, prior to the 
Amsterdam Treaty (which came into force in 1999) lay in five areas: 
economic and social cohesion, education, vocational training and youth, 
culture, public health and trans-European transport, telecommunications and 
energy infrastructure. After the Amsterdam treaty, the CoR became 
responsible for more areas, important to local and regional authorities. These 
include transport policy, guidelines for employment policy, incentives to
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promote co-operation between member states for employment, social 
provisions, implementing decisions concerning the European Social Fund, 
support measures in the field of general training and youth, relocation 
training, support measures in the cultural field, support measures in the 
health sector, expansion of trans-European networks, specific structural 
policy action outside the scope of the Funds, definition of the tasks, 
objectives, organisation and general rules of the structural funds, setting up 
of the Cohesion Fund, implementing decisions in respect of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and finally environmental policy (CoR 
website pp2-3)
7. The 222 members include: 24 members each from Germany, France, Italy 
and UK, 21 members from Spain, 12 each from Belgium, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Sweden, 9 each from Denmark, Ireland 
and Finland and 6 from Luxembourg.
8. This is a term first used in the context of the German Lander and their role in 
the EU policy making. Later it was widely used to describe the sub-national 
authorities (SNAs) involvement in EU policy-making (Jeferry 1997: p.213)
9. It has been suggested by Write that greater regionalization is the result of 
three factors: the level of the state, the level of the market and the level of 
society. Changes like an ideological shift against the state and in favour of 
the market or individual, budgetary restrictions, fragmentation of public 
delivery, changing attitudes on church, family, trade unions or political 
parties are all factors that impact upon local government and inter­
governmental relations (Write 1998: pp.40-45)
10. The study is entitled: The European Community, Regions and European 
Integration: A Comparative Study of Policy Sectors in Preparing for 1992, 
Leonardi (ed.) 1993 The Regions and the European Community
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11. In an abridged version of events, after winning the election PASOK 
requested from the EU that certain revisions be made to the original terms of 
entry -  such as on agricultural and regional aid. The EU agreed to the 
suggestions and PASOK was happy to accept EU membership (Featherstone 
1994: p. 159).
12. An analysis and evaluation of Greece’s entry to the EU is beyond the 
purpose of this thesis. However, highlighting developments can contribute to 
a better understanding of the evolution of the structure of regional-local 
government policy in Greece and the way Muslim/ Christian relations in 
Western Thrace have been affected.
13. The IMPs were based on the principle of additionality. That is, some 
national funding was required in order to complement the EC funding and 
most of the EC contribution was to be paid retrospectively. Therefore, 
money had to be found from the national budget leading to centralised 
decision-making and administration of the programmes 
(Parageorgiou&Vemey 1993: p. 143).
14. For a further discussion on the effects of regionalism in Greece, see the 
article in the daily Kathimerinv. ‘The first assessment of Capodistrias’ 
January 14, 2001, pp.8-9.
15. As European integration becomes reality, the issue of a European (supra 
national) identity has become the subject of many studies. The possibility of 
a new supra-national identity either to replace or complement the national or 
ethnic identity of European citizens is not as straightforward. The acquisition 
of such a new identity might depend on other factors such as shared history, 
culture or territory (Guibemau 2001: p.262). The prospect exists, however, 
that the EU will become a new body of appeal for citizens who feel that their 
rights are not covered sufficiently by their nation state (ibid.: p.261). For a 
short discussion on existing trends in the study of national identity and 
supra-nationalism see Smith 1998: pp.216-218.
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16. Among other issues Article 14 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that the rights 
and freedoms laid down in the Convention should ‘be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status’. Greece signed the 
Convention in 1950 and ratified it in 1974 (for more information see 
http ://www.unhcr.md/article/conv.htm)
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Chapter 4
Theoretical Approaches towards minorities: the case of Greece
1. Introduction
This chapter looks at theories of nation and ethnicity in relation to the Muslim 
minority in Greece. The aim is to provide a theoretical framework for the 
subsequent chapters on historical, political and educational issues for the region 
of Western Thrace.
The term ‘minority’ appears throughout the chapter and refers to the 
general concept of minority populations in terms of ethnicity, religion or culture. 
Although the term ‘minority’ can refer to any group of people with distinctive 
social or behavioural characteristics, it is used here only with references to the 
above cases. Moreover, the general term ‘minority’ is always in reference to 
modem European society unless specified. When comments are directed 
specifically to the case-study group the terms ‘Muslim minority’ or ‘Greek 
Muslims’ or the ‘Muslim minority of Western Thrace’ will be adopted.
Emphasis is placed on theories of nationalism, nation building and 
ethnicity. The assumption adopted in the following pages is that ethnic 
minorities cannot be fitted or harmonised with the process of nation-state 
formation mainly due to historical circumstances and the socio-political situation 
of the minority group itself. Further, the study of minorities is an 
interdisciplinary subject presenting interest to many analysts. Here, a socio­
political approach is used, based on both objective and subjective criteria for 
defining the main characteristics of the Muslim minority in Greece. Objective 
criteria include those features a collectivity should possess in order to qualify as
112
a nation, while subjective criteria define the notion in relation to its members’ 
sense of belonging.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals 
specifically with definitional components of a minority group and attempts to 
apply them to the study of Western Thrace. These definitional components are 
examined both in terms of the Muslim minority itself and the Greek/Christian 
majority. The reason for this duality is that whatever the actions of a minority 
group, they will always be either in reaction to or collaboration with the majority 
group.
The first part of the section outlines the legal definitions of minority 
groups, adopted by various international organisations during the last century, 
with respect to the general trends towards minority groups. The case of Greece 
in respect to the above organisations is examined including the particular 
agreements signed by Greece and the way Greece’s attitudes towards minorities 
were shaped by these agreements.
The second part of the section focuses on socio-political concepts of 
minorities and their application to the Muslim minority in Greece. Three levels 
of analysis, based on Barth’s notion of ‘ethnic boundaries’ are used: civic, ethnic 
and religious. These three levels reveal the way Muslims interact with the Greek 
society on one hand, and how tolerant the Greek society is towards the Muslims 
on the other. This analysis also provides some information on the ethnic as 
opposed to the religious consciousness of the Muslims, the role of the elites in 
shaping it and the way this process relates to the Greek state experience.
The second section pays particular attention to minority relations to the 
nation state. The concepts of territory and culture are used as examples of 
objective and subjective criteria respectively of nation/ethnicity and nation-state 
building. These concepts can be applied to the case of minorities within modem 
states and compared with legal definitions of minorities outlined in the earlier
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section. Finally, the case of Greece is examined on the basis of what has been 
argued in the section.
In general, the chapter will attempt to show first, the limitations of the 
legal definitions and second, the complexity of issues surrounding minorities. 
This is especially true for the case of the Muslim minority in Greece as other 
factors such as a relatively homogenous state, three ethnic groups (Turks, 
Pomaks and Rom -  sharing a common religion) and interstate relations, 
influence the way the Muslim minority perceives or is perceived by the 
Greek/Christian majority group.
2. Section I: Defining minorities
Any study regarding the present and future status of minorities or minority rights 
is confronted with questions of conceptual clarity. There is a wide spectrum of 
academic approaches and legal, governmental and international definitions 
relating to minorities.
Broadly speaking, two trends can be discerned in the general 
bibliography of minorities. The first deals with theoretical and methodological 
issues, focusing on criteria that constitute a minority and factors that affect its 
behaviour. These factors include the complex relations between ethnicity, 
nationalism and racism.
The second trend concerns more international aspects of minorities. 
Thus, minority behaviour in the international arena is considered as well as the 
role minorities play in nation building, ethnic conflict, secessionism and 
sovereignty. In this light minorities are examined in terms of their importance in 
international politics, and also in regard of the importance international policies 
have played for their survival.
114
Considering the above trends, the purpose of this section is to arrive at a 
working definition of minorities that will be applicable to the study of the 
Muslim minority in Greece. This attempt will be pursued on two levels. First, as 
the Muslims of Greece are subject to international agreements, the study of the 
Lausanne Treaty is examined together with separate treaties signed between 
Greece and Turkey concerning the issue. Second, existing academic literature on 
the subject of ethnic minorities and minority nationalism is explored.
2.1 Legal Definitions
The end of the Cold War allowed for the development of new antagonisms and 
drew attention to problems relating to nationalism and ethnic minorities. 
However, the issue of ethnic minorities is not exclusively a twentieth century 
problem; it has preoccupied international relations since at least the 1640s with 
the Peace of Westphalia (Jackson-Preece 1998: 55). But not until the early 
twentieth century, with the collapse of the empires and the formation of new 
nation-states were minorities treated more in terms of ethnicity rather than 
religion as had been the case previously.
After the First World War, the League of Nations accepted that there was 
a link between international peace and minority welfare. The establishment of 
the League of Nations System of Minority Guarantees sought to grant civil and 
political equality and a minimal cultural protection for the minorities at an 
international level. (Jackson-Preece 1997: p.346). These guarantees were more 
relevant to the new states that emerged after the defeat and collapse of the 
Ottoman, Habsurg and Hohenzollem Empires in 1919 (ibid.). Part of the System 
of Minority Guarantees included the Treaty of Sevres (1920) and the treaty of 
Lausanne (1923) and covered protection of minorities (Stavros 1995: p.2). Both 
Treaties relate to the present study of Western Thrace. The League of Nations 
System of Minority Guarantees did not produce impressive results as many 
participating states were highly critical (Jackson-Preece 1997: p.346) and 
reluctant to accept minority responsibilities. Consequently, the System of 
Minority Guarantees became inoperative after the League of Nations collapsed.
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The only treaty that has survived to today is the Lausanne Treaty signed between 
Greece and Turkey.
After the Second World War the international community placed 
particular emphasis on the protection of individual human rights. Although 
national minority rights were included under this heading, there were no specific 
provisions for their protection. Indeed, minority rights and world peace appeared 
to be incompatible as, after the outcome of the Second World War, the 
international community viewed minorities with suspicion with respect to state 
sovereignty. The reason for such mistrust towards minorities came form the fact 
that some minority leaders collaborated with the Nazi aims in opposition to their 
host nations. Broadly speaking and for the purpose of the present study, the most 
important agreements were sponsored by the Council of Europe (COE), the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and The United 
Nations (UN) (Jackson-Preece1997: p. 347).
The end of the Cold War and the political developments that followed 
brought national minorities to the centre of European and international 
discourse. New efforts to elaborate national minority issues were made by the 
UN, COE and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), previously known as CSCE. All three organisations focused both on 
the issues of state sovereignty and national minority-collective rather than 
individual rights. The attempt to balance the two is reflected in the following 
agreements.
2.1.1 The case o f Greece
Greece has signed most of the agreements promoted by the international and 
European organisations. However, the Lausanne Treaty (1923), signed by 
Greece and Turkey, is the only document that has defined the national minority 
framework in the two countries1. Other agreements signed by Greece include the 
UN Charter of 1945, the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European
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Convention on Human Rights (1950), the CSCE Helsinki Act of 1975, and the 
CSCE Charter of Paris in 1990.
According to Herakleidis, the official position of Greece concerning the 
status of minorities is defined primarily within a strict legal framework 
(Herakleidis, 1997: pp.216-218). Therefore, the existence of a national minority 
is a legal matter defined either by the state’s legal system or by international 
agreements. It is only in this way that the obligations and duties of a state 
towards its minorities’ populations are guaranteed. Additionally, for Greece 
minority rights are like human rights, individual and not collective. In other 
words, minority rights are part of human rights.
Within this framework, Greece supports the idea that an 
ethnic/national/religious minority should have the right to preserve its distinct 
identity. But at the same time the members of a minority should have the right to 
be assimilated if they so wish. In addition, the members of a minority should 
co-habit with the majority in the same region or area in order to benefit from 
provisions made by the state such as teaching in the minority language or 
provision of religious services (ibid.).
Bearing this framework in mind, it is not surprising that Greece only 
recognises one minority in its territory, the Muslims of Western Thrace and 
resists any calls for change in the Muslim minority’s status. As the demands 
from members of the Muslim minority grew during the 1980s combined with an 
increasing awareness within the international community of the Muslim issue, 
many started to dispute the adequacy of the Lausanne Treaty’s provisions2. 
Some experts shared the view that the Lausanne Treaty had served as a 
particular approach to regional problems occurring during a specific historical 
period. What had become clear from the various discussions of the Treaty was 
the need for its review (Stavros 1995: p.24).
In general it can be argued that unwillingness to deal with issues 
concerning national minorities is not limited to Greece. The same attitudes are
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adopted by international organisations. As a result, agreements are produced 
adhering to strict legalistic terms based either on concepts of state sovereignty or 
protection of minority groups. The following analysis aims to show the 
inadequacy of such perceptions and the need for a more socio-political approach.
2.2 Socio-political concepts of Minorities
A legal framework can never be adequate to understand the complex issue of 
ethnic minorities. As has been described, the Muslim minority of Western 
Thrace is recognised as a religious group guaranteed the same equal citizenship 
rights as the majority Greek /Christian population. However, this group of 
people consists of three ethnic categories, each of which possesses distinctive 
cultural features. We can therefore talk of a group of people or legal entity with 
a common religion, different ethnicity and different cultural characteristics 
among themselves.
Three levels of analysis in this section is pursued in order to arrive at a 
working definition for the Muslim minority: civic, ethnic, religious. Drawing on 
Barth’s well-known thesis on ‘ethnic boundaries’, these three levels can act as 
‘social boundaries’, as a process of defining, maintaining and generating ethnic 
groups. As Barth argues, ‘an ethnic boundary canalises social life -  it entails a 
frequently quite complex organisation of behaviour and social relations’ 
(Hutchinson & Smith 1996: p.79).
2.2.1 The Civic level
The civic concept of nation first emerged in Western Europe (Hutchinson 1994: 
p. 17), and focused, mainly, on the creation of an independent territorial state 
whose membership would be based on equal citizenship. The emphasis is 
therefore on a territorial integrity (Smith 1991: p.82) that requires the active 
participation of its members. In this sense the nation and national integration is 
inclusive to the ‘extent that it becomes a unit of identity and loyalty.. .that
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citizens recognise one another as belonging together in a subjective, internal 
sense...’ (Brubaker 1996: p.81)
In order to explore attitudes of civic affiliation of the Muslim minority to 
the Greek State, the meaning of ‘Greekness’ will be briefly examined. Early 
Greek nationalism was influenced by the French Revolution and the 
Enlightenment (Veremis 1983, Kitromilidis 1990) but despite these civic 
perceptions the Greek nation was eventually defined in terms of common 
ancestry (ibid.) culture and language (Diamantouros 1983, Kitromilidis 1990). 
The Great Idea (Megali Idea) of liberating the irredenta3 became a reference, a 
milestone for the shaping of Greek national consciousness. Genealogy and 
common culture descending from a glorious ancient past, and the integration of 
the Byzantine period, became a prime conception of the Greek nation. These 
new nationalistic ideals stood in contrast to the ecumenical character of the 
Orthodox Church,4 but the ‘single minded efforts of the state resulted in ethnic 
parochialism engulfing the Church of Greece’ (Veremisl997: p.39)
Although the Greek State came into being in 1832, only after 1923 did it 
acquire the territorial shape that we know today. Continuous conflict with 
neighbouring countries - also in the process of nation-state building - resulted in 
the reinforcement of ethnic, territorial and cultural values as a unique part of the 
Greek identity. To a large extent ‘national identity heritage’ contributed to the 
shaping of contemporary Greek identity. International politics, such as the break 
up of Yugoslavia and the controversy over FYROM on the one hand, and closer 
European integration on the other (Triandafyllidou & Paraskevopoulou 2002) 
contributed to the re-invention or rediscovery of the genealogical conceptions of 
the Greek nation. As Tsoukalas argues, we have been ‘witnessing an increased 
fetishisation of Greekness’ with strong ethno-biological and genealogical 
connotations (Tsoukalas 1993: p.57). In other words increased emphasis has 
been placed on the idea that only people bom Greeks can claim true 
‘Greekness’.
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After exploring some of main features that compose perceptions of 
Greekness, two questions come to mind. First, how does the Greek state 
perceive its only legally recognised Muslim minority and second, to what extent 
do members of the Muslim minorities perceive themselves as members of Greek 
civic society?
The answer to the first question is fully elaborated in the later section on 
ethnic/religious minorities and the state. Briefly however, the Greek state feels 
most comfortable with the legal attribution of civic characteristics to the Muslim 
minority, defined either by national or international laws. It is felt that this is the 
only way that minority rights can be defined and, at the same time establish the 
duties of a state towards these groups. (Herakleidis 1997: p.21). For this reason, 
Greece has always been reluctant to accept an ethnic status for the Muslim 
minority and likewise, the existence of ethnic groups such as Jews, Rom and 
others (ibid.: p.233).
Regarding the civic identity of the Greek Muslims, its very foundation is 
a matter of controversy. On one hand the Muslim minority’s civic identity is 
stressed at the expense of their ethnic one. On the other, Muslims are excluded 
from certain parts of the Greek society. According to Smith, the components of a 
nation’s civic model are a historic territory, a legal political community, legal- 
political equality of members and common civic culture and ideology ensured 
by a public system of education and the mass media. (Smith 1991: p. 11). These 
components can be found as part of the Greek nation alongside other ethnic 
facets.
If we apply the above components to our study, the complexity of issues 
surrounding the question of civic identity starts to appear. Firstly, the concept of 
an historic territory might not be as clear in all cases. For the case of Western 
Thrace however, there is a strong affiliation to the land by all its inhabiting 
groups, strengthened by the controversy between Greece and Turkey whose 
victories prior to 1923 were based on the idea of recapturing an ‘enslaved land’. 
Even today there is a feeling, or a belief, among the Muslim population that
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Western Thrace was given as a gift to Greece, and among the Greek/Christian 
population that the territory was liberated.
Second, the concept of legal-political equality is complicated in respect 
to the civic status of the Muslim minority. For the Christian population all civic 
duties are performed by state institutions. However, for the Muslims, certain 
civil duties such as divorce and inheritance issues are performed by the religious 
authority of the Mufti.
Third, despite occasional violations, which Muslims protested about, the 
Muslim minority appears for the most part, to enjoy equal rights with the 
Christian population. But even in this respect an exclusionist element can be 
found. For example, Muslim conscripts were not allowed to carry guns, instead 
being allocated to secondary and unarmed services (Marangoudakis & Kelly 
2000: p. 10). Although this practice has recently stopped, as a result overall 
changes in the army, policies and attitudes in general regarding the Muslim 
minority are not yet clear.
Finally, a segregated educational system leaves no room for a shared 
culture. Some of the curriculum the Muslim students follow is the same as in the 
Christian schools. However, whilst the existence of separate schools satisfies the 
terms of the Lausanne Treaty, it also contributed to widening the gap in Western 
Thrace society.
In summary, it can be argued that the emphasis on the definition of the 
civic status placed upon the Muslim minority by the Greek State is far from 
realistic. Christian membership of the Greek nation fulfils all of Smith’s civic 
characteristics while Muslim membership in comparison seems ‘incomplete’ in 
terms of civic affiliation.
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2.2.2 Ethnic level
Ethnic recognition of the Muslim minority has been demanded since the 1960s 
by some of its members. Further demands followed during the 1970s and 
reached a peak in the 1990s with the organisation of massive demonstrations and 
the public burning of primary school books provided by the Greek government. 
As in the case of the civic level, the issue of ethnicity raises further 
complexities, especially as Western Thrace is the arena where Greek and 
Turkish nationalist aspirations are tested.
In contrast to the type of ‘civic’ society developed in Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe has experienced an ‘ethnic’ type where a nation is perceived as a 
community of common descent (Smith, 1991: p .ll) . This difference is very 
important as it influences both the nationalist ideology and the way individuals 
relate to the nations (Mouzelis 1994: p. 38). Thus, in the case of Greek society, 
the establishment of the state took a different form from that of Western Europe. 
The ‘modem’ form of society was unable to replace the ‘traditional’ and both 
coexisted together in an unbalanced relationship, (ibid. p.39)
As for the ‘ethnic’ position of the Muslim minority in this amalgamation 
of a ‘modem/civic’ and a ‘traditional/ethnic’ state of Greece, we need to 
distinguish between the terms of ‘ethnic category’ and ‘ethnic community’. To 
adopt Smith’s definitions an ethnic category is a unit of population with very 
little self-awareness and consciousness that they form a separate collectivity, 
although they can be perceived as such by outsiders. An ethnic community by 
contrast can be argued to share certain characteristics such as a collective proper 
name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more 
differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific 
‘homeland’ and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. 
(Smith 1991: pp. 20-21)
The Muslim minority of Western Thrace is divided into three ethnic 
groupings, the Turks, which constitute the largest part of the Muslim community
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(48%), the Pomaks (37%) and the Muslim Rom (17%).6 Taking into account 
first the recent calls from Muslims to change the status of the Muslim minority 
from a religious to an ethnic status, and second Smith’s highlighted differences 
between types of ethnic groupings, a possible change in legal status is a 
complicated issue for two reasons.
The first, as has been argued previously, is that Greece is a state where 
civic identity is weak. The Christian population of Western Thrace, as in the rest 
of Greece, has not only a civic but also a developed sense of ethnic affiliation 
towards the state. This affiliation is maintained and reinforced through the 
uneasy relationship between Greece and Turkey. The long conflicts and 
disputes, the destruction of Greek irredentism and the birth of the modem 
Turkish state have confirmed the role of the Turks as the hostile ‘other’ for 
Greece (Triandafyllidou & Paraskevopoulou 2002). This type of perception 
inevitably leads to a hostile atmosphere and suspicion among the Western 
Thrace population. And, as opposed to Billig’s banal nationalism, the flag 
usually “waves” in Western Thrace, acting as a reminder of national 
independence. These patriotic sentiments are expressed in local and national 
celebrations commemorating Greece’s liberation from Turkish mle.
The second reason relates to the terms of ethnic category and ethnic 
community which are both applicable as far as the ethnic composition of 
Western Thrace is concerned. The Turkish population can be characterised as an 
‘ethnic group’ identifying themselves as ethnic Turks and regard Turkey as their 
homeland. The situation is not so clear in the case of the Pomak and Rom groups 
who, it can be argued, are better described by the definition of an ethnic category 
than an ethnic community. Neither possesses a written language nor a particular 
affiliation to the land, although the Pomaks are considered more as an 
autochthonous population, and neither have historical/mythical literature or 
traditions, invented or otherwise, praised by Pomak or Rom philologists. 
Instead, both groups tend to identify with the same demands raised by the
m
Turkish elite, which is happy to incorporate them. This identification is further
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reinforced by the Muslim minority educational system where the Turkish 
language is taught to students regardless of their ethnic origin.
In summary, the strong concept of ethnic affiliation towards a nation is 
present both in the Christian and Muslim communities, maintained and 
reinforced by both internal (perceptions of Turks as hostile others) and external 
(Greek-Turkish relations) factors. In addition, the application of concepts of 
ethnicity to the Muslim minority group raises questions that only point to the 
complexity of the issue beneath simple affiliation.
2.2.3 Religion
As religious identities preceded ethnic or national ones, religion has played an 
important role in the later formation of the nation-state and the populations that 
inhabit them. After the eighteenth century, nationalism replaced great religions 
as the primary legitimation of the social order (Hutchinson 1994: p. 68). South 
Eastern Europe is no exception.
Ottoman religious policy remains a major factor determining the 
historical developments of the Balkan people (Stavrianos 2000: p. 105). Under 
the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the population was organised into religious 
rather than ethnic communities. The development of the millet system provided 
a degree of religious freedom initially to Armenians and Christians, and at later 
stage, to Jews and Roman Catholics (Koppa 1994: p.64). Despite occasional 
violence and discrimination, the various religious minorities enjoyed greater 
freedom than those in Western Christendom, for example Huguenots in Catholic 
France and Catholics in Anglican England.
The Millet policy, according to many historians, accounted for the 
longevity of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, mass conversions were not 
practised and occurred only in a few areas in the Balkan Peninsula including 
Albania, Bosnia and the Pomak population in Thrace (Stavrianos, 2000: p. 106). 
In the long run, it could be argued that the millet system contributed to the
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preservation of the cultural characteristics of Balkan populations. (Koppa 1994: 
p.64, Stavrianos 2000: p. 107).
In relation to the study of Western Thrace, religion is the only common 
and officially recognised characteristic among the members of the Muslim 
community. One question to be addressed is what relationship exists between 
religion and ethnic affiliation in the Muslim minority. This question has become 
more relevant since the call from the Muslim minority to change its status from 
a religious to an ethnic one. An answer can only be given with reference to the 
historical developments in the region from the beginning of the twentieth 
century till today. This is examined in detail in subsequent chapters but the 
relationship between religion and the Muslim minority can be divided into two 
broad periods, from 1923 to the 1960s and from the 1960s to the present day.
As part of the Ottoman Empire, all members of the population were 
categorised according to their religion. This theocratic concept of membership 
was challenged by the collapse of the Empire. As in the case of Greece, Turkish 
nationalists had to appeal to deeply traditional and religious communities for 
support. Kemal Atatiirk tried to introduce a secular, westernised view of 
nationalism. These attempts were not always successful as small towns and 
villages resisted change, retaining strong Islamic loyalties. (Smith 1991: p. 104, 
Kastelan 1991: p.311). This was also the case in Western Thrace. The religious 
leadership was sceptical of Kemalist reforms and remained attached to the Old- 
Muslim and theocratic characteristics of the Ottoman Empire (Athens Academy 
1994: p. 39). In this context, the members of the Muslim minority were satisfied 
being referred to a ‘Muslim minority’, the official description used by the 
Lausanne Treaty to characterise the Muslim community.
After the 1960s a new secular, Turkish-educated political leadership 
emerged within the Muslim minority. This new leadership represented a new 
‘modernist’ ideological trend within the Muslim minority. Closer connections 
with Turkey were gradually pursued in terms of communication, movement of 
population, and education. This ‘opening-up’ of the Muslim minority was
125
accompanied by demands for Greece to recognise the Muslim minority as an 
ethnic rather than a religious community.
What we have therefore been witnessed during the second half of the 
century is the progressive replacement of the old Ottoman religious values by a 
secular nationalist/ethnicist affiliation. As Balibar argues, the ethnic identity can 
incorporate the religious consciousness and to some extent, it can succeed in 
replacing it (Balibar 1988: p. 147).
3. Section II: General Comments on the Nation State
There is a controversy in academic thought as to when nations emerged. 
Theories of nation-state formation can be divided roughly into two main trends. 
On the one side there are the ‘modernist’ accounts supporting the notion that the 
nation emerged at the same time as the state in the modem era and developed 
through processes of modernisation following the end of the French and 
American Revolutions. The process of modernisation refers to the rise of 
industrialism, modem bureaucratic institutions, a common mass education 
system, a state army, and ‘high culture’. On the other side there are the 
‘primordialist’ and some ‘perennialist’ theories arguing that nations preceded the 
formation of state. This is more the case in Eastern Europe and some Asiatic 
countries. The emphasis of these theories is on ethnicity, myths, values, religion 
or language. Another approach is that of ethno-symbolism. Ethno-symbolists 
accept the existence of an ethnic past of the nations and look at the way modem 
nationalisms have rediscovered the symbols, myths and memories of the past in 
order to promote ethnic and national attachments to their nation (Smith 1998: 
p.224).
Despite these differences on the birth of the nation there is an agreement 
that the state and ultimately the nation-state in its present form (Smith 1998: 
p.71) was the product of modernity but also the ‘producer’ of modernity. After 
the ideological influence of the French Revolution, which replaced dynastic
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loyalties with the idea of popular sovereignty, nationalism and nation building 
gained ground. The old system of empires and dynasties started to disintegrate 
and gave way to a new form of political organisation, the ‘state-nation’ or 
‘nation-state’ depending on where the emphasis lies.
More could be said on the theme of the state and nation in both political 
and cultural approaches that shape the various theories of nationalism. However, 
that is beyond the scope of this chapter. But a focus on two particular features of 
the nation-state, territory and culture, both representing ‘objective’ and 
‘subjective’ criteria, can be of further benefit to the study of minorities.
3.1 Territory
The concept of territory is important in both modernist and primordialist 
theoretical perspectives. A ‘clearly demarcated territory’ is part of Gidden’s 
(Smith 1998: p.71) definition of what constitutes a nation, while for Anderson 
‘the nation is imagined as limited’ due to its boundaries (Anderson 1991: p.7). 
The nation for ‘Modernists’ is then a specific territory inhabited by legally equal 
citizens.
For the primordialist, the idea of territory has a special meaning for the 
people. It is more than a geographical area determining the borders of their 
nation. It is their ‘homeland’, a historically unique land where the ancestors 
lived and are buried. This homeland could also be a ‘sacred’ place where holy 
people and heroes ‘walked and taught, prayed and died’ (Smith 1997: p. 14) and 
therefore became a place of pilgrimage.
The idea of territory as the nation’s homeland helped to define the 
borders of the new nation-states in the modem period. But this process of state 
building was not always peaceful and most of Europe was mapped into distinct 
states through wars, alliances and other manoeuvres (Tilly in Hutchinson & 
Smith 1994: p.253). According to Smith ‘the modem world is one of national 
competition and warfare; as a result, military factors and militarism assume an
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increasingly central role in the distribution of resources and the formation of 
political communities and identities’. (Smith 1998: p.71). These military 
confrontations have often created minority populations and defined 
majority/minority relations within a state. This has been the case in the Balkan 
Peninsula at the beginning of the century and can be witnessed even today, for 
example in Yugoslavia, where more than one state claims particular territories 
while ethnic secession movements develop in others.
3.2 Culture
As in the case of territory, culture is a determinant feature of nation states both 
from a modernist and primordialist point of view; as ‘reinvented’ in the first case 
and as ‘rooted’ in the second. For both versions the aim is the same: the 
reinforcement of a common culture to be shared by all members of the 
community.
For Gellner, the introduction of a ‘high’ culture is an essential part of the 
modem industrial state. This ‘high’ culture is based on mass education, literacy 
and standardisation. A cultivated ‘high’ culture aims to eliminate the ‘low’, 
regional cultures of the agrarian pre-modem societies to create room for a 
common mass culture based on the above characteristics. As culture pre-existed 
nations, nationalists use cultural elements or re-invent them for their own 
purposes. The aim is to create a feeling of unity. For Anderson it is for this 
feeling of brotherhood/unity for which so many people are willing to sacrifice 
their lives (Anderson 1991: p.7); the project of political nationalists.
Hutchinson looks at the recurrent forms of cultural nationalism and 
argues that the cultural nationalistic movements take on a more organic form of 
the nation. Thus, nations are natural formations ‘evolving in time and it is to 
history their members must return to discover the triumphs and tragedies that 
have formed them and the lessons they may draw for the future’ (Hutchinson 
1994: p.44). The aim of cultural nationalists is therefore to reinforce the
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traditional element within the society and evoke love for a common culture and 
inheritance that members naturally share.
3.3 State and Minorities
In most cases the majority of the population that is the dominant ethnic group is 
the one that gives a name or a cultural charter to the state (Smith 1991: p.39). 
Although there are some exceptions to this pattern -  for example in apartheid 
South Africa where it was the Afrikaner minority governing -  in Europe the 
majority populations established their power in their state ‘homeland’ and 
applied a majority culture within its boundaries. In states where ethnic ties are 
strong, as for example in Greece, the dominant culture of the state is that shared 
by the ethnic majority. Even in countries that claim a more multicultural 
approach and emphasise a more civic attachment to the state, heritage of the 
dominant culture can be detected (English in Britain or Castilian in Spain).
What therefore is the position of minorities in the modem state system in 
terms of territory and culture? Most of the concepts that aim to identify 
minorities in present day states have been borrowed from the theories of 
nationalism and nation building. But if we consider, as Jackson-Preece suggests, 
minorities as ‘ethnonations who have failed to secure the ultimate goal of ethnic 
nationalism -  independence in their own nation-state -  and consequently exist 
within the political boundaries of some other nations’ (Jackson-Preece: 1998: 
p.29), then these concepts can also be useful for the study of minorities.
3.4 Territory and Minorities
Territory either as the geographical area of the state or as a homeland, is 
important for minorities. As in the case of the majority population, territory also 
defines the ‘home’ of a minority in the new state. However, the status of this 
‘home’ depends upon historical preconditions and the cultural heritage of the 
minority.
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We can therefore identify two types of a minority’s territory. First, in 
civic terms, the territory is a political unit where the minority lives and enjoys 
equal citizenship rights. This concept applies to immigrant communities or 
dispersed minorities such as Jews or Rom, or minorities that have been excluded 
from a population exchange. The second type is territory as a ‘homeland’. 
Although the concept of territory as a ‘homeland’ is central to the primordialist 
explanations of nationalism there is, nevertheless, a common usage of the term 
‘homeland’ both by scholars and people. This second type includes more 
localised and ‘indigenous’ groups of people such as the traditional area of 
Greeks in Albania, traditional area Kurds in Turkey, or the area of Vlachs or 
Pomaks in Greece and Bulgaria.
The importance of the concept of territory as an objective characteristic 
can also be found in the international agreements that cover the rights and the 
protection of minorities. Some examples of the territorial factor in the definition 
of minorities are as follows.
According to the League of Nations’ definition (1919) a minority is:
‘that part of the permanent population of the state, which, linked by historical 
tradition to a determined portion of the territory and having a culture of its own, 
cannot be confused with the majority of the other subjects because of the 
difference of race, language, or religion’ (Jackson-Preece 1998: p.30).
For the League Council in 1930 a minority is:
‘by tradition... a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a 
race, religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to 
preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the 
instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and 
tradition of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other (ibid.)
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For the United Nations Sub commission of Minorities Resolution, as pursued by 
the Capotorti study in 1976:
‘A minority is a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state 
in a non-dominant position, whose members -  being nationals of the state -  
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the 
rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or languages’. (Rozakis 
1996: p.96)
Finally, according to the Council of Europe Copenhagen Document (1990) - 
excluding immigrants, migrant workers and refugees - minorities are defined as:
‘separate or distinct groups, well defined and established on the territory of a 
state, the members of which are nationals of that state and have certain religious, 
linguistic, cultural or other characteristics which distinguish them from the 
majority of the population’.
Certain of the above definitions put more emphasis on objective whilst 
others stress subjective characteristics. But in all of them, the territory of a state 
is considered to be the minority’s ‘home’ in civic terms while any further 
attachment to the land is not specified with the exception of the first definition 
which adopts more objective characteristics). The question of rights is a central 
problem for the adoption of international standards for minority rights. That is, 
the rights of states, minorities or individuals should be balanced in all situations 
so they do not conflict with each other (Jackson-Preece 1997: p. 351). For 
example, while some groups would argue for the preservation of the national 
minorities some states would be more preoccupied with the maintenance of 
territorial integrity and the supremacy of the sovereign state’s rights, (ibid.).
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3.5 Shared culture and minorities
The adoption of a common/shared culture by the state allows little room for any 
alternative cultures to develop. We should note here the difference between an 
alternative counterculture movement such as a youth movement, which also 
deviates from the mainstream culture, and a cultural ethnic movement. The 
counterculture movement is an outcome of reaction to mainstream culture, 
whereas the cultural features of an ethnic movement, which pre-existed a state 
culture, are quite separate from it.
According to Gellner’s account of ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultures, minority 
culture (when the minority lacks political or economic power) can be considered 
as deriving from agrarian ‘low cultures’ that could not be absorbed by the 
mainstream culture. Minorities are implicitly excluded by the above pattern of a 
standardised culture. In general terms, however, the way minorities are 
perceived in contemporary societies relates (as mentioned above) to the 
ethnic/civic attachment of the citizens to the state and, to an extent, to the state’s 
culture. In western European societies there is more emphasis on a civic model 
of society. An immediate question thus is ‘how civic is the culture adopted by 
Western European states’.
In countries with a more ethnic attachment to the nation-state (as in 
Greece or Eastern Europe), minorities are perceived, by nationalists, not to be 
part of an “organic” nation. Since members of these groups are not part of the 
majority they cannot share any special bond with the rest of the population. This 
second view, although more inclusive for the members of the dominant ethnie, is 
exclusive towards minorities as it is based on an ethnic sense of belonging -  i.e. 
through ancestry, language or special cultural bonds.
In terms of the minority definitions adopted by international 
organisations listed above, both the civic and cultural elements have been taken 
into consideration. This is especially evident in the League of Nations more 
objective definition. The later definitions list more subjective features. Although
132
they include both the features of a territory and common culture, legal 
definitions do not include the historic conditions or external factors such as 
inter-state conflicts that can determine the minority’s behaviour and future.
3.6 The case o f  Greece
For Rozakis there is only one level of tension between minority groups and the 
Greek state: this lies in the fact that Greece, after the Balkan Wars, has achieved 
a high degree of population homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and has therefore 
become intolerant to other populations. (Rozakis 1993: pp. 9-31) This is true to a 
certain degree but cannot be considered as the only reason with respect to the 
Muslim minority which is officially recognised by Greece.
With end of the Balkan Wars, the borders of the Balkan states were once 
again re-defined (see chapter 5). Populations of different ethnicities found 
themselves outside their state-boundaries. As a partial solution to this problem, 
population exchanges were agreed by the European powers. In Greece two 
population exchanges took place. The first in 1919 with the Treaty of Neuilly 
between Greece and Bulgaria, and the second in 1922 following the Treaty of 
Lausanne between Greece and Turkey. The Lausanne Treaty excluded the 
Muslim population of Western Thrace and the Greek Christian population in 
Istanbul. As a result, from the 1920s till the present day, Greece has had a 
relatively homogenous population of Greeks both in terms of ethnicity and in 
terms of religion. The extent of this homogeneity is debatable however, as there 
are other groups such as the Jewish communities of Thessaloniki and Athens, 
the Vlachs, Armenians and others. It is only under a legal definition that 
recognition as a religious minority could be given to the Muslims of Western 
Thrace.
Attitudes towards minorities in Greece are closely related to the 
historical circumstances leading to the formation of the modem Greek state and 
to Greece’s relationships with its neighbour states, as it will be elaborated in a
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later chapter. Both of these factors can be examined in both territorial and 
cultural levels.
3.6.1 Territory
Greece within its present borders is considered to be the Greek ‘homeland’ by 
the majority of the population. This concept of ‘homeland’ was reinforced by 
early Greek nationalists whose aim was to present a continuity in terms of 
population and ethnic integrity from antiquity to the time of the Greek 
Revolution. So the starting point was when Greece was the Greece of Pericles, 
of fifth century Athens that gave civilisation to the rest of Europe; a glorious 
past, a golden age. The Byzantine Empire was incorporated (reluctantly by some 
intellectuals) into this historical continuity as a successor to classical Greece. In 
terms of territory, Greek nationalists made it their mission to liberate, not to 
occupy, territories that Greek populations used to inhabit. This aim found 
expression in the Great Idea, was begun with the retrieval of lands inhabited by 
Greeks and ended with the defeat of the Greek army in Smyrna as the outcome 
of the Greek-Turkish War in 1922.
For the Muslim minority, Western Thrace is their ‘home’ and most 
importantly, an area adjacent to the state which the dominant ethnic group of 
Turks considers as its ‘homeland’. But the region itself is considered as much of 
a ‘homeland’ for the Muslims as it had been during the Ottoman times. For 
many Muslims, Western Thrace is not a Greek homeland but a gift from Turkey 
after the Balkan Wars. The Pomak population is ‘indigenous’ (with all the 
limitations of such a term) to the area extending to regions of south Bulgaria (for 
more details see chapter 5 and Appendix 1).
Perceptions here of territory as a ‘homeland’ are similar among the 
Christians and the Muslims. That is, both groups believe Western Thrace to be 
their ‘homeland’ each pointing out to different historical circumstances to justify 
their claim. The troubled Greek-Turkish relations over the years and the fact that 
the region is so close to the Turkish borders cultivates a climate of unease
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although, at present, a positive attitude prevails in both communities will be seen 
in Part HI.
3.6.2. Culture
As was seen in section I of this chapter, Greece is an ethnic-state with a deeply 
embedded idea of ‘Greekness’ within its society. This is due in part to the 
existence, over many years, of a homogenous population, and to the fact that the 
traditional element was not successfully replaced by modernity. In this particular 
situation a more ethnic religious attachment to the state existed on the one hand 
contrasted by strong clientelistic networks on the other. In addition, uneasy 
relations with neighbouring countries, especially Turkey, enhanced the 
perception of Greekness in this context.
As has been argued before, minority culture is not well regarded by the 
state as it ‘deviates’ from the standardised common culture. For the Muslims of 
Western Thrace, a large proportion of whom identify with Turkey, their culture 
can be seen as a ‘double deviation’, in that it is not only excluded by the 
mainstream culture but is also identified with the culture of the ‘enemy’. Again 
this element could contribute to the uneasiness of the Greek state towards the 
Muslims.
4. Conclusion
There are three conclusions that can be drawn from the preceding discussion for 
the Muslim minority in relation to Greece.
First, legal definitions, although useful for the protection of minorities 
are not adequate representations of what constitutes a minority. It can be argued 
that the legal definition represents a snapshot of the minority, adopted without 
due consideration of its history and its socio-political and cultural position.
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Second, different types of nationalism have different effects on minority 
populations. In the case of Greece where the civic state is weak in comparison to 
the stronger Greek ethnic identity, there is a weak civic attachment in the 
relationship of the Muslims to the Greek state. On an ethnic level, the majority’s 
strong ethnic attachment to the nation is also reflected in the position of the 
dominant ethnic group of Muslims. The only difference being that the 
attachment lies within the borders of another state. On the religious level, we can 
witness a progressive replacement of religious identities by secular/ethnic ones 
among the members of the Muslim minority. This pattern, however, is not 
unknown to the process of nation building and had also been experienced by the 
Greek/Christian population during the last century.
Finally, both in terms of territory and culture as objective and subjective 
criteria of defining a nation or a collectivity of people, there are different 
perceptions as to the idea of ‘homeland’ and a ‘shared’ state culture. Again, 
historical processes and interstate relations when combined can offer an account 
of the difference of affiliations and the tensions occurring from such affiliations.
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Notes
1. Some of the articles included in the Treaty are:
Article 1
As from May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish 
nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of 
Greek nationals of Muslim religion established in Greek territory.
These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without 
the authorisation of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government.
Article 2
The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in 
Article 1:
a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople
b) The Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace.
2. The Lausanne Treaty has been argued (by the Muslims) to be inadequate in 
the answers it given to the new demands of the Muslim minority in terms of 
status and educational issues
3. The irredenta included all lands inhabited by Greeks. Greekness was defined 
in terms of language, culture, historical memories and religion. In terms of 
territory it included Macedonia, Thrace and other northern regions south of 
the Donau, the Aegean islands, Cyprus, Asia Minor and parts of Anatolia. 
(Kitromilidis 1990: pp.43-45)
4. Religion was a main factor of identification in the Ottoman Empire.
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘the basic guiding principle of the policy 
followed by Greek Governments in recent years, vis-a-vis the handling of 
minority issues have been those of moderation and consensus. This has been 
especially true since 1991, when the Government solemnly reaffirmed the 
principles of Hsonomia’ i.e. equality before the law and ‘isopoloteia\
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equality of civil rights in relation between Christians and Muslims’. Official 
web-site of Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6. The Rom population also inhabits other areas of southern Greece but they 
are a Christian population excluded from the Lausanne Treaty.
7. The information is provided by the official web-site of the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry and concerns the issue of minorities in Greece. The emphasises is 
on the violation of human rights in Greece and Greece’s denial of the 
recognition of other minorities such as the Vlachs, Jews, Rom and, of 
course, the controversial case of the Slavomacedonians.
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Chapter 5
Historical Background of the Muslim Minority
1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to give an historical review of the region of Western 
Thrace and of its population which consists of Christian and Muslim citizens of 
Greece. Western Thrace became part of the Greek State in 1923 with the 
signing of the Lausanne Treaty between Greece and Turkey. The Lausanne 
Treaty also defines the status of and provides the terms for the Muslim minority 
which was excluded from the compulsory exchange of populations that took 
place at the time between Greece and Turkey.1
The term ‘minority’ here is used with the reference to the Muslim 
population of the area which had been defined by the Lausanne Treaty in 
religious and civic terms. As will be argued the Muslim community consists of 
three ethnic groups. For this reason, the concepts of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnic 
category’, examined in the previous chapter, will be used throughout this 
historical background.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first part portrays the 
general characteristics of the region with emphasis on the Muslim population. 
This portrayal includes both the natural and the civil elements of the area and 
provides statistical information concerning the fluctuation of the population 
inhabiting the region (Muslim and Christian).
This section also examines the ethnological structure of the area with 
particular emphasis on the Muslim minority. Although a detailed analysis of the 
subject is beyond the interests of the present thesis, some information is 
provided as part of the regional profile of the Muslim minority. As will be
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explored, three separate ethnic groupings can be identified -  the Turks, the 
Pomaks and Rom - each of which has a separate language and culture.
Finally this section looks at the contemporary characteristics of the 
Muslim minority population today. It is argued that the society of Western 
Thrace is segregated in terms of ethnicity and ethnic affiliations. As a result, the 
Muslim minority is a relatively isolated and poor community in terms of 
residential areas, education, economy and employment. Most Muslims have a 
more rural and traditional way of life in comparison to the Christian population. 
There is also class differentiation within the Muslim community, which 
corresponds to the three ethnic categorisations.
The second section of the chapter focuses on the important historical 
moments of the region - from its incorporation in the Greek state until today -  
and how have these affected the Western Thrace population in socio-political 
terms. The section is divided into four sub-sections.
The first examines the events that led to the signing of the Lausanne 
Treaty. This involves a brief overview of the two Balkan Wars and the First 
World War, which led to the Greek-Turkish War. Major themes for this period 
include on the one hand, the Greek expansionist plan of the ‘Great Idea’2 
(Megali Idea), and, on the other, the Turkish efforts to homogenise its 
population and create a modem Turkish nation-state.
The second examines the Lausanne Treaty, and the exchange of 
populations between Greece and Turkey that followed. More specifically, this 
part will concentrate on the decisions taken in Lausanne and the Treaty’s most 
important articles for the Muslims of Western Thrace3 as well as on the 
consequences of the exchange of the respective populations, especially in 
Western Thrace.
The third consists of an overview of the significant historical facts from 
1920 to the present day concerning the Muslim minority, including their
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minority status of within Greek society. The time frame spans three main 
periods that show the patterns of change of Muslim minority identification and 
ethnic affiliation:
1. 1920s-1940s: when relations between Greece and Turkey are initially 
unsettled but gradually improved with the signing of a Greek-Turkish 
Friendship Treaty in 1930. The Muslim minority, during this time under a 
religious leadership, did not seek closer relations with the modem and secular 
Turkish state.
2. 1940s-1960s: the most important events of this period included the Bulgarian 
occupation in the Second Word War, the Greek Civil War, Greek and Turkish 
membership of Nato, the Greek dictatorship and when Greece and Turkey 
developed friendly relations during the 1950s. Over the twenty-year period 
there is gradual shift of Muslim support in favour of the ‘Modernist’ 
movement which was ideologically closely related to Turkey and Turkish 
nationalism.
3. 1970s to the present day: although the first decade of this period is important 
for Greece itself (with the issue of Cyprus and the transition to democracy), 
the 1980s witnessed the formation of Muslim parties and a rising demand for 
ethnic self-determination of the Muslim minority. Greece initially responded 
to this new challenge with strict reference to the legal framework of the 
Lausanne Treaty and the Greek constitution but later during the 1990s 
introduced reforms to tackle some of the educational problems faced by 
Muslim students. During this period, the Greek regional restructuring and 
closer integration with EU presented new challenges for the Muslim 
minority/Christian majority relations. These two issues will be more fully 
explored in later chapters.
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2. Section I: General characteristics of the region
2.1 Geography
The region of Thrace can be defined both culturally and geographically. In 
cultural terms it is been described from ancient times as the land of the 
‘Thracians’4, but due to its geographical position, (at the crossroads between 
Europe and Asia) many populations have inhabited the area over the years. The 
Western Thracian boarders also varied in different periods, but generally the 
central reference point for the geographical definition of Thrace has, from the 
time of Herodotus (5th century BC), always been the Haimos (Balkan) 
mountainous range.
After the treaties of Berlin (1878), Sevres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) 
and the establishment of the state boundaries between Greece, Bulgaria and 
Turkey, Thrace was divided into three sections. Eastern Rumelia or Northern 
Thrace (now southern Bulgaria), Eastern Thrace (the European section of 
Turkey) and Western Thrace, the north-eastern part of Greece.
The Thracian section of Greece, today, borders the region of Macedonia 
to the west and is demarcated by the river Nestos5. To the east and north-east, it 
is separated from Turkey (Eastern Thrace) by the river Evros and from Bulgaria, 
in the north, by the mountain range of Rhodopi and a stretch of the Evros river. 
The natural southern boundary is the north Aegean, called the Thracian Sea, the 
coastline of which extends from the Nestos estuary to the Evros estuary. Its 
surface area covers 8,547-km, of which 4,018-km form the plains, while the rest, 
2,208-km, is upland and 2,352-km mountainous. Politically, the region is 
divided into the three prefectures of Xanthi, Rhodopi and Evros. Recent changes 
in the Greek Regional system have incorporated the administrations of Western 
Thrace and East Macedonia into one regional unit with a government appointed 
Regional Officer.
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In economic terms the land itself is very fertile due to the rich 
hydrographic system - many rivers, lakes. This aquatic ecosystem is an 
important factor for the economy of Western Thrace, presenting the opportunity 
to develop fish-farming. The possibility of eco-tourism could also be considered, 
as it is rich in natural wildlife, including rare species of birds, plants and fish that 
are already protected by international conventions. The mineral wealth of this 
region also remains unexploited.
Despite its natural wealth, the region is considered to be one of the 
poorest in Greece and the EU. Western Thrace, relatively scarcely populated 
(about 3.5% of the total population in Greece), is also one of the least 
economically developed as it produces only 2.5% of the gross national product 
(Athens Academy: 1994 p. 18). This is blamed partly on its geographical 
isolation and party on the highly centralised policies followed by the Greek 
government. The economic features of the area will be examined in subsequent 
chapters, however a brief section on the economy is provided here as part of the 
region’s profile.
2.2 Demography
Prior to the signing of the Lausanne Treaty (1923) and after the Muslim 
population constituted the majority in Western Thrace. In the three prefectures, 
out of a total of about 200,000 people, 120,000 were Muslims. Available data 
from the time shows the ethnological composition of the Muslim population as 
follows:
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Table 2: Division of Muslim Minority before the Lausanne Treaty
Xanthi Rhodopi Evros Total
Turks 30,327 50,000 10,571 90,899
Pomaks 14,824 8,000 675 23,499
Rom 500 1,500 506 2,506
Circassians 2,000 2000
Total 45,652 61,500 11,752 118,904
Source: Data has been collected from K.G. Adreadis: The Muslim minority of 
Western Thrace, 1956
After the signing of the Lausanne Treaty and the exchange of 
populations in 1923, many Christian Greek refugees were relocated in Western 
Thrace. The Muslim population remained in Western Thrace under the terms of 
the Treaty. The next two censuses of 1928 and 1951 were the only ones6 to 
provide statistical information on religious and linguistic characteristics. The 
1928 census shows that a total of 303,171 people resided in the area of Western 
Thrace, one third of who were Muslims (Athens Academy 1994: p.45).
Similarly the 1951 census shows that in terms of religion there were 
about 112,665 Muslims and in terms of language, 92,443 Turkophones, 18,671 
Pomaks and 7,429 Rom (Rozakis 1996: p. 98). In Western Thrace there was a 
6.4% decrease in population due to the Bulgarian occupation during the Second 
World War and the civil war that followed (Athens Academy 1994: p.45). For 
the Muslim minority the figures show a similar decrease for the same reasons as 
for the general population.
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Table 3: Muslim minority in 1951 census
Xanthi Rhodopi Evros Total
Turks 23,086 40,564 3,446 67,096
Pomaks 18,722 7,213 1,860 27795
Rom 425 1,860 2,831 5116
Circassians 12 20 32
Total 42,245 49,657 8,137 100039
Source: K. Vakalopoulos: History of Northern Greece, Thrace, 1993
After this period it is estimated that there were about 120,000 Muslims 
in the area of Western Thrace (Rozakis 1996: p. 99). In a European Commission 
report on linguistic minorities a similar estimate is given (see Table 4).
Table 4: Estimates o f  Christian/Muslim population in Western Thrace (1988)
Xanthi Rhodopi Evros Total
Christian Greeks 46,800 51,000 144,000 241800
Turks 11,000 46,000 2,000 59000
Pomaks 25,000 12,000 2,000 39,000
Muslim Rom 6,000 9,000 7,000 22,000
Total 88800 118,000 155,000 361,800
Source: Linguistic Minorities in the European Community, European
Commission 1990
According to the Athens Academy report (1994) there are an estimated
105,000 Muslims in Western Thrace -  this figure including Muslim immigrants 
abroad who also hold Greek citizenship (ibid. p. 47).
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2.3. The ethnography o f  the area
As has been mentioned above, Western Thrace is, in geographical terms, at the 
crossroads between Europe and Asia. This location is reflected in the social 
characteristics that the area has exhibited throughout its history. Today, except 
for the traces of ancient civilisations, it is the region where Islam and 
Christianity co-exist; Greek, Turkish, Slavophone and Rom languages are 
spoken and cultural characteristics from various ethnic groupings show their 
influence in many forms of social life.
Since 1923, a Greek Orthodox Christian majority and a Muslim minority 
have inhabited Western Thrace. This Muslim population was exempt from the 
compulsory exchange of population between Greece and Turkey and its 
existence is defined within the bilateral terms of the Lausanne Treaty that will be 
examined later in the chapter. Despite a common religion, the Muslim minority 
of Western Thrace is a diverse community in terms of ethnic origin, language 
and culture and consists of three ethnic groupings: the Turks, the Pomaks and 
the Muslim Rom. More detailed analysis on the three ethnic groups and the 
complexity surrounding the question of ethnicity in general is provided in 
Appendix 1.
2.3.1 Turkish population
The Turks populating Western Thrace descend from groups such as the Ottoman 
and Sunni Turks who came to the area during the expansionist wars of the 
Ottomans against the Byzantine Empire, and before the fall of Constantinople. 
During the Ottoman Empire they were politically superior in the ranks of the 
administration. As well as controlling the bureaucratic machinery, the Ottomans 
were also the military class of the empire. In other words, they were directly 
involved in the mechanism of power. Being the descendants of such high social 
classes during the Ottoman Empire, sections of this group today inhabit the most 
prosperous areas in the towns of Xanthi and Komotini, as well as the most fertile 
areas of agricultural land. (Panagiotidis 1995: p.25)
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Another group within this category that has played an important role in 
the recent history of Western Thrace is the Circassians. Originally coming from 
the Caucasus, from an area called Circassia, many immigrated to Asia Minor 
and Thrace after the Russians took over the Caucasus in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Although Muslim in religion, many Circassians fought on 
the side of the Greeks during the 1918-1922 Greek -Turkish War. After the 
withdrawal of the Greek army and the events that followed in Asia Minor, many 
Circassians fled to Western Thrace. In the early 1920s, the Circassians - 
possessing high educational and administrative skills - were influential members 
of the Muslim community. Their presence created an anti-Turkish climate which 
brought about objections from Turkey and they were eventually removed from 
the area after the signing of the Greek-Turkish Treaty of Friendship in the 1930s 
(ibid. p.29).
Today, there is a developed solidarity among the Turks of the Muslim 
minority. Being the largest group within the Muslim minority, Smith's concept 
of an 'ethnic community1 can be applied. That is, the members share a common 
name, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of 
common culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland’ and a sense of 
solidarity (Smith 1991: p. 21).
2.3.2 Pomaks
Much research has been done in the area of Western Thrace concerning another 
ethnic grouping of the Muslim minority, the Pomaks who are Muslim by 
religion, Slavophone in language, and with a distinctive cultural tradition.
Many researchers, historians, social anthropologists and social scientists
t V iuse Herodotos’s (5 century) writings and the surviving elements of Pomak 
culture and language, to suggest that the Pomaks are an autochthonous group 
and have inhabited the area from ancient times. As for the term 'Pomak' itself, 
there are two interpretations of its origin. Some believe that the word comes
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from the ancient Greek word “pomax” which means someone that drinks a lot (a 
feature common in ancient Thrace). Another explanation comes from Bulgarian 
scholars, who argue that the word is derived from “pomagats” which means 
helper.
The Pomaks, as often seen in the literature, have always lived on high 
ground within the region in order to avoid invasions. The same holds true for 
today, as most villages on the mountainous parts of Xanthi and Rhodopi are 
inhabited entirely by Pomaks. However, the Pomak population is not unique to 
Western Thrace. A larger group that shares the same characteristics can be found 
in South Bulgaria, the area that borders Greece and Turkey.
In terms of population today, the Pomaks in Greece form the second 
largest group within the Muslim minority. There is a Pomak language 
(pomaktsou), but it is only an oral one and therefore is only taught informally in 
the family home and spoken in Pomak villages. Pomak society is in essence a 
deeply religious and rural community with distinctive cultural features and 
traditions. Even today, in some villages (like Myki or Sminthi in the prefecture 
of Xanthi) women are dressed in a local type of costumes not to be found in 
other parts of Greece.
Despite being a distinctive group, there is little evidence of a strong 
Pomak ethnic consciousness in Greece7. The Pomaks tend to identify most with 
the Turkish population and support Turkish calls mainly because the two groups 
have much in common: the same religion (both are part of the Muslim minority 
and the terms that define it), the same political representatives and the same 
educational system.
2.3.3. The Muslim Rom
There are historical sources to show the existence of Rom groups throughout 
Thrace (not only the Greek part) during the Byzantine Empire, but there is little 
information about their social life and their relation to the Christian population
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during this time. There is evidence suggesting that some converted to 
Christianity but their faith was never strong and they continued their own social 
and cultural life (Zegkines 1994: p.60).
Ottoman sources reveal many references to the Rom of Thrace. These 
sources are usually governmental papers dealing with administration, taxation or 
census matters. During this time some of the Rom became Muslims, but others 
remained Christian. This information comes from a source stating that the 
Muslim Rom who chose to live in Christian neighbourhoods had to pay the same
Q
taxes as the other Christian population.
Today, in Greece there are both Christian (Greek Orthodox) and Muslim 
Rom. It is only the latter group that is recognised by the Lausanne Treaty. The 
Muslim Rom is the smallest group of the Muslim minority. As in the case of the 
Pomaks, the Rom population possesses its own language (Romany) which does 
not have a written form. The Rom live in both urban and rural areas, share the 
characteristics of a general Rom culture and do not actively become involved 
with Muslim minority issues and demands. It can be argued that the Muslim 
Rom population does have a sense of common ethnicity and many cultural 
characteristics shared with both the Christian Rom in Greece and other Rom 
population in the Balkans. For example, the Greek Rom accepted the 
internationally recognised ethnic name ‘Rom’ which was proposed during the 
1990s. Additionally, the Rom Association of Macedonia and Thrace (consisting 
both of Muslim and Christian Rom) held its annual conference in the prefecture 
of Xanthi in 2001 in order to consider issues relating to the Rom position in the 
Greek society (Embros, daily of Xanthi: 8.10.2001)
2.4. General characteristics of the Muslim minority
As has been seen previously in the chapter, the formation of the Muslim 
minority in Western Thrace from the Lausanne Treaty to the present day is the 
result of three factors. These are, the religious status determined by the Lausanne
149
Treaty, the increase in secularisation as connections with Turkey drew closer 
and finally the relations between Greeks and Turks.
Despite ethnic affiliations and national attachments, the Muslim minority 
today constitutes a separate community with its own social, cultural and 
economic characteristics. Their weak civic identity on the one hand, and the 
weak Greek civic identity 9 on the other, means that the Muslim community is 
not fully incorporated into Greek society. As a result the Christian and Muslim 
populations of Western Thrace coexist in two parallel societies.
The two communities (Christian and Muslim) are segregated in a number 
of ways that leads to further isolation of the Muslims. First, in terms of different 
religion and education, as has been mentioned previously. Second, in terms of 
geographical location; the area of Western Thrace is, in general, relatively 
isolated but the Christians live in urban towns or villages with easier access to 
the centres. The majority of Muslims in contrast live in more mountainous and 
isolated villages, which in many cases, have no asphalt roads and where, if there 
is snow, there is no access even for an ambulance or a doctor10. Finally, the local 
economy is supported mainly by traditional methods of farming and by a 
segregated market system of small shops. This ‘ethnic’ choice of consumption 
not only separates the communities but also does not allow for further economic 
development (Athens Academy 1994: p.36).
The social status of the members of the Muslim communities is lower 
than that of the Christian and education appears to be the most important cause 
of this. The linguistic problems, the hard agricultural work and relative poverty 
give little opportunity to Muslims students to further their education and this is 
reflected in Muslim levels of employment. During, the farming season many 
children help their parents and do not attend school on a regular basis. Many 
children finish their education in primary schools and seek seasonal on farming 
employment as a means of living. In a newspaper article about Western Thrace, 
it was estimated that, overall, about 72% of the population in Western Thrace 
have not completed the nine-year term of compulsory education in comparison
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to 57% for the whole of Greece. It is suggested that the higher percentage in 
Western Thrace is due to the educational difficulties encountered by Muslim 
students. (Daily, Ta Nea: 20-10-1997, see also National Census 1991)
Furthermore, the social divisions within the Muslim minority show the 
same patterns as during the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the Pomaks are mainly 
employed in agricultural and pastoral jobs and confined to smaller rural 
communities that tend to follow more traditional forms of life. However, the 
decline in agriculture, seen especially in the fall in demand for tobacco, has 
changed this pattern for the Pomaks who now seek seasonal work in other towns 
outside Western Thrace and tend to be employed in the most health-hazardous 
occupations.
Turkish inhabitants are comparatively more affluent. Some, descending 
from an administrative class during the Ottoman time, retained their financial 
and social position, enabling them to further their education. The occupations of 
this urban Muslim class vary from professional positions to ownership of small 
shops. Even those in agriculture own the more fertile areas of land in the plains 
and reside in villages far more accessible in terms of transportation than the 
mountainous Pomak villages.
Finally, the Rom population lives both in towns and in the countryside. 
Their occupations are mainly seasonal or they are involved in small trade: a 
pattern of employment echoing that of the Christian Rom living elsewhere in 
Greece. The Rom live in distinctive neighbourhoods and are less affiliated to the 
other members of Muslim community.
3. Section II: Important Historical Moments of the Region
3.1 Western Thrace: From the Balkan Wars to the Lausanne Treaty
Apart from its geographical location, a series of historical events have 
determined the composition and identity formation of the Western Thrace
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population today. The region became part of the Greek state in 1923 with the 
signing of the Lausanne Treaty by Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the Lausanne 
Treaty not only established the physical borders between the states but also 
sought to determine the fate of the populations in both countries at the time by 
the compulsory population exchange between the two countries that took place 
immediately afterwards. Under the agreement, however, the Greeks in Istanbul 
and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos (Turkey) and the Muslims of Western 
Thrace (Greece) were characterised as non-exchangeable and were required to 
remain. This decision was reached between Kemal Atatiirk and E. Venizelos 
(the respective Prime Ministers of each state at the time) so that the two groups 
could form the bridge for future Greek-Turkish relations, at least this was what 
was officially argued11.
3.1.1 The two Balkan Wars
In 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress, also known as the ‘Young 
Turks', began their revolution in Turkey to save the declining Ottoman Empire. 
When eventually successful, they proceeded with policies of ‘centralisation and 
Turkish hegemony* (Stavrianos 2000: p.528). The Young Turks’ nationalist 
victory coincided with the awakening of nationalism in the Ottoman ethnic 
populations. Influenced by the nationalist ideal on the one hand and feeling 
threatened by this new Turkish nationalist government on the other, the leaders 
of the Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian national minorities unified for the first time 
against the Ottoman regime. Their example was soon followed by the 
governments of the Balkan States (Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece), 
which by secret treaties of alliance, one after the other declared war against 
Turkey in October 1912 (Castellan 1991: pp.515-520). This was the only 
successful entente between the Balkan countries. This First Balkan War was 
short and decisive; when the armistice was declared in December 1912, the 
Ottoman Empire had lost all its European territories except Constantinople (now 
Istanbul).
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The disagreement between the allied countries over the division of the 
newly gained territory and, specifically, the division of Macedonia and Thrace, 
resulted in the Second Balkan War (1913). In the heated negotiations between 
the allied countries, Bulgaria felt disadvantaged by the proposed territorial 
divisions and driven by its internal political climate, decided to attack 
(Crampton 1983: pp.421-422). Serbia and Greece, joined by Montenegro 
declared war against Bulgaria, who within a month asked for an armistice (July 
1913)12. The Treaty of Bucharest (1913) ended the hostilities of the Second 
Balkan War. Western Thrace (Gioumouldjina with a stretch of Aegean coast 
extending to Dedeagach) was retained by Bulgaria allowing her an outlet to the 
Aegean Sea13 (ibid.). In an attempt to hilly integrate the new area around 50,000 
Bulgarians emigrated to Western Thrace. Consequently, during this time the 
population of the province was very mixed - the largest group being the Greek, 
Bulgarians and Turks (Stavrianos 2000: p. 579)
In November 1916 Greece entered the First World War on the side of the 
Allies and Associated Powers. Bulgaria, on the other hand, fought on the side of 
the Central Powers as it had been promised part of Serbia. After the defeat of the 
Central Powers, Bulgaria was required to cede part of its territory, including 
Western Thrace. Article 48 of the Neuilly Treaty however, stated that “the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to ensure the economic 
outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea” (the Neuilly Treaty). The terms of the 
Treaty of Neuilly (27 November 1919) signed between the Allies and Bulgaria 
also required an exchange of Bulgarian and Greek populations. From 1919 until 
the Lausanne Treaty (1923), Western Thrace was governed by Greece14.
The end of First World War found Greece with many internal problems 
and divisions, mainly between royalists and anti-royalists fuelled by the 
interference of the Allied Powers. The result of the domestic discord and of the 
dominance of the ‘Great Idea’ as the national state ideology, was the Greek 
army’s offensive near Ankara in 192115. The Greek-Turkish conflict ended with 
the defeat of Greece and the events that followed became a reference point for 
modem Greek history and modem Greek identity.
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3.1.2 The Lausanne Treaty and the Exchange o f Minorities
Following the Greek defeat, the Turks demanded the return of Eastern Thrace to 
Turkey. These demands were accompanied by the advancement of the Turkish 
army to the area. When they met with the British troops, tensions rose. Finally, 
the Mudanya Armistice was agreed (October 1922) and marked the beginning of 
the talks in Lausanne.
The Lausanne Treaty signified the end of the Greek irredentist project 
and the birth of the modem nation-state in Turkey. The terms and conditions that 
were agreed between Greece and Turkey in 1923 defined the physical borders16 
of the two states and decided the fate of the populations that, until then, although 
ethnically diverse, cohabited in the same areas. The Treaty is still in force today 
and provides protection for the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of Greece 
and Turkey respectively who were exempt from the exchange and establishes a 
policy framework to be followed by the governments.
More than a million Greeks from Turkey and about 400,000 Muslims 
from Greece were exchanged (Clogg: 1995 p. 107). Most of the Greek refugees 
settled in Western Thrace and Macedonia. In both areas the Christian Greeks 
had been a ‘minority’ in terms of numbers after the Balkan Wars. For example, 
in Western Thrace only 20% of the total population were Greek while, as the 
1928 population census shows, after the exchange the percentage increased to 
60% (ibid. p. 109). Most of the Greek populations (with the exception of about 
100,000 each in Albania and Turkey, 110,000 in the Dodecanese and 310,000 in 
Cyprus) resided within the borders of the Greek state which had now become 
one of the most homogenous countries in the Balkan Peninsula. In order to 
preserve and further enforce this homogeneity, any reference to small minority 
populations such as Slavomacedonians, Albanian and Vlachs remained a 
sensitive issue.
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Section Three of the Lausanne Treaty, entitled the ‘Protection of 
Minorities’, and Articles 37-45 deal with the minority populations exempt from 
the exchange and are based, as has been mentioned above, on a bilateral 
reciprocity of mutual obligations between Greece and Turkey. The provisions 
include a general framework for the protection of minorities and specific 
guarantees for religious and linguistic freedoms (Rozakis 1996: p. 103)
3.1.3 General Provisions
According to Article 37 of Section III:
‘Turkey, and (Greece respectively)17 undertake that the stipulations contained in 
Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no 
regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, 
nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them’. (The 
Lausanne Treaty, 1923)
Under this general framework Article 44 provides guarantees for the 
implementation of clauses under Section IH. It is therefore required that:
‘Turkey, and Greece agree that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section 
(...) shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not 
be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of 
Nations (...) Any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have 
the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger (...) 
and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as 
it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. Turkey and Greece 
further agree that any difference of opinion (...) shall be held to be a dispute of 
an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations (...) and be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The 
decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and 
effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.’ (the Lausanne Treaty, 
1923)
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3.1.4 Specific provisions
More particular provisions include rights of citizenship, education and religion. 
Some of the provisions under Article 39 include free movement and 
immigration, equal civil and political rights, equal possibilities of employment, 
freedom of speech and press and commercial activities.
Articles 41 and 42 deal specifically with educational and religious 
freedoms. ‘In the matters of public education, the respective governments 
undertake the obligation to assure that in geographical areas (towns and districts) 
where a considerable proportion of the members of the minorities live, 
appropriate facilities are established allowing the instruction of their respective 
languages in primary education (Article 41). The respective Governments are 
also obliged to grant public funds in the same areas to promote education, 
religion and charity concerning the minorities’ (Article 42) (Rozakis 1996: 
p. 104)
To summarise, the Treaty of Lausanne opened a new chapter for Greek- 
Turkish relations, marking the abandonment of the Greek ‘Great idea’ and the 
beginning of a Modem Turkish state. The new geographical borders, the legally 
defined existence of respective minorities and international factors (for example 
the case of Cyprus) became a vital part of the historical developments that 
followed. The strengthening of ethnic homogeneity in Greece (as well as 
homogenising efforts in Turkey) contributed to new perceptions of national 
identities in both countries and constituted each other as the ‘external Other’. 
These perceptions have influenced identity formation of the Muslim minority of 
Western Thrace through the historical events that will be briefly examined in the 
following section.
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3.2 From The Lausanne Treaty to Today
Within the framework set by the Lausanne Treaty, the Muslim population shared 
the area of Western Thrace with the Christian Greek majority. Muslim attitudes 
and loyalties from 1923 to today developed in relation or response to the 
consolidation of Greek and Turkish nationalism. Far from static, this is an 
ongoing process of identity formation, which takes place within an 
amalgamation of ethnic and religious preferences.
Accordingly, two major ideological trends within the Muslim minority 
can be identified as major forces of change. The first is the ‘Old-Muslim’ 
tradition whose elites remained faithful to the old theocratic values of the 
Ottoman Empire, opposing Kemal’s secular nationalism. The second is the 
‘Modernist’ movement that actively exerted its influence on the minority’s 
political beliefs after the 1950s, reflecting the hostile Greek-Turkish relations at 
the time. A new secular, Turkish-educated political leadership emerged from 
within the Muslim minority and gradually pursued closer connections with 
Turkey. This ‘opening-up’ was accompanied by demands for Greece to 
recognise the Muslim minority as an ethnic rather than religious community (see 
also chapter 7).
Three periods of Greek-Turkish relations reveal these ideological 
changes and the respective demands of the Muslim minority:
3.2.1. 1920-1939
The beginning of this period was marked by increasing movements of the 
population in Western Thrace. First, the Bulgarians that inhabited the area in the 
aftermath of the Second Balkan War returned to Bulgaria in accordance with the 
Neuilly Treaty. Second, with the outcome of the Greek Turkish war, many 
Greek refugees were settled in the area boosting the Christian Greek population 
from 20% to about 60% of the total population. Third, approximately 106,000 
Muslims remained in the area as part of the bilateral terms of the Lausanne
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Treaty. The exchanged Greek populations of the time were impoverished, tired 
and bitter having experienced successive wars for almost a decade.
The remaining Muslim population was organised into the three 
communities of Xanthi, Komotini and Didimotiho, all governed by three 
conservative Muslim Muftis who remained faithful to the Sacred Law of Koran 
(iSeriat). This religious attachment entailed the partial rejection of the reformist 
nationalist programme in Turkey. The judiciary power which came from the 
Islamic Law was applied by these three Muftis who received a salary from the 
Greek state. As the chapter on education will show in more detail, there were 
about 101 primary and secondary schools for the education of Muslim students. 
The Turkish and Greek language became the official teaching languages (with 
the exception of the Arabic language used for the Koran and religious education) 
in the Muslim schools and the Turkish language books were to be sent from 
Turkey.
The fact that the minority elite did keep its distance from Turkey resulted 
in a good relationship with the Greek state. But the economically advantaged 
Muslims from urban areas and especially those in Komotini already had closer 
relations with Turkey, favoured Atattirk’s reformism and were more suspicious 
of the Greek state.18 Wishing, however, to preserve their previous wealth and 
status, they adapted to the new situation (Athens Academy 1994: p.97). The 
mass support for the religious leadership came from Muslims inhabiting more 
rural areas, who belonged economically to a lower agricultural class and who 
were more devoted to the traditional religious values.
The influx of the refugee population created practical problems for 
their accommodation in Greece.19 Many of the refugees were given temporary 
shelter in Western Thrace and Macedonia. Muslim as well as Christian houses 
were used for this purpose. Recent memories from the wars and different social 
and cultural backgrounds made cohabitation difficult and required the strong 
presence of the police (Ladas 1932: pp.476-485).
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As a result of increasingly strained relations, Turkey brought the matter 
before the Mixed Committee of the League of Nations, accusing Greece of 
taking advantage and abusing Turkish property. Greece defended itself but more 
accusations were to follow and in 1925, neutral members of the Committee 
came to the region to observe the situation more closely and recognised the 
difficulties of sheltering the refugees -  many of them were placed temporarily 
with local Turkish families - while disturbing the religious values of the 
Muslims. In 1926, Greece and Turkey came to an agreement over the situation 
and by 1928 Greece had removed all the refugees from Muslim properties 
(ibid.). The other major point of disagreement was, as has been mentioned 
above, the case of the 150 Circassians that had fled Asia Minor and had settled 
in Western Thrace with the aid of the Greek government (Nikolakopoulos 1991: 
p.l 81). As part of the Ankara Agreement (1930) signed by Greece and Turkey, 
these Circassians were removed and a short period of Greek-Turkish friendship 
followed.
In summary, the 1923-1930 period was important for Western Thrace. 
The exchange of populations, the arrival of the Asia Minor Greek population 
and the rise of modem Turkish nationalism all presented new challenges for the 
region and its Christian and Muslim population. In ideological terms, the rural 
and deeply traditional Muslim society remained attached to the ‘Old Muslim’ 
values while new ‘Modernist trends’ started to appear.
3.2.2. 1940s-1960s
During the Second World War, Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace were 
occupied by Bulgaria. Forced efforts at assimilation were made for both the 
Christian Greek and Muslim populations. There are reports that these efforts 
were more insistent in the case of Pomaks who were considered to be of 
Bulgarian descent. In addition, during the ensuing Greek Civil War many 
Muslims left the country to return in 1949 when it was over. With the end of the 
war Western Thrace was returned to Greece and from the 1950s onwards 
friendly relations developed between the two countries. In 1975, Bulgaria 
declared that it had no territorial ambitions for any Greek territory.
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In the early 1950s relations between Greece and Turkey were on 
favourable terms when both countries became part of NATO in 1952. A more 
flexible policy towards the Muslim minority was adopted by the Greek state . 
For example, some changes occurred in Muslim education: the Turkish language 
became compulsory in Pomak schools, the ‘Jelal Bayar’ secondary school 
opened in Komotini and was allowed to use the label Turkish school' and from 
the 1960s onwards, school teachers trained in Turkey were employed in the 
Muslim schools (Athens Academy 1994: p.40).
Another important development in this period was the increasing number 
of Muslim students from Western Thrace in Turkish universities. There are two 
reasons why the Muslim students chose to continue their tertiary education (see 
chapter 6) in Turkey: familiarity with the Turkish language rather than Greek 
and second, Turkey provided incentives for the Muslims from Western Thrace, 
such as easier entrance or scholarships for university study. Consequently, a 
Turkish-educated, secular Muslim intelligentsia returned to Western Thrace and 
increased the support for the ‘Modernist movement’ that sought to homogenise 
the Muslim minority and called for the recognition of an ethnic rather than 
religious Muslim status.
In summary, this period started with friendly relations between Greece 
and Turkey, although this proved to be short-lived due to the Cyprus issue. 
During this time the Greek government followed a more flexible policy, 
especially towards for the Muslim primary and secondary education. As a result, 
from an ideological perspective, a new Turkish educated group increased the 
‘Modernist’ support within the Muslim minority.
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3.2.3 1970’s to the present day
During the military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974), freedom of movement 
was restricted for both Muslims and Christians. However, further suppressive 
measures against the Muslim minority were then introduced. Members of the 
minority community boards, previously elected under the provisions of Decree 
2345/1920 (which relates to the election of minority representatives), were 
dismissed and replaced by non-elected members (selected by government 
agencies), who were prepared to act against the interests of the Muslim 
minority21. In addition, Sarakatsani Greeks from other regions were given 
financial incentives to move to the area and increase the Christian population 
(World Directory of Minorities 1997: p. 124)
Whilst the aim of previous governments was to incorporate the Muslim 
population into Greek society, these new measures succeeded in excluding and 
isolating them. Despite the collapse of the dictatorship, some repressive 
measures were still in operation up until the mid 1990s. For example, until 
1995, much of Western Thrace was a restricted militarised zone for reasons of 
national security. This zone, bordering Bulgaria, included many Pomak villages 
whose members needed special permission for travel and, even then, villagers 
were restricted to an area of 30 kms from their residence. The same policy was 
in force for visitors who also needed the special permits, issued by the police. 
Although the restricted zone was abolished in 1995, the long time that it was in 
force contributed to negative feelings amongst the local groups.
A combination of factors led to the mobilisation of the Muslim minority 
and to demands that took on a more international character during the 1990s. 
Factors such as the restrictive measures, the new ‘Modernist’ Muslim elite and 
the restructuring of the Greek regional system, led to the unification of the 
Muslim minority. The Muslims expression of their grievances took the fonn of 
demonstrations and the public burning of schoolbooks provided by the Greek 
government during the beginning of the 1990s.
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3.2.4 Reasons for conflict
The conflict evolved around two main issues: religion and education. In the case
t  •of religion the issue of controversy was the appointment of the Mufti. When 
the last appointed Mufti of Rhodopi (1943) died in 1986, the Greek state 
appointed a new Mufti (in accordance with Greek law). The ‘Modernist’ Muslim 
elite, who enjoyed mass support at the time (see in the later chapter on Muslim 
politics), mobilised the population against the appointment and elected an 
unofficial Mufti who was subsequently imprisoned for obstructing the law of 
justice.
The controversy also spread to the issue of vakoufia. This is religious 
property administered by a committee of Muslims who are appointed by the 
Greek state. Muslims claimed that these appointments were made without prior 
consultation with the Muslim community and as a result the property was 
mismanaged. Greece insisted on its policy for the state appointment of the 
Mufti. (See also Appendix 1)
The other controversy related to the issue of Muslim education, a subject 
that is considered as a separate chapter. Briefly, however, there were two issues 
that led to Muslim demands during the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. The 
first concerned the Special Pedagogical Academy for the training of Muslim 
teachers. The representatives of the Muslim community argued that the purpose 
of this Academy was to replace the Turkish teachers, and perceived it as a means 
of assimilating the Muslims into Greek society. The second concerned the issue 
of schoolbooks. The Greek government had appointed a group of academics in 
the 1990s to prepare new school textbooks for the Muslim schools in order to 
replace the old ones written in the 1950s. This angered the Muslim minority who 
refused to use books not coming from Turkey and again accused Greece of an 
assimilationist policy.
Both issues (of conflict) have a more symbolic meaning for the Muslim 
minority: a demand for cultural self determination that - given the gradually 
developing physical and ideological links with Turkey shown in this overview -
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becomes a demand for ethnic self-determination. In both cases the mass reaction 
against the Greek state appointments emphasised the unity of the community 
with its own distinctive identity.
The issue of religion faded away but the issue of education remained as 
the primary concern of the Muslim community (another indicator in itself of 
growing national/ethnic identification over religious identity). Recent reforms 
(1995) by the Greek state included a special university entrance process to 
enable Muslim students to study in Greek universities. The Muslim community 
reacted to the educational laws by abstaining from Muslim schools for five days. 
As Baltsiotis argues this was contradictory to previous complaints of the Muslim 
minority that they were excluded from the Greek universities. (Baltsiotis 1998: 
p. 320)
There are two other areas in which the Muslim minority showed its 
dissatisfaction. First, towards the end of the 1980s a large number of Pontian 
Greeks from the ex-Soviet Union arrived in Greece and were accommodated in 
Western Thrace. The newcomers, themselves a previous ethnic minority, had a 
developed Greek ethnic and Greek Orthodox religious identity. Their placement 
in the area was perceived as an attempt to boost the declining Christian 
population of the area at the expense of the Muslims.
Finally, there has been a movement in recent years by Christian Greek 
associations and individuals to reassess the Pomak cultural life with emphasis on 
its distinctiveness and ancient autochthonous origins. Again the Muslim 
community perceives this as an attempt to dissolve its unity, (ibid.).
In summary, the period from the 1970s till today has witnessed the 
unification of the Muslim minority and the transformation of their religious 
identity through demands for ethnic self-determination. The Muslim community, 
under the influence of the ‘modernist’ ideology, expressed their wish for ethnic 
recognition through their dissatisfaction over religious and educational issues. 
As shown in this brief historical overview, the process of changing identities
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was gradual and was closely connected to Greek-Turkish relations over the last 
century.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the main historical events that shaped the society of 
Western Thrace in the relatively short period from 1923, when it became part of 
the Greek state to the present day. The first part concentrated on general 
characteristics of the region such as the geography and demography of the area. 
With regard to the Muslim minority, a brief account was given of the 
ethnological composition and social position of the Muslim citizens in Greek 
society. Factors such as the region’s short history within the Modem Greek 
state, Greek-Turkish relations and the existence of cultural diversity, have served 
as a basis for identity formation in Western Thrace for both the Christian and 
Muslim populations.
The focus of the second part of the chapter was to explore the most 
important periods of the 20th century in the area of Western Thrace in relation to 
the Muslim minority and the challenges posed for the Greek state. It was shown 
that identity formation is an on-going process closely connected (in relation or 
response) to these historical developments.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the present chapter.
First, the location of Western Thrace, although geographically isolated 
from the other Greek regions, is relatively important for both strategic and 
economic reasons. Consequently, as we have seen, all the neighbouring 
countries had territorial ambitions for the area. Although at the present moment 
Western Thrace is placed among the poorest regions in the EU, its natural 
wealth and geographical position are assets for future development. In addition, 
recent developments such as the new political realities in Bulgaria and the 
possibility for Turkey’s entry to the EU could bring new economic and social 
expansion in the area.
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Second, there is no accurate statistical information on the present size of 
the Muslim population as the last census that included religious affiliations was 
taken in 1951. Nevertheless, it is estimated that out of a total of 360,000 people 
in Western Thrace, around 120,000 are Muslim citizens who live mainly in the 
prefectures of Xanthi and Rhodopi. The Muslim minority today is a unified 
group in terms of its national loyalties and affiliations. But as for ethnic 
background, three groupings can be identified: the Turks, the Pomaks and the 
Muslim Rom. What unifies the three groups is religion, which also defines their 
existence and the framework of policies that affect the Muslim society 
(according to the Lausanne Treaty).
Third, the Muslim society is relatively isolated from the Christian one. It 
can be argued that both communities coexist in parallel societies. This isolation 
is demonstrated in the differences between their residential areas, levels of 
education, economic activity and social status, including class differences and 
rural/urban divides. These cleavages can be also found within the Muslim 
community itself. For example, the Pomaks tend to live in more rural areas than 
the Turks and Rom and the Turks are usually more prosperous than the other 
two groups.
Finally, two ideological movements can be distinguished within the 
Muslim minority, both of which determined the later demands of its members 
for ethnic self-determination. Both relate to Greek-Turkish relations and the 
historical circumstances that encouraged their development. Until the 1950s the 
Muslim elite was attached to the traditional and religious values of the Ottoman 
empire. This ‘Old Muslim’ trend was satisfied with the religious definition 
granted by the Lausanne Treaty and focused on the satisfaction of religious 
rights.
Active since the 1930s, a ‘Modernist’ trend has become the leading force 
in Muslim minority affairs. There was a gradual change in identification patterns 
with more focus on a rising ethnic consciousness. By the 1990s the previous
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religious identity had been replaced by demands for ethnic recognition. These 
demands were reflected in Muslim dissatisfaction with religious and educational 
policies.
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Notes
1. There is reciprocity of the terms in relation to the Christian Majority that was 
also excluded and remained in Istanbul.
2. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the ‘Great Idea’ was the main 
ideological force of the newly created Greek state for most of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. The main aim was to liberate all regions which 
were inhabited by Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox populations and have 
not been included in the independent Greek state. The Great idea reflected 
the prophecies for liberation, well known during the Ottoman empire (Clogg 
1995: p.50)
3. And subsequently for the Greeks that remained in Turkey, a subject beyond 
the interests of the present study
4. At the time of Herodotus all people who lived south of the Haimos and 
Rhodopi ranges including the Aegean, Propontis and Macedonia were called 
Thracians. The people on the north of this border were considered as 
‘barbarians’ (Delopoulos 1994: p.351).
5. This is an unchanged boundary since the era of Macedonian domination in 
the 4th century BC.
6. According to Rozakis there are three reasons that the question of language 
and religion are not included in recent censuses. First, as an effort by the 
Greek state to integrate the population into one linguistic and religious body. 
Second, due to Greek conservatism which stems from the limited mobility of 
a large part of the population and from the relative isolation of the country. 
Third, the fact that some of the minorities, like the Muslim one, have been 
identified with the territorial claims of neighbouring countries. (Rozakis 
1996: p.98)
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7. Recent efforts, mainly from Christian Greeks, have been made to highlight 
and support a Pomak culture for example to create a written form of Pomak 
language or collect folk songs and poetry which is mostly condemned by the 
Pomaks (the same efforts have been made for the Muslim Rom).
8. More on these sources are mentioned in the study of the Rom by Zegkines 
(1994).
9. Three examples show a weak civic identity of the Muslim citizens as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. To recap, first, for the Christian 
population all civic duties are performed by state institutions. For the 
Muslims, certain civil duties such as divorce or inheritance issues, are 
performed by the religious authority of the Mufti (although legally such 
duties can be pursued by the Greek civil institutions). Second, some Muslim 
conscripts were not allowed to carry guns, instead being allocated to 
secondary and unarmed services. This practice has recently stopped but 
overall, in the army policies and attitudes regarding the Muslim minority are 
not yet clear (Marangoudakis & Kelly 2000: p. 10). Third, a segregated 
educational system leaves little room for a shared culture. Some of the 
curriculum is common for both Muslim and Christian students: however, the 
existence of separate schools satisfies the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, 
whilst widening the gap in Western Thrace society. There have been recent 
changes -  what the government calls ‘a positive discrimination’ system -  to 
encourage the entrance of Muslim students into Greek universities. These 
changes, as in the case of the army, coincide with the state’s recent efforts to 
strengthen a Greek civic society that is also weak in comparison to other 
European societies.
10. Lack of access is not a problem only confined to Western Thrace, as many 
Aegean islands and other mountainous areas also face similar problems.
11. It can be argued that another reason for this agreement was an effort to 
keep alive the expansionist ideas of both sides concerned.
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12. While the Serbo-Bulgarian tension was escalating, Rumania also started to 
march towards Sofia and Turks advanced its eastern border taking once 
more Adrianople. In the outcome of this war, Bulgaria was in a very weak 
position (Crampton 1983: pp.422-423)
13. The north part of Macedonia was annexed to Serbia, Greece gained 
Thessaloniki and north Epiros (today southern Albania) and the port of 
Kavala in the eastern part of Macedonia.
14. In 1920 the Treaty of Sevres was signed between Greece and the Ottoman 
empire according to which Smyrna was to be administered by Greece for 
five years and could be annexed to Greece if  the people decided so. In 
addition, the Treaty annexed to Greece the area of Eastern Thrace which 
together with Western Thrace gave Greece entire control over the Aegean 
coastline. (Stavrianos 2000: p.581). However, Turkey never ratified the 
Treaty.
15. During the First World War the ‘Great Idea’ was not the predominant 
ideology that united the Greeks. In contrast it became the source of a deep 
disagreement also known in modem Greek history as Ethnikos Dihasmos 
(National Schism). The controversy lay over the issue of Greek 
participation in the First World War. The National Schism of 1915-16 had 
left deep divisions within the Greek society: divisions that also reappear in 
the later period of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) (Clogg 1995: p.153). 
The issue of National Schism affected the position of ethnic minorities who 
were viewed with suspicion as their vote protested against Greek 
nationalism and was perceived as a threat to Greek sovereignty (see also 
chapter 7). (Mavrogordatos 1983: p. 238).
16. Greece was unable to put forward any further claims in Eastern Thrace; the 
borders of the two countries converged at the river Evros, and remain the 
same today. The total area of Thracian territory incorporated by Greece 
was 8,586km2. According to the terms of the treaty the two countries were
169
under mutual obligation to maintain a demilitarised zone of thirty 
kilometres wide on either sides of the borders. (Svolopoulos 1994: p.268).
17. It should be noted that all provisions and obligations refer to non-Muslim 
populations of Turkey. Article 45 highlights the same obligations for 
Greece: The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the 
non-Muslim minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on 
the Muslim minority in her territory.
18. Even during the 1920s there were members attached to Turkish nationalist 
ideals, but they did not have the degree of influence of the religious elite.
19. The Asia Minor Greeks faced many problems adapting to Greek society. 
Most were impoverished as they left everything behind, some spoke only 
Turkish or Greek dialects and many lost members of their families during 
the war. Most importantly, the refugees carried the memories of their lost 
land for many decades after their arrival, which prolonged their 
incorporation into Greek society.
20. The good relations were disturbed in the middle of the 1950’s. The 
increasing conflict over Cyprus and the involvement of British and 
American diplomacy led to the persecution of the Greek minority in 
Istanbul (Clogg, 1995: p. 159). In fear for their lives many Greeks fled 
Turkey. By 1990 only about 3,000 Greeks resided in Istanbul and a few 
hundred in Imvros and Tenedos (ibid.: p. 224) and this means that the 
Lausanne Treaty terms for population reciprocity have been undermined. 
These events however did not have an impact on the Muslim minority in 
Western Thrace (Alexandris & Paresoglou 1994: p.820). As Herakleidis 
argues, Greece was very careful in handling the situation of the Greek 
minority in Istanbul and did not seek to adopt similar measures against the 
Muslims in Western Thrace in 1955, as well as in later crises. (Herakleidis 
1997: p.233)
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21. One example is the appointment of the Rom Muslim (Ahmed Damatoglou) 
as a Mufti of Didimotihon (in the prefecture of Evros) in 1973 and a non- 
Muslim as a chairman of the council for the administration of religious 
organisations in the prefecture of Xanthi. (Poulton, 1993: p. 184).
22. The Mufti has judicial duties such as over family or inheritance matters and 
is responsible for the appointment of the imams (clergy) and the 
management of religious property (yakoufia).
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Chapter 6
Education of the Muslim Minority
1. Introduction
Education is a significant feature of every modem state, playing an important 
role in the creation of a common national identity above any other ‘sub-identity’ 
based on class, locality, religion or language. For this reason it can often be 
observed that educational issues feature prominently in political agendas. 
Moreover, primary importance is given to education with the creation of new 
states or in international agreements signed by states (Smith 1991: p. 118).
In most cases, national identity is closely related to the values of the 
major/dominant ethnic group and education is the vehicle for the formation and 
perpetuation of their ethnic identity (Fragoudaki 1995: p. 15). Ethnic or religious 
minority groups in a society can often find themselves outsiders as far as this 
side of education is concerned. For the same reason, education often becomes 
the object of grievance and dissatisfaction for members of ethnic or religious 
minorities. Minority education can become a point of unification where 
particular ethnic or religious identities are formed and preserved.
In Greece the education of the Muslim minority, which is common for 
the three ethnic groups (Turks, Pomaks and Rom), is defined by the Lausanne 
Treaty (1923) and other subsequent agreements between Greece and Turkey. 
Despite the existence of these agreements, Muslim education has proved to be a 
subject of controversy. There have been complaints from members of the 
Muslim minority about an increasing ‘Hellenisation’ of the Muslim minority 
education system on one hand and the inadequate quality of education on the 
other. There are differing views on Muslim education between the two 
ideological trends, the ‘Modernists’ and ‘Old Muslims’1. The subject of Muslim
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education is not only a Muslim concern but is often featured in existing 
academic literature concerning the Muslims of Western Thrace (see Appendix 
1).
The present chapter explores Muslim education by concentrating on 
three issues. First, the various agreements between Greece and Turkey and their 
articles will be examined. Briefly, the major document for the definition of 
Muslim minority education is the Lausanne Treaty. The 1923 Treaty was 
followed by the Educational Agreement of 1951 (initiated by the Council of 
Europe), the Vienna report of 1967 and the Educational Protocol of 1968. Since 
1968 there have been no further agreements between the two counties regarding 
the education of the Muslim minority but successive Greek governments have 
introduced legislation in attempts to modernise the educational system.
The chapter next examines the structure of Muslim education at primary, 
secondary and tertiary level. The educational agreements between Greece and 
Turkey cover only primary schools. This section discusses the effects and 
complications of this arrangement as many Muslim students continue their 
secondary and tertiary education in Turkey.
Following this, the chapter then concentrates on particular problems 
faced by the Muslim students in the present educational system. Significant 
factors are poor linguistic skills, compounded by bilingualism, trilingualism, and 
the low level of education in the Muslim community in general. Moreover, the 
difference in pedagogical style of the Greek and Muslim teacher creates 
controversial attitudes towards authority. Finally, despite education being 
compulsory for all students for nine years, most Muslim female students finish 
their education in primary school after six years. Neither the Greek state nor the 
Muslim leadership is especially proactive in challenging this situation.
In general terms, the aim of the chapter is to show that due to state 
agreements and the structure of the Muslim minority educational system, 
Muslim students today face problems that become an obstacle to their personal
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and career development and subsequent status in society. The agreements were 
the result of particular periods in Greek-Turkish relations rather than the 
outcome of fruitful efforts to improve the education of the respective minorities. 
Recent regulations and initiatives such as the scheme for ‘positive 
discrimination’ in the entrance criteria for universities, the abolition in 1995 of 
the special licence in the mountainous area have brought positive results as more 
Muslim students started to attend higher education. However, these can be 
viewed only as initial steps and further actions are required both from the state 
and the Muslim minority to overcome these obstacles.
2. Treaties and Agreements concerning the Education of the Muslim 
Minority
Muslim education since the mid-1980s has became the object of grievances 
between the members of the Muslim minority and the Greek authorities. These 
grievances were triggered by the authoring and circulation of books in the 
Turkish language by the Greek state instead of those supplied by Turkey as had 
been the case until then. The Greek government justified its actions by arguing 
that the books from Turkey took such a considerable time to arrive that the 
students’ curriculum suffered as a consequence whilst the Muslims perceived it 
as an effort of assimilation. Demonstrations followed and the Greek-produced 
books were publicly burned.
This was the most extreme incident that expressed the opposition of the 
Muslim minority to the Greek government2. Looking at the short history of the 
area it can be observed that educational issues have been consistently the subject 
of talks, agreements, treaties and regulations signed by Greece and Turkey at 
various historical moments. All these shaped the structure of the Muslim 
minority educational system and the equivalent Greek educational system in 
Turkey.
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2.1 The Lausanne Treaty
The signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 constituted the Muslim minority in 
Western Thrace - and at the same time the Greek population of Istanbul, 
Tenedos and Imvros - as a legal entity. The various articles of the Treaty were 
designed to protect the basic rights of the two respective minority populations 
with regard to their cultural, linguistic and religious freedom and survival.
Articles 37-45 of the Treaty specified particular issues that needed to be 
guaranteed protection. According to Articles 40 to 42, both Greece and Turkey 
were obliged to provide adequate facilities for Muslim/Christian children 
(respectively) to be educated in their native language. However, the state could 
also include its official language in the school curriculum as a compulsory 
lesson where it was deemed important. In areas inhabited by minority 
populations, both states were to contribute economic assistance to the 
educational establishments. In addition to these provisions, minority populations 
had every right to set up and manage any charitable organisations, religious or 
private educational establishments that were privately funded and used the 
minority’s own language (see also chapter 5).
Whilst the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty established the basic 
principles for the education of the minority populations in Greece and Turkey, 
they were not adequate to cover all future issues and therefore further 
agreements that followed were based on the reciprocity clause3. The first attempt 
by Greece and Turkey at the creation of a legal framework for the Muslim 
minority in Greece was in the 1930s. Following the agreements in the area of 
Western Thrace, the Greek language was introduced as compulsory in Muslim 
schools for certain lessons. It was also during the thirties that the Muslim 
schools in Greece started to carry the label ‘Turkish’ schools and were 
characterised as such by the Prime Minister, Venizelos4.
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More serious consideration was given to the issue of education after the 
Second World War. Three separate agreements were reached between Greece 
and Turkey during that period.
2.2 The Educational Agreement o f 1951
In April 1951, Greece and Turkey signed a five-year Educational Agreement 
(morfotiki simfonia). During this period there were equal numbers of minority 
populations in both states: the Greek population in Istanbul and Muslim minority 
population in Western Thrace. The year after the agreement took place both 
Greece and Turkey became part of NATO5. This agreement which was signed in 
a brief period of detente between the two countries was significant in 
establishing a Turkish education system in Western Thrace (Anagnostou 1999:
p. 161).
In addition, it should be noted that the agreement took place not as a 
Greek-Turkish initiative to solve the educational problems of their respective 
minorities but instead under the guidance of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. On the 5 of November 1949, the Committee of the Foreign 
Ministers of the Council of Europe advised the states’ members of the Council 
to establish educational agreements. Responding to this in Ankara in 1951, 
Greece and Turkey proceeded to sign the agreement. A committee composed of 
two Turkish and two Greek members was set up to enforce the agreement. As 
well as meeting at least once annually to discuss any progress, this committee 
met every time there was a problem (Panagiotidis 1995: p. 27).
The proposals of the 1951 Educational Agreement (ratified in 1952 in 
Greece) included the establishment of educational institutions, the exchange of 
instructors, students and teaching materials, the establishment of scholarships 
and the teaching of the Greek/Turkish language, history and literature in the 
respective educational establishments. It was proposed that each country should 
establish cultural institutions and youth centres and promote the free circulation 
of books and other publications.
176
The most important part of this agreement for the future o f the Muslim 
education in Greece was the introduction of the Turkish language using the 
Latin alphabet which came to gradually replace (until the 1970s) the commonly 
used Arabic language and alphabet (Tsitselikis 1996: p.352). This feature 
reflects the ideological trends within the Muslim community itself. As we have 
seen, during the 1950s, the influence of the ‘Modernist’ wing started to increase. 
This more secularised ideological trend within the Muslim minority encouraged 
closer links with Turkey and campaigned for the introduction of Turkish 
language in primary schools. For the first time the Pomak and the Rom 
populations were taught Turkish as the main language of the Muslim minority. 
This is often viewed in the existing literature as a turning point for the future 
unification of the Muslim minority.
2.3 The Vienna Report 1968
The Vienna report (ekthesi tis Viennis) came after the critical time in the Greek- 
Turkish relations during the 1950s and 1960s. Although it is not a treaty as such 
with binding clauses it is nevertheless seen as being an important first step 
towards the 1968 educational protocol that sought to improve general relations 
between the two countries (Panagiotidis 1996: 27). In 1968 the foreign ministers 
of Greece and Turkey agreed each to appoint a representative who would 
investigate the particular problems of the two states with special emphasis on the 
minorities. The representatives would then report to their governments.
The two representatives explored the existing problems and proposed 
solutions for the areas that needed further investigation. On the issue of 
education, the need for minority languages to be used freely in the school 
curriculum was highlighted along with the serious lack of school books in 
minority languages in the Muslim minority community of Western Thrace and 
that of the Greek minority of Istanbul, Tenedos and Imvros. Additionally, the 
reinstatement of state teachers (Greek and Turkish respectively in minority 
schools) who were removed during the turbulent years in the 1960s was
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proposed. Finally, it was agreed to prohibit the use of labels or the organisation 
of school events that would be insulting to the ‘religious or ethnic consciousness 
of the Greek and Turkish people’ (ibid.: p.28). In real terms this last suggestion 
was aimed at the removal of controversial labels such as the ‘Turkish school’ in 
Western Thrace.
2.4 The Greek -Turkish Educational Protocol o f 1968
The Vienna proposals were considered and approved by the foreign ministers of 
Greece and Turkey at their meeting in London on 27th of June 1968. This report 
led to the 1968 Educational Protocol (Morfotiko Protokolo) signed by the 
dictatorial Greek government and the then Turkish government. The 1951 
Agreement contained few articles that were legally binding and most merely 
suggested what was thought best for the minority population rather than 
committing the states to formal obligations.
According to the 1968 Protocol for the Muslims of Western Thrace, the 
use of the Greek and Turkish languages, suggested in the 1951 Agreement, was 
officially established. More particularly Turkish was agreed upon as the working 
language for most subjects with the exception of history, geography and the 
Greek language. The study of the environment was added to the list of Greek- 
language taught lessons at a later date (a more detailed examination of this 
subject list and working languages will take place later in the chapter). 
Educational materials and books in Turkish were to be sent and distributed by 
Turkey - or Greece for the Greek minority in Turkey - after an initial approval 
from the Greek State. Finally, the Protocol governed issues of discrimination in 
the classroom of both Muslim and Greek students respectively. Teachers were 
given guidelines for their behaviour in the classroom and were not permitted to 
remark or comment on sensitive issues.
Again, as in the case of the 1951 Agreement, the 1968 Protocol also 
marks an ideological change within the Muslim population in Western Thrace. 
The establishment of the Turkish language as a second working language in the
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classroom for all sections of the Muslims minority (Turks-Pomaks-Rom) can be 
identified with the aims and aspirations of the ‘Modernists’ who emphasised the 
provision of a more secular, state-based education (in this case the Turkish 
state). It was from that point on that a more ethnically unifying educational 
system was to follow.
2.5 From the Protocol to today
Both the 1951 Agreement and the 1968 Protocol can be considered to be the 
initial steps towards a legal framework for the education of the Muslim minority. 
A further step taken by the Greek government in 1969 was the establishment of 
a Special Pedagogical Academy in Thessaloniki offering a primary school 
teacher training course for Muslim students. The creation of this Special 
Academy gave students the opportunity to continue their higher education in 
Greece (although only for the profession of primary school teacher), upgraded 
the quality of teachers training and most significantly aimed at reducing the 
number of the Turkish teachers employed in the Muslim schools of Western 
Thrace6. (Tsitselikis 1996: 350)
In addition to the opening of the Special Academy, further laws were 
introduced from 1977 onwards, which gave a more clarified structure to Muslim 
primary education. Two of the most important were law 694/77 and law 695/77. 
The first defined the establishment of Muslim schools as part of Muslim 
education as public (i.e. a state provision) with accordance to the Lausanne 
Treaty. It also sets the criteria for opening Muslim schools and their general 
management and inspection. The second, law 695/77, referred to the legal 
framework for the employment of Muslim teachers including the trained 
teachers in the Special Academy (ibid.).
After 1991, the thrust of the general policy towards Western Thrace and 
minority issues changed . Educational policy was also reviewed and changes 
took place with the introduction of law 2341/95. As seen above, a system of 
‘positive discrimination’ was introduced enabling Muslim students to continue
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their education in the Greek universities and technical schools. According to this 
system the Muslim students were required to pass the general university exams, 
but the method of admission was more advantageous for them than for Greek 
students. Muslim students were encouraged to follow Greek tertiary education 
instead of going to Turkish universities, which until 1996 had been almost the 
only option for Muslim students. This encouragement, on one hand, gave more 
opportunities to Muslim students from various economic backgrounds to achieve 
the same educational standards as Christians. On the other hand, attendance in 
Greek universities aimed at reducing the Turkish nationalist influence on the 
members of Western Thrace8. The effects of these reforms are examined later in 
chapter.
3. The Structure of the Muslim minority Education
3.1 Pre-school Education
Pre-school education in Greece is provided by nursery schools and attendance is
1/2 1/2compulsory. The duration of studies is for two years from age of 3 to 5 .
According to the official publication on the Greek educational system, 
the role of nursery schools is “to help infants develop physically, emotionally, 
intellectually and socially within the context of the wider purpose set by primary 
and secondary education”9. Increasingly pre-school education is regarded by 
education specialists as highly beneficial for preparing children to enter school 
life.
Pre-school education for Muslim students is not part of the above 
educational agreements and therefore is not provided as part of the Muslim 
educational system. The main reason for this exclusion is that pre-school 
education was not widely available at the time of the treaties for either 
community. However, when nursery schools were established for the Christian 
population all over the country no steps were taken for a pre-school Muslim 
education.
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The opening of nursery schools in the Muslim educational system is 
considered to be, by both Christians and Muslim teachers of particular benefit as 
an introduction to the bilingual education that follows in primary schools 
(Tsitselikis 1996: p358). Despite the perceived benefits until recently there had 
been reluctance to raise the issue. For example some members of the Muslim 
community took the view that the introduction of nursery schools would be as 
part of an assimilation process - as can be seen in the letter of Nazim Reficka, 
Editor of a local newspaper10 (cited in Panagiotidis 1996: p. 102).
For the Greek government too, the establishment of nursery schools 
posed practical problems such as the issue of qualified Muslim nursery school 
teachers (already a controversial area for primary education as we shall see 
later). It should be mentioned however, that pre-school education appears 
increasingly in the demands of the Muslim minority and featured in all 
interviews of the present study. Today there are about 185 nursery schools 
established in Muslim areas following the demand of local parents. However, 
nursery schools are part of the Greek/Christian mainstream educational system 
and the instruction language is therefore Greek11. In this way, bilingual 
education is not being introduced to students.
3.2 Primary Muslim Education
Today there are about 230 Muslim minority primary schools in Western Thrace
1and the student attendance starts at 5 years old, as in the case of the Christian 
students. The ethnic composition of these schools can be divided into four 
categories: schools where the students are predominately Turkish, schools with 
mainly Pomak students, schools with Rom children and finally mixed schools 
where Muslim students from all three ethnic groups attend (Kanakidou 1994: 
p.72-73). Table 5 below shows in more detail the distribution of Muslim schools 
of each category in the three prefectures of Western Thrace. The ethnic 
composition of schools depends mainly on the geographical distribution of the 
Muslim population.
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Table 5: Ethnic Composition o f  Muslim primary schools
Ethnic Composition Xanthi Rhodopi Evros Total
Turks 32 78 8 118
Pomak 38 26 9 73
Rom - 3 3 6
Mixed 6 28 1 35
Total 76 135 21 232
Source: in Panagiotidis 1996: p.39
3.2.1 Classes and Language
As we have seen previously, according to educational agreements signed by 
Greece and Turkey (1951, 1968), Turkish and Greek were established as the 
teaching languages in Muslim primary schools. Turkish was treated as the 
mother tongue and Greek as the official language. Following the above 
agreements further laws were passed from 1968 onwards and provided a specific 
curriculum, teaching timetable and schoolbooks for Muslim primary schools.
Accordingly, subjects such as history and geography are taught in the 
Greek language, and the subjects of religion, arithmetic/geometry and natural 
history are taught in Turkish. Books for subjects taught in Greek are provided by 
the Greek State and are the same as the ones circulated in Christian schools all 
over the country. For the subjects taught in the Turkish language, the books are 
provided by Turkey, and since the 1990s, as we have seen, by Greece.
The following two Tables provide more analytical information about the 
classes taken by Muslim primary School students.
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Table 6: Hours per week spent in Greek language lessons
Subjects Primary School Year Total hours 
per week1 2 3 4 5 6
Greek language 11 11 10 10 10 10 62
History - - 2 2 2 2 8
Geography - - - 2 2 2 6
Civic education - - - 1 1 1 3
Environment 2 2 2 - - - 6
Singing lessons 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 3
Physical education 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 3
Total 14 14 15 16 16 16 91
Source: The data is from the Kanakidou study, 1994: pp. 83-91 
Table 7: Hours per week spent in Turkish language lessons
Subjects Primary school Year Total hours 
per week1 2 3 4 5 6
Religion - 2 3 3 3 3 14
Turkish language 8 9 8 7 7 7 46
Maths-Geometry 3 3 3 3 3 3 18
Natural history - - - 2 2 2 6
Handicrafts 1 3 2 1 1 1 9
Singing Lessons Vi 1/2 1/2 1/2 Vi Vi 3
Physical
education
x/2 1/2 1/2 Yl Vi Vi 3
Total 13 18 17 17 17 17 99
Source: The data is from the Kanakidou study, 1994: pp. 83-91
In primary schools, Muslim students come into contact formally with the 
Greek language for the first time -  this is especially true for those students who 
come from more isolated areas of the countryside or mountain villages. Lack of 
pre-school education also delays the introduction to the Greek language and 
makes the process more abrupt.
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As can be observed in Table 6, the number hours for the Greek language 
lessons remains fairly stable throughout the years. By comparison, the hours 
spent in Turkish language lessons increase after the second year and remain the 
same until the end (Table 7). Combined, the hours taught in each language are 
approximately the same (i.e. the students are taught only a few more hours in 
Turkish language). However the students face linguistic difficulties in the Greek 
taught subjects. From the very beginning, due to lack of background knowledge 
of Greek the educational material cannot be completely covered, a situation that 
the effects of which are seen in later years. For example, when the subject of
fhgeography taught in Greek is introduced in the 4 year, Muslim students can 
lack a fundamental vocabulary such as 'river' or 'lake'. The Christian teacher 
therefore experiences difficulties in the classroom (Kanakidou, 1994: p.90). The 
same problems arise when history and civic education are introduced.
There is also a problem with the Greek books that are distributed in 
Muslim schools. As it has been mentioned earlier, the books for the Greek 
taught lessons are the same as the ones in Christian schools for national 
curriculum. These books are therefore designed for students who have first, 
Greek as a mother tongue and are familiar with the Greek alphabet (ibid.: 85) 
and second, do not receive a bilingual education. This difficulty with the books 
combined with the obstacle of covering the appropriate material in each year as 
laid down by the ministerial guidelines is repeated throughout primary school. 
Most importantly, this incomplete education reflects upon the performance of 
Muslim students in secondary schools, as we shall see later.
3.2.2 Teaching Staff
According to the Treaties, Christian teachers are responsible for the lessons 
taught in Greek and Muslim teachers responsible for lessons in Turkish. In total 
there are about 320 Christian teachers and 420 Muslim teachers teaching in the 
Muslim primary schools of Western Thrace in 1996 (Panagiotidis, 1996: p.48).
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Muslim primary school teachers are divided into two categories on the 
basis of their citizenship. The first category covers teachers of Turkish 
citizenship, whose number is defined by the Foreign Ministry. This is organised 
as part of the Lausanne Treaty and the reciprocal arrangement which is in place 
for an equivalent number of Greek teachers to teach in Greek schools in Turkey. 
In the second category are teachers who are Greek Muslim citizens who can be 
graduates of three different educational establishments: pedagogical colleges / 
universities in Turkey, the Special Pedagogical Academy in Greece, and special 
Muslim religious schools (Kanakidou 1994: p.76, Panagiotidis 1996: p.48).
The following Table shows the composition of Muslim primary school teachers 
in Western Thrace:
Table 8: Composition o f  Muslim primary school teachers (1996)
Christians Greek Muslims Turkish
Citizens
teachers
Total
Special
Pedagogical
Academy
Graduates 
from a 
Turkish 
Academy
Graduates
from
Religious
Schools
Total 348 247 93 81 9 778
Source: the data is provided in Panagiotidis 1996: p. 48
The graduates from the Turkish academies usually take a more 
‘modernist’ view of the Muslim minority affairs. The graduates from religious 
schools are mainly employed privately and usually become Imams (local 
Muslim priests) in the villages. In the past, graduates from the religious academy 
were members of the ‘old-Muslim’ wing of the Muslim minority in Western 
Thrace, attached to more traditional values and conservative views and 
ideologically opposed to the ‘Modernists’.
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The establishment in the 1970s of the Special Pedagogical Academy in 
Thessaloniki and the placement of its graduates in Muslim minority schools for 
teaching lessons in the Turkish language had two specific aims. First, to replace 
teacher-graduates of Turkish academies who had little Greek education, and 
second to replace the ‘Old Muslim’ religious teachers whose education was 
mainly theological. These religious teachers were called upon to teach all 
lessons, even the sciences. Overall, the Greek state aimed to reduce the number 
of teachers with a Turkish nationalist bias. As a result of this ideological goal, 
initially some members of the Muslim minority did not always welcome 
graduates from the Special Pedagogical Academy and were suspicious of the 
teachers. The issue of the Special Pedagogical Academy still remains 
controversial (see Appendix 1).
3.3 Secondary Education
Secondary education in Greece consists of two levels. The gymnasium lasts for 
three years and is compulsory for every student between the ages of 12-15. The 
role of the gymnasium is to provide a general education at a high level. The 
lyceum, the second level, is also for three years for students between the ages of 
15-18 and is not compulsory. Education in the lyceum is more specialised and is 
designed to prepare students for university entrance examinations.
Neither the Lausanne Treaty nor any of the other treaties that followed 
gave a legal framework for Muslim secondary education. The Greek government 
had to deal with the problem of Muslim secondary education from the 1960s 
onwards when the demand arose. It was also at that time that nine-year 
compulsory education was introduced as a minimum requirement at an 
international level (Tsitselikis 1996: p. 357).
Today the following type of schools provide secondary education for Muslim 
students
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a. Two Muslim minority gymnasiums and lyceums: The Tzelal Bayar 
gymnasium in Komotini opened in 1952 and the Muslim minority 
gymnasium in Xanthi opened in 1965.
b. Two religious schools, one in Rhodopi and the other in Echinos (in the 
prefecture of Xanthi)
c. Five mainstream secondary {gymnasium and lysium) schools in the 
mountainous areas of both Rhodopi and Xanthi. All lessons are taught in 
Greek with exception of religion, which is taught in Turkish.
In the first category, the two schools are private and function in the same 
way as other private schools in the country (Kanakidou 1994: p.77). The first 
Muslim secondary schools opened in 1952 in Rhodopi and the second in 1965 in 
Xanthi. Lessons are taught for equal hours in both languages and are staffed 
with both Muslim and Christian teachers.
The two religious schools function in the same way as other religious 
schools in Greece. The emphasis is on theology but other lessons are taught as 
well. The duration of the study here is five years. In the past, graduates from 
these schools used to be employed as teachers in Muslim schools. In many 
cases, they also became the imams of the village. Since 1978, the law 
concerning their job eligibility changed. Graduates can now only be employed 
under private contracts rather than the civil service contracts that ordinary 
teachers (both Christian and Muslim) hold, and knowledge of Greek language is 
a prerequisite.
The aim of opening the five mainstream secondary schools in the 
mountainous areas was twofold. That is, to provide more school positions for the 
Muslim students while making the Greek mainstream education more attractive 
to Muslims. The establishment of these schools was accompanied by a new 
system of university entrance requirements particularly favourable to the 
Muslim students.
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In general terms however, the lack of a defined policy on secondary 
education has led to some gaps in Muslim education. Many Muslim students 
choose to continue their education in Turkey. Low standards in Greek language, 
due in part to the difficulties experienced in primary school education, poorly 
equipped schools and other pedagogical shortcomings, as will be discussed later 
in the chapter, cannot prepare adequately the Muslim students for Greek 
university entrance. A Turkish university therefore is often the only other option 
open to Muslim students12.
3.4 University Education
There are two possibilities for those Muslim students once they have completed 
their secondary education and who want to continue to further education in 
Greece. First, they can choose to enter into the national exam system and 
compete for places under the general entrance examination system, with the 
recently introduced more favourable terms. Accordingly, Muslim students can 
enter universities through a quota system rather than solely on their performance 
in written examinations. The same system applies to immigrant and repatriated 
students.
The second option for Muslim students is to study at the Special 
Pedagogical Academy in Thessaloniki. Graduates from this Academy can be 
employed as teachers in Muslim minority primary schools. The duration of 
study at the Academy is two years and is considered particularly low in 
comparison to the equivalent teacher training courses for Greek mainstream 
schools which last four years. Other two-year teacher training courses existed 
until the beginning of the 1990s but considered inadequate and they were 
replaced by a four-year course. Despite this decision, the Special Pedagogical 
Academy for the training of Muslim teachers remains a two-year course (see 
Appendix 1).
Graduates of the Special Pedagogical Academy have also the option to 
transfer on to other university departments following the completion of their
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two-year course if they so wish. In addition, due to high demand and also as part 
of the law governing Muslim priests13, the Special Pedagogical Academy has 
included a department for Muslim Religious Studies to meet the educational 
requirements of Imams.
4. Section III: School Attendance and Problems faced by Muslim Students
4.1 Schools attendance
As has been mentioned above, school attendance is compulsory for all children 
for nine years, from primary school to the first level of secondary education 
(gymnasium). Statistics from the three prefectures of Western Thrace show that 
in fact primary school attendance by Muslim students is quite low and 
continuation to secondary education is even lower. On the next page, Table 9 
shows in detail the number of students registering in Muslim primary schools in 
the years between 1984 and 1986.
Table 10 shows the numbers of students graduating from the Muslim 
primary schools six years later. The data provided includes details from the three 
different prefectures and levels of attendance are arranged according to gender. 
The low number of students in the Prefecture of Evros results from only a 
fraction of Muslims (mainly Rom and Pomaks) inhabiting the area. It is worth 
mentioning that most Muslims in Rhodopi are Turks whereas more Pomaks 
inhabit the area of Xanthi (for more details see chapter 5 and Appendix 1).
Considering the data in Table 9, it is clear that of the students registering 
in Muslim minority primary schools, only about 70% actually graduate (Table 
10). To take for example the years 1986-87, 2028 Muslims students were 
registered in Muslim primary schools in all three prefectures. From that number 
only 1467 actually graduated in the years 1991-92.
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The percentage for girls is lower with only 68% in the data provided 
graduating from the primary schools. The reason for this gender distinction in 
school attendance lies principally in the values of traditional Muslim society. 
Girls entering adulthood are considered to be ready to assume the role of women 
with the result that only a small part of them continue their education.
The data does not reveal great differences among the prefectures. Both in 
Xanthi and Rhodopi, only 70% of the students registered in primary education 
actually graduate. In the prefecture of Evros, the percentage of Muslim students 
leaving school earlier is higher, but one explanation for this is that Rom children 
are less likely to follow formal education than the other two ethnic groups 
(Panagiotidis 1996: p. 42).
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Table 9: Registration in Muslim Primary Schools in the period 1984-1987
Prefecture 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 Total
M F T M F T M F T M F Total
Evros 65 54 119 89 63 152 80 88 168 234 205 439
Rhodopi 556 526 1082 648 575 575 562 771 1033 1766 1572 3338
Xanthi 391 403 794 412 406 406 429 398 827 1232 1207 2439
Total 1012 983 1995 1149 1044 2193 1071 957 2028 3232 2984 6216
Source: Co-ordination Office o f  Minority Sc lools, Ministry o f  Education provided in Panagiotidis 1996: p.41
Table 10: Graduation from Muslim Primary Schools in the period 1989-1992
Source: Co-ordination Office o f  Minority Sc lools, M
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Prefecture 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 Total
M F T M F T M F T M F Total
Evros 34 31 65 48 47 95 57 37 94 133 115 254
Rhodopi 439 367 806 411 329 740 396 352 748 1246 1048 2294
Xanthi 325 296 621 300 303 603 335 290 625 960 889 1849
Total 798 694 1492 759 679 1438 788 679 1467 2345 2052 4397
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Table 11: Registration in Secondary Greek Gymnasiums
Prefecture 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 Total
M F T M F T M F T M F Total
Evros 9 1 10 17 3 20 20 4 24 46 8 54
Rhodopi 64 30 94 88 41 129 114 57 171 266 128 394
Xanthi 92 59 151 103 65 168 146 79 225 341 203 544
Total 165 90 255 208 109 317 280 140 420 653 339 992
Source: Co-ordination Office o f  Minority Sc lools, Is/. inistry o f  Education
Table 12: Registration in Secondary Muslim Gymnasiums
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 Total
M F T M F T M F T M F Total
Evros - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rhodopi 98 30 128 102 31 133 92 34 126 292 95 387
Xanthi 19 18 37 37 18 55 31 15 46 87 51 138
Total 117 48 165 139 49 188 123 49 172 379 146 525
Source: Co-ordination Office o f  Minority Sc lools, N inistry o f  Education
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As highlighted in the Panagiotidis study, school attendance for Muslim 
students in secondary schools drops dramatically. Most students appear to finish 
their formal education in primary school. Tables 11 and 12 show the levels of 
secondary school registration of Muslim students between 1990 and 1993 (see 
Tables 9 and 10). Data is provided for both Greek mainstream education and 
Muslim minority schools at secondary level. Gender and residential distribution 
are two factors included in the statistics.
Comparing Tables 10, 11 and 12, the data shows that only 34% of the 
students in total graduating from primary schools between the period 1989 to 
1992 actually registered in secondary education. Following the previous 
example, in the period 1991-1992, 1467 students graduated from Muslim 
primary schools. Combining the numbers from Tables 11 and 12 it is apparent 
that only 592 students registered in secondary education. A percentage of 
Muslims followed secondary education in Turkey. There is no concrete data 
showing how many students choose this option but the percentage is not high. It 
can therefore be concluded that less than half of Muslim students enter 
secondary education.
As far as female secondary education is concerned, the data from Tables 
11 and 12 shows that only 23% of girls register. This figure is half of the 44% 
level reported for boys registering in secondary schools. The values of the 
traditional Muslim society again largely account for the difference. For example, 
the onset of puberty prohibits women mixing with men. Under these 
circumstances girls are hesitant or are not allowed by their parents to continue 
their education in mixed secondary schools. As there are no single sex schools in 
Greece, it is not possible to establish whether more girls would be encouraged to 
continue if there was such a provision.
Attendance in mainstream secondary schools and Muslim minority 
secondary schools is of equal numbers in Rhodopi. In the case of Xanthi, more 
Muslim students follow the mainstream secondary schools. One reason for this
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difference is that there are more Pomak people inhabiting the mountainous areas 
of Xanthi and the only Muslim minority secondary school is situated in the town 
of Xanthi, this would make commuting from these villages to the Muslim 
schools very difficult. As a consequence the students attend the five mainstream 
secondary schools operating within their immediate areas.
Data from the three prefectures shows that there is little difference 
between Xanthi (36%) and Rhodopi (34%) with regard to numbers of students 
attending secondary education. In contrast, in the prefecture of Evros, only 21% 
of Muslim students continue their education to the secondary level. This again 
illustrates that Rom children are less likely to attend secondary schools.
The above figures for school attendance reveal that less than half of the 
Muslim students register for secondary education, despite a nine-year period in 
education being compulsory. There is not the same detailed data for Muslim 
students graduating from secondary schools. Table 13 shows the percentages of 
Muslim students that follow the 9 years of compulsory education in the 
prefecture of Rhodopi only.
Table 13: Progress o f  Muslim students in the Prefecture o f  Rhodopi
1986-87 1991-92 1994-95
Registered in the 1st year 
of primary school
Graduated from primary 
schools
Graduated from Greek 
mainstream secondary 
schools
1033 748 121
Source: Data from Panagiotidis 1996, p. 45
Although definite conclusions cannot be drawn from the above table, the data 
clearly indicates the low percentage of students that actually graduate from 
secondary schools.
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4.2 Problems faced by Muslim Students
As it has been mentioned previously in the chapter, according to Greek-Turkish 
agreements made in 1951 and 1968, the Turkish language was established as the 
mother tongue for the Muslim minority and Greek as the official language. The 
educational system was accordingly adapted with some of the subjects in 
primary school being taught in Turkish. This move highlighted the development 
of the closer connections between the Muslim community and Turkey on the 
one hand and on the other, the unification of members of all three ethnic groups 
under a ‘Turkish identity’ (see Appendix 1). Thus, under the new legislation, 
Pomaks and Rom were taught in Turkish. The teaching of Turkish to the Pomak 
population was also favoured by Greece as a means of discouraging any possible 
contacts of the (slavophone) Pomaks with the then Communist Bulgaria 
(Anagnostou 1999: p. 165)
The way the educational system functions today however, means that 
Muslim students from all three ethnic groups face language problems. In 
addition to the social segregation between the Muslim and Christian societies 
these problems stem further from three factors. The first of which is the 
existence of bilingual education. Language matters become especially complex 
for Pomak and Rom children when in addition to their own language they are 
exposed to a trilingual environment. Second, their family environment and rural 
social background have been traced as contributory factors to their poor 
linguistic skills during school years. Finally, the different pedagogical style 
between Christian and Muslim teachers highlights the lack of knowledge and 
practice of education in a multi-lingual, multi-cultural environment.
4.2.1 Bilingual Education
The incorporation of bilingual education in Muslim primary schools aims to 
safeguard the linguistic rights of the Muslim minority. In school students are 
introduced formally to the two cultural environments which surround them and 
in which they will be expected to operate as individuals in the future.
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Bilingual education is achieved by teaching lessons in two languages, 
Greek and Turkish. To recap, although Turkish language lessons are taught for 
only few more hours than Greek lessons in reality Muslim students are more 
familiar with the former. As Turkish is the language spoken outside school and 
most families tend to watch Turkish channels on the television (via satellite 
dishes), the actual time Muslim students come into contact with Greek is very 
limited.
There is another factor that places the Greek language in a secondary 
position is the duration of school terms. The total number of school days is 170 
as defined by the Ministry of Education. Muslim religious holidays reduce the 
total number of days spent at School by about three extra weeks. Moreover, 
Muslim schools are not open on Fridays and although there is a special 
arrangement to open on Sundays, in reality only the Muslim teachers attend. The 
presence of a Greek teacher is therefore quite limited.
Already from the third year in primary schools there are indications of 
linguistic difficulties. When the lessons of Geography and History are 
introduced, taught in Greek, the majority of Muslim students, as we have seen 
earlier can only use basic words and tend to have a mechanistic grasp of the 
Greek language. But there are problems with the teaching of the Turkish 
language too. Most lessons taught in Turkish are technical and require only the 
basic Turkish which Muslim students are familiar with anyway. In addition, 
books for Modem Greek and Modem Turkish language are written for native 
speakers - for mainstream education of the two countries - and therefore are not 
adapted to the needs of a bilingual education.
For Pomaks and Rom the case is even more complicated. Pomak and 
Rom languages do not have a written form. The Pomak language, ‘pomahtsu\ 
can be considered to be the main feature of the Pomak identity today;14 it is what 
distinguishes the group in terms of history, culture and origin. Linguists argue 
that pomahtsu is a variation of Slavic with elements from Greek and Turkish
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languages. The Pomak language is widely used among the Pomak population 
within Greece and Bulgaria.
The other spoken language is Greek Romany which is spoken both by 
Christian and Muslim Rom15. Romany is influenced by Medieval Greek, Modem 
Persian, Armenian, and Turkish languages. There is evidence that the Rom 
language has started to be replaced by Turkish (i.e. a language shift) especially 
in the area of Rhodopi.
The 1951 Agreement and the 1968 Protocol define Turkish as the main 
language of the Muslim minority. As a result, both Pomaks and Rom experience 
trilingualism: Pomak or Rom languages in the social environment, both Turkish 
and Greek in schools. There has been dispute as to the negative affects of these 
agreements which aim to unite Muslims from the three ethnic groups into one 
entity. However, little attention has been paid to the educational problems of this 
system.
Muslim students show particularly low performance in education. 
Language is considered to be one obstacle for their development and educational 
achievement. In addition, the Pomak and Rom languages are threatened with 
extinction.
4.2.2 Poor linguistic skills
Children from various backgrounds develop different linguistic skills, which 
could affect their later performance in education. The concept of early linguistic 
skills influencing school performance is applicable in the case of Muslim 
minority students in Western Thrace, especially for those Muslims inhabiting 
countryside areas.
In general, the overall percentage of the educated population in Western 
Thrace remains low in comparison to other regions, as can be observed from 
Table 14 below. It should be added that the overall low economic performance
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(in both domestic and EU levels) of the region of Western Thrace, as we have 
seen in previous chapters, is also reflected in the educational level of the local 
population.
Table 14: Education Level o f  Population in the Greek Regions, 1991
Regions Higher Education Degree 
(%)
Without a Secondary Education 
Degree 
(%)
Attiki 10.3 42.2
Macedonia 5.4 60.6
Peloponnese 4.7 62.9
Sterea Ellada 4.5 63
Crete 5 63
Aegean Islands 4.4 64.8
Thessaly 5 66.5
Epirus 5 68.6
Ionian Islands 4.1 67.8
Western Thrace 4 72.2
Source: National Statistics Records: Census 1991
Problems arising from bilingualism and trilingualism and the low level 
of education in the social and family environment of students contribute not only 
to a limited vocabulary among Muslim students but also, in many cases, to the 
incorrect usage of language. These are the causes which lie behind why Muslim 
students show low performance in primary schools and why they are not 
adequately prepared to follow secondary or higher education. Furthermore, the 
current legal framework of Muslim education presents an obstacle to its 
upgrading. As a result, Muslim students receive an inadequate education in both 
Turkish and Greek languages (Tsitselikis 1996: p.374) in order to fulfil the legal 
requirements while the real issue of Muslim education remains overlooked.
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4.2.3 Pedagogical Style
Significant information concerning Muslim minority primary education comes 
from the research into pedagogical style conducted by Kanakidou in Western 
Thrace at the beginning of the 1990s (Kanakidou, 1994: pp. 85-92).
Kanakidou found that Muslim teachers follow a teacher-centred method 
of education emphasising their position as ‘teacher’ which is based on their age, 
position in the religious community and the knowledge of the Koran that they 
possess. In contrast, the Christian teacher uses a student-centred method which 
is based on teacher-student interaction.
Some of the differences in teaching styles observed included the attitude 
of students when the teacher entered the classroom. In the case of the Muslim 
teacher all students stood up, whereas for the Christian teachers, students were 
more relaxed and remained seated.
The study mentions that while teaching, the Muslim teacher asked very 
few questions, including, for example, ‘is two and two four?’ or ‘do I go to the 
town by bus?’ In contrast the Christian teacher would ask ‘how do I go to town’ 
or ‘what is the colour of the apples’?
This lack of consistency in teaching style highlights the inadequacies of 
an inexperienced multicultural education provided to Muslim students. This 
poses an additional problem of cultural clash to the students at primary level. 
Furthermore, the difference in teaching styles reflects to an extent the gap 
between teacher training courses in mainstream Greek Educational Academies 
and the Special Academy of Thessaloniki where most Muslim teachers are 
trained.
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5. Conclusion
Today, the Muslim minority of Western Thrace has lower levels of educational 
achievement in comparison to the rest of the population. Of the students 
registering in primary schools, only 70% graduate and from this number less 
than half progress to secondary education. Figures given earlier reveal that a 
significant part of the Muslim population does not posses the basic secondary 
level certificate.
It can be concluded therefore that the present bilingual educational 
structure provided for the Muslim students is inadequate and functions as an 
obstacle to their progress. Female students in particular appear to be affected the 
most by this situation. As has been argued, the strict traditional values of the 
Muslim society combine with the shortcomings of the present educational 
system to discourage female school attendance.
To summarise, the first part of the chapter explored the important 
Treaties and Agreements signed by the Turkish and Greek governments from the 
1922 until today: the Lausanne Treaty, the 1951 Educational Agreement, and the 
1968 Educational Protocol contain the legal definitions which still inform 
present-day Muslim education. The Lausanne Treaty guaranteed the right for 
Muslim schools to exist, while the other two agreements established Turkish as 
the official teaching language in Muslim minority schools.
The second part looked at the structure of Muslim education at all three 
levels: primary, secondary and university. More particularly, the detailed 
curriculum for six year of primary school education was examined as well as the 
ethnic composition of the Muslim primary schools in three prefectures.
The third part dealt with the specific problems faced by the Muslim 
students. Data provided revealed the low school attendance among the Muslim 
population, the small number of girls in education and the low percentage of 
graduates from both primary and secondary schools. Language appears to be the
200
main obstacle and accounts primarily for the low attendance. Again the problem 
of language arises as a hurdle to be overcome for the trilingual Pomak and Rom 
students.
From a critical examination of all the information, it can be argued that 
the legal framework has acted as an obstacle to the development of a functional 
modem educational system. First, the focus of the Treaties on primary education 
has only served to create problems for the introduction of nursery schools in 
Muslim society, part of which questions its benefits. In addition, the present 
structure of primary education does not equip students adequately to pursue a 
secondary education. As a result less than half primary school graduates register 
in either Muslim minority or Greek secondary schools.
Second, bilingual teaching has been introduced in Muslim primary 
education in order that Muslim people are not deprived of learning in their 
language. Although Turkish people are taught in their mother tongue, Pomak 
and Rom are deprived of this right. Students from these two groups have to learn 
two languages which are new to them, Greek and Turkish. Considering the 
overall low level of education which already exists in Pomak and Rom society, 
the teaching of two additional languages makes attendance in Muslim primary 
schools for students from these two groups very difficult.
Finally, gender divisions also influence school attendance. Statistics 
show that girls are much less likely to graduate from primary schools and even 
less likely to continue to secondary education. This is especially the case in rural 
areas where traditional values are stricter than in urban centres. No significant 
efforts have been made by either State, local Muslim communities or by the 
Gender Equality Committee to tackle this problem.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the above findings is that 
there is a real need to redesign and upgrade the educational system of the 
Muslim minority. Priority should be given to the specific requirements of the 
Muslim students rather than to the Turkish or Greek states’ interests. In order to
201
begin this process, points for consideration include the introduction of nursery 
schools, the circulation of books designed for bilingual education and the 
provision of more appropriate teacher training courses.
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Notes
1. As we have already seen, there is an ideological difference among the 
Muslims of Western Thrace. To recap, this difference originates from the 
time Kemal Atatiirk introduced secularised changes in order to modernise 
Turkey. The ‘Old-Muslim’ leadership of the Muslim minority at the time 
opposed these changes as threatening to the traditional values of the Muslim 
society and distanced itself from the Turkish influence. From the 1960’s 
onwards the ‘Old-Muslim’ leadership lost its popularity as a new more 
influential movement arose, the ‘Modernists’. The new leadership 
ideologically representing Turkish nationalism sought closer links with 
Turkey.
2. Part of the Muslim protest was to publicly bum the new books and refuse to 
send their children to school. These protests coincided with increasing 
demands to change the status of the Muslim minority into and an ethnic one. 
It is worth mentioning that these demands did not include recognition for a 
Pomak or Rom ethnicity.
3. As we have seen earlier in the thesis the framework of the Lausanne Treaty 
is based on a reciprocity clause (ritra amiveotitas) according to which both 
the Muslims in Greece and the Greeks in Turkey are dependant on the 
mutual obligation of Greece and Turkey to preserve each other’s cultural 
identity. In the case of education therefore, all agreements have a bilateral 
character.
4. 1930s was the period of Greek-Turkish friendship agreed by the two Prime 
Ministers, Venizelos and Atatiirk. Part of this friendship agreement was the 
renaming of schools from ‘Muslim’ to ‘Turkish’.
5. As seen before, despite the temporary ‘friendship’ between the two states 
more turbulent years were to follow. Thus, it was during this time that the 
problem in Cyprus started to move to the centre of the political arena, and
203
the Turkish government systematically began to persecute the Greek 
minority in Istanbul (Helsinki Watch Report 1992). Greek Cypriot demands 
for unification with Greece grew due to the increasingly threatening climate 
with Turkey. It was this time that Britain and America, Greece and Turkey 
started to get involved with the issue and caused the division of the island 
later (Clogg 1995: pp. 161-162).
6. The establishment of the Special Pedagogical Academy in Thessaloniki also 
came at close to the time when the ‘Modernists’ became the influential 
group replacing the ‘Old-Muslim’ theocratic tradition. Most of the Turkish 
universities trained Muslim teachers were influenced by the values of the 
Turkish state, the inspiration of the Modernist movement. It can be argued 
therefore that the Greek government partly followed these actions precisely 
to avoid strengthening the neo-Turkish nationalism among the members of 
the Muslim minority. The Turkish trained teachers included Muslims of 
Western Thrace that continued their studies in Turkish universities, and 
Turkish citizens teachers transferred from Turkey according to the 1951 
Educational Agreement.
7. During the mid-1990s the whole approach of the Greek government towards 
the Muslim minority changed. Economic investment was encouraged by the 
Greek state aiming at the upgrading of the whole region. There were more 
efforts to approach the Muslim minority. Policies such as allowing free 
entrance to the Pomak territory (a special licence had previously been 
required in the past) providing more secondary schools, opening medical 
centres were introduced. There are various reasons for these policies, most 
important of which is the geographical position of Western Thrace. The 
changing situation in the Balkans can transform the region into an economic 
centre. Second, is the increasing influence of Turkey in the Muslim 
community of Greece that contributed to the changing attitude of the Greek 
state.
8. Baltsiotis 1997: p.329.
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9. Official Educational Report, European Commission: p.2.
10. Naxim Refica argues that the refusal by the Muslim local government to 
accept the establishment of Nursery schools has disappointed a large part of 
the Muslim community that believes to the educational value of such 
schools. ‘Aile Birlik’ daily local Newspaper, August 1991, cited in 
Panagiotidis 1996.
11. Dikaiomatica, Electronic journal for Human Rights, 2001: p.l
12. However, not all students are welcomed by the Turkish government. The 
Editor of the Muslim newspaper ‘The voice of Thrace’, A. Dede in his 
article ‘Caught between states’ argues: “It is the policy of Turkey. If you 
support their policy, your child can study there. Otherwise not.”, Internet: 
(www.armorv.com accessed February 1999)
13. In accordance to law 182/24-12-1990
14. Sella-Mazi, 1997: p.379.
15. Christian Rom (100,000-200,000 in number) live in various parts of Greece. 
The Muslim Rom (about 25,000) inhabit the area of Western Thrace. 
Zegginis, 1994: p. 10
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Chapter 7
Political Parties in Western Thrace
1. Introduction
This chapter analyses political developments in Western Thrace in the period 
from 1923 to 1990, beginning with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty and 
ending with the aftermath of the creation of the independent Muslim political 
parties. The political and electoral behaviour of the Muslim minority is closely 
examined and compared with that of the Christian community. The data 
analysed in the following pages concerns mainly Pomak and Turkish political 
participation as there is insubstantial data about the voting behaviour of the 
Muslim or Christian Rom. In addition, the chapter concentrates on national 
election results as they better reveal ethnic sentiments. Local government was 
only a weak institution in Greek politics (until recently) and therefore could not 
provide a forum for Muslims to express such sentiments.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section provides an 
historical background of political life in Western Thrace from the 1920s to the 
end of the Second World War, beginning with a reference to the pre-1923 
period. The aim is to consider particular factors for differentiating between the 
Muslim/Christian communities and their role in local political life.
The main argument is that the cultural and ethnic differences of the 
population in Western Thrace resulted in a division within local society that is 
also reflected in the local politics. The increasing replacement of the ‘Old- 
Muslims’ by a more Modernist friendly leadership (the two main ideological
trends within the Muslim community1) played an important role in Muslim 
voting behaviour throughout this period. Whilst historically, and even today, the 
Muslims of Western Thrace express themselves politically through the existing
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Greek national parties (with the exception of the 1980s), they have nevertheless 
followed their own patterns of voting.
Specific data from the time is analysed and comparisons are made 
between Christian and Muslim votes as well as the Pomak and Turkish voting 
results. The section looks at: a. attitudes of Greek parties during the 1910s and 
1920s towards minorities, b. brief history of local politics before Western Thrace 
became part of Greece, c. the period between the wars with an emphasis on the 
first political split among ‘Modernists’ and Old-Muslims, d. the re-establishment 
at the local level of the Old-Muslims.
The second section examines the contemporary electoral behaviour of 
the Muslim minority. Domestic and international political developments in the 
1980s brought about the establishment of Muslim parties for the first time in the 
prefectures of Xanthi and Rhodopi. Data from the election results of the period 
in which these parties participated is detailed and analysed.
The Muslim parties’ vote diminished after the April 1990 elections and 
they did not participate in the following elections that took place in 1994. The 
reason for this decline was the introduction of a change in the electoral system 
according to which a party could elect an MP only if it collected more than 3% 
of the national vote. This system was introduced in many European States at that 
time (as seen in Germany, for example, which has a 4% minimum average) and 
has affected all small parties. Subsequently, Muslim politicians stood again as 
candidates for the major Greek parties.
2. Section I: Historical Background
2.1 Greek political parties and ethnic minorities 1913-1930: a eeneral outline
After the redefinition of the Greek national borders following Greece’s 
defeat in Asia Minor, many exchanges and movements of population took place.
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However, minority populations remained within the Greek state as can be seen 
in the following table:
Table 15: Ethnic Groups in Greece in 1930
Language Orthodox Catholic Protest. Muslims Israelite Other Total
Greek 5,716,100 27,747 3,867 2,623 9,090 96 5,759,523
Turkish 103,642 327 760 86,506 17 2 191,254
Slavo-
Macedonian
81,844 68 11 2 58 1 81,984
Spanish 28 58 41 72 62,999 2 63,200
Armenian 31,038 1,432 16 10 10 2 33,631
Vlach 19,679 9 2 3 10 0 19,703
Albanian 95 59 17 18,598 3 1 18,773
Bulgarian 20 0 0 16,755 0 0 16,775
Romany 3,853 0 1 1,130 0 14 4,998
Russian 3,177 49 14 3 40 12 3,295
Italian 98 2,878 18 1 203 1 3,199
English 201 274 1,605 1 15 2 2,098
Other 1,751 2,577 1,235 307 316 29 6,248
Total 5,961,529 35,182 9,003 123,017 72,791 162 6,204,634
Source: Statistics Centre of Greece, 1930, p.98
The trends within the Greek political parties towards ethnic minorities 
started to form during the pre-1923 period. It was during these turbulent years 
for Greece that the ethnic minority vote played an important part in Greek 
political developments. Ethnic voting patterns came to be the concern for the 
three main Greek political parties at the time: Venizelists, Anti-Venizelists and 
the Communist party.
Venizelism (Liberalism) was principally the driving force behind Greek 
irredentism and the Greek ambitions towards the new territories during and after 
the Balkan Wars. The party sought to bring social reforms and capitalist 
modernisation to the Greek state (Castellan, 1991: p.545). Towards ethnic 
minorities, the Venizelist stand is often presented as a contradiction. On the one 
hand, the party guaranteed and respected minority rights and could draw the 
support of the Muslim minority vote, for example in Western Thrace as we shall
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see later. On the other hand, Venizelist nationalism, expansionist plans and 
desire for Greek homogenisation were perceived as a threat to the interests of 
minorities, resulting in support for the Antivenizelist party, as for example, in 
the case of Macedonia (see in 2.2.1 of the present chapter). (Mavrogordatos, 
1983: pp.230-231)
The Antivenizelist party (Conservative party) was no less nationalistic 
than the Venizelists. Although it never questioned the consolidation of the 
territories won by Greece, from early stages it was nonetheless reluctant to 
participate in Venizelists’ nationalist aspirations. Deriving their support mainly 
from the South of Greece, the Anti venizelists were sceptical of Venizelos’s 
social and economic reformations and represented a more traditionalist force, 
suspicious of rapid changes (Clogg, 1995: p. 95). Even during the interwar 
period, their reluctance to participate in the materialisation of the Great Idea 
attracted the support of the ethnic minorities (Turks, Bulgarian and Jews) of 
North Greece who were dissatisfied with the settlement of refugees in their 
region (Mavrogordatos 1983: p. 231).
A third party that came to influence Greek politics (although with 
marginal support) especially during the interwar period was the Communist 
party (KKE) (Mouzelis 1978: p. 26). Minority rights were incorporated in party 
policy and following the Third International, KKE opposed the division of both 
Macedonia and Thrace. For the minorities themselves, the party in 1925 argued 
‘... under the pretext of the national defence of the Greeks, land is taken away 
from the minorities to be given to the Greek refugees, and a systematic colonial 
and Hellenisation policy is generally pursued...’ (quoted by Mavrogordatos 
1983: p. 233). This position cost the party a considerable share of its support and 
by 1935 the emphasis had shifted towards the equal treatment of minorities 
instead of regional unification for Macedonia and Thrace.
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2.2 Political behaviour of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace between the 
period 1913-1955
This section deals with data from political developments, especially concerning 
the electoral behaviour of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace in the period 
1913-1955. The aim is to map the social factors that influenced local political 
life and the developments that led to the formation of the political leadership 
within the Muslim minority.
In brief, the main argument can be summarised as follows. Cultural and 
ethnic differences reinforced by the memories of the first twenty troubled years 
of the previous century in the Balkan Peninsula as well as the Greek domestic 
political situation can be seen as the basis for the differentiation between the two 
communities. This differentiation led to the gradual isolation of the Muslim 
minority from Greek political life and political parties (as we shall see in the 
second section of the chapter). The electoral behaviour of the Muslim voters 
during this period was influenced by its increasing attachment to the political 
and nationalistic ideologies of Turkey, but also by the Greek political situation.
2.2.1 The pre-1923 period
Although Western Thrace was not part of the Greek state, it is useful to look
briefly at the regional political situation in the period before the signing of the
Lausanne Treaty (1923). Muslim participation in politics was as active as in
forthcoming years of the century, especially in the area of Greek Macedonia
where more than half a million Turks lived prior the exchange of populations
between Greece and Turkey (Pentzopoulos 1963: pp.125-140, Clogg 1995: p.89) 
2
The question of ethnic minority voting patterns came to be of crucial 
importance in Greek politics during this time. As there was a continuous war 
occurring in the area, Greece was involved in fighting for territorial integrity, 
expansion and survival. The vote, therefore, of minority populations loyal to the
210
enemy nations (i.e. Turkey and Bulgaria) at times proved to be unfavourable for 
the interests of Greek nationalism (Mavrogordatos 1983: p.237).
A good example that reflects this situation are the elections of 1915, when 
not surprisingly all minorities in the area of Macedonia voted against Venizelos 
and therefore against the war. Although the overall outcome of the elections was 
not influenced and Venizelos won, ethnic minorities were perceived by 
Venizelists as an obstacle to Greek nationalism and sovereignty (see also note 
14, Chapter 5) (ibid. p.238).
For the area of Western Thrace a system of political representation started to 
appear in the 1910s, albeit not very sophisticated and without continuity. The 
key moments as highlighted by Nikolakopoulos can be summarised as follows 
(Nikolakopoulos 1991: pp. 173-174).
a. The establishment of an autonomous political administration after the Treaty 
of Bucharest (28.7.1913). The new autonomous area was called the 
‘Democracy of Gioumouldjina’. Autonomy was granted when the Greek 
army withdrew its forces following the revolt of some inhabitants of Western 
Thrace. Turkey, which did not sign the treaty, assisted in the revolt. The 
autonomous government consisted of five Turks, one Greek, one Armenian 
and one Jewish representative. The ‘Democracy of Gioumouldjina’ was 
dissolved after a Turkish-Bulgarian agreement (1913), when Turkey 
withdrew its army and allowed Bulgarian occupation in October 1913.
b. Elections took place in 1914 during this first Bulgarian occupation. The 
‘Turkish Muslim MPs of Western Thrace in the Bulgarian Parliament’ as 
they called themselves, in 1918 sent a message to the French General 
D’Espery and asked the Allied Powers to occupy Western Thrace with the 
participation of the Greek Army.
c. In the period of Allied government from 1919-1920, the Higher 
Administrative Assembly was established and consisted of six Greeks, five 
Turks, two Bulgarians, one Armenian and one Jewish representative. Its 
president was Greek, elected by the Greeks and the Armenian representative
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and assisted by the blank vote of the Jewish representative and one of the 
Turkish representatives. During this period there was a movement supported 
by both Turks and Bulgarians for the establishment of autonomy in the 
region.
d. In May 1920, Western Thrace (and also for a brief period Eastern Thrace) 
came under Greek occupation. In the elections of 1920, Antivenizelists won 
the majority of seats with the assistance of the Macedonian ethnic 
minorities’ vote. In Thrace however, the situation was different and most 
Muslims voted for the Venizelos party. Consequently, twenty Turkish 
candidates were elected as MP’s with the party of Venizelos. Soon after, 
these elected Turks left the Venizelists and with Turks from other parties 
supported the Antivenizelists (Mavrogordatos 1983: p.238). One explanation 
for this move can be found in the ideological difference between Modernists 
and Old Muslims.
Two significant factors can be determined as having influenced later 
political developments within the Muslim minority. First, we witness the 
formation of a political leadership within the Muslim minority. Second there are 
the internal differences among the members of the Muslim minority which 
resulted in the election of a Greek president in the Higher Administration 
Assembly during the period of Allied occupation (1919-20) (Nikolakopoulos 
1991: p. 176).
2.2.2 The Period between the Wars
The following two tables present trends within Muslim and Christian voting 
patterns during 1926-1936.
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Table 16: Muslim voting in Western Thrace 1926-1936 (% o f  valid votes)
YEAR Anti-
Venizelos
Party
Venizelos
Party
Agriculture
Party
Communist
Party
Others
1926 - 93.14 0.57 5.89 0.40
1928 26.37 37.18 35.69 - 0.76
1929 - 100.00 - - -
1932 - 86.3 6.64 3.61 3.42
1933 - 71.89 - 2.92 25.19
1936 36.28 49.38 4.85 9.49 -
Source: data ]rom Mavrogordatos 1983: p.245
Table 17: Christian Votes in Xanthi and Rhodopi 1926-1936 (% Valid Votes)
Year Conservative 
(Anti-Venizelos) 
Party
Venizelos
Party
Agriculture
Party
Communist
Party
Others
1926 9.7 65.9 6.1 18.2 -
1928 4.6 86.0 - 6.8 1.0
1929 - 91.4 - 8.5 -
1932 10.0 73.3 4.7 12.0 -
1933 20.5 62.6 - 16.6 -
1936 25.0 57.9 8.6 8.4 -
Source: data from Nikolakopoulos 1990-1991: p. 178
By comparing the data from the above tables two main trends can be 
determined within the Muslim minority’s political behaviour during this period - 
the first being observable after the incorporation of Western Thrace into Greece. 
Initially there was popular support for the party of Venizelos which started to 
diminish from 1934 onwards after the anti-Venizelos party took power. 
Secondly, the internal fragmentation of the Muslim minority into two main 
streams is visible: the ‘Modernists’ versus the ‘Old-Muslims’.
Furthermore, as we have seen, minorities were treated with suspicion in 
Greek political life. For this reason, most of the main political parties avoided 
creating any political organisations or networks among the members of
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minorities as they were not considered to be a completely equal part of the 
Greek political life (Nikolakopoulos 1991: p. 176).
Minority votes did exert influence in the final outcome of the elections, 
giving a boost to Antivenizelism. It was within the interests of the Venizelists in 
1923 therefore to make the allowance for both Muslims in Western Thrace and 
Jews in Thessaloniki to vote in separate electoral colleges (this policy had 
existed before 1923). For Western Thrace the separate college included Turks 
and Pomaks who were at the time mainly traditionalists. The separate colleges 
were abolished after the 1930s, ceasing for the area of Western Thrace in 1934 
(Mavrogordatos 1983: p.239, Dodos 1994: p.64). The existence of such separate 
electoral colleges did play a role in the gradual establishment of an autonomous 
political consciousness within Muslim minority.
The above tables also show that for this period the majority of both 
Christians and Muslim voters supported the Venizelists mainly for the reasons 
explained: i.e. for Christians (the majority of whom were refugees from Asia 
Minor) due to their attachment to the Venizelist aspirations and for the Muslims, 
opposition to Atatiirk’s reforms. However, after the 1930s, while Venizelist 
support remained among the Christians, there was a drop among Muslim voters. 
It was in 1933 that Antivenizelists took power and their increasing support 
among the Muslim voters reflected the ideological division described earlier.
Tables 16 and 17 also indicate that there was limited support for the 
Communist party amongst both Muslims and Christians, although this support 
was considerable higher among Christians. This affiliation to the Communist 
party came largely from the tobacco industry and its highly unionised workers. 
Well-developed clientele and patronage networks3 within the minority in turn 
accounted for the low support amongst Muslims.
The Agrarian party, established in 1922, played only a minor role in 
Greek political life (Mouzelis 1978: p.93). There was limited support from the 
Christian population. The occasional high Muslim support for the party (and in
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the same way for the category ‘others’ in Table 16) can be explained by the 
standing of independent Muslim candidates.
There was also a differentiation between Pomak and Turkish voting 
patterns. For example, in the area of Xanthi the political structure of the parties 
followed the lines of the differentiation between the Pomak (mainly, Old- 
Muslim supporters) and the Turkish populations (increasingly Modernists). The 
representation of the two groups became clear in 1932 when for the first time 
two Pomak politicians stood: one an independent candidate, and other, a 
candidate for the Agrarian party.
The results from the 1932 elections show the Turkish-speaking 
population and the Pomaks as completely separate: the Pomak candidates 
collected 72.2% of the votes in the Pomak areas of Xanthi and only 20.7% in the 
town of Xanthi and the Turkish-speaking villages. In contrast, the Turkish 
candidate in the Pomak area collected 22.5% of the votes while in the town and 
in Turkish speaking villages he collected 67.1% (data from Nikolakopoulos 
1991: pp. 183-184). Pomaks however, also tended to vote in
personalistic/patronage way and eventually gave their support to ‘Modernists’. 
Later on, many became supporters of Turkish nationalism (Mavrogordatos 1983: 
p.265) and have remained with the ‘Modernist’ wing until today (see previous 
chapters and Appendix 1).
To summarise, it can be argued, that the major feature of the period 
between the wars for the Muslims was the internal fragmentation between the 
old-Muslims and the ‘Modernists’. As we have seen previously, the influence of 
the old-Muslims was exerted on the more conservative members of the minority 
and was supported by the Greek administration. ‘Modernists’ were influenced 
by Kemal and the increasing Turkish nationalism and used the jargon of 
modernisation, expressing their opposition on issues affecting the Muslims such 
as education.
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During the period between the two World Wars and after the Second 
World War, the development of Turkish national consciousness was identified 
with the changes introduced by Kemal. At this time the Greek administration4 in 
Western Thrace by supporting the ‘Old-Muslims’ appeared to endorse old- 
fashioned traditions, the Arabic alphabet and a strict religious life according to 
the Koran. Despite these trends, the existing data also suggests that during the 
interwar period Muslims sided with the winning party (Venizelists initially and 
anti-Venizelists after 1933), desiring to remain on good terms with successive 
Greek governments.
2.2.3 The post Second World War and Greek Civil War period: 1945-1955
As we have seen Greece came out of the Second World War and the Civil War 
(1946-1949) as the only Balkan country without a communist government. 
Nevertheless, the country was far from democratic and the society very divided. 
The political situation that followed was reminiscent of the National Schism 
(1915-16) (Clogg 1995: p. 154).
To give a general outline of the political life at the time, in the national 
elections that followed, two new parties participated: a. on the right Ellinikos 
Synagermos (ES) and b. on the left the Eniaia Democratiki Aristera (EDA)5, the 
front for the illegal Communist party. In 1951, ES won the elections and with a 
change in the electorate system, its victory was guaranteed in the 1952 elections 
and won 82% of the seats. From then onwards the right was in power until 1963 
(ibid.).
National parties6 during this period also included: Laiko Komma (LK -  
Popular Party) and Komma Phileftheron (KPh-Liberal Party) both 
conservative/centre, the Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis (ERE -  National Radical 
Union which replaced the ES, the Ethniki Proodeftiki Enosis Kentrou (EPEK -  
National Progressive Centre Union) and the conservative Synagermos Agroton 
kai Ergazomenon Party (SAE -  Rally of Farmers and Workers). This latter party
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was nationally insignificant (about 1.2% of the national vote) but enjoyed 
particular support in Xanthi due to the popularity of the local candidate.
With the end of the Second World War, the area of Western Thrace
7
gained independence from Bulgarian occupation . It was during this period that 
the ideological movement of the ‘Modernists’ emerged as the most powerful 
section within the Muslim community. Support for the ‘Modernist’ was 
expressed in the elections of 1950 and 1951 when Muslim candidates attached to 
this ideological wing attracted the largest proportion of the votes (about 50%- 
60% of the total Muslim vote in all three elections) and were elected as 
parliamentary representatives for the Muslim minority. The ‘Modernist’ 
candidates for the above elections stood with the Liberal party (KPh) and the 
Popular party (LK) at a time, as we can see in Table 18, when both parties had 
lost support among the Christian population8 (Nikolakopoulos 1991: pp. 186- 
190).
‘Modernist’ members were also elected to the Muslim Minority 
Association (DEMP) which dealt with the management of Muslim property, 
showing once more the internal ideological changes within the Muslim 
community. In the 1950s elections for the executive council, Modernists both in 
Xanthi and Rhodopi won seats with almost 60% of the Muslim vote (ibid.).
The following Table 18 shows in more detail the comparative results of 
Christian and Muslim vote for the major parties (on the Centre and Right) in the 
area of Western Thrace in the 1950 and 1951 elections. The main feature of the 
1951 elections is the change in the electorate system from proportional 
representation to ‘reinforced’ proportional representation (Clogg 1987: p.26) 
which favoured the Right. For this reason we have an increase in support for ES.
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Table 18: Comparison of Muslim and Christian vote (1950, 1951) for the major 
political Parties
Election 5.3.1950 Elections 9.9.1951
Christians Muslims Christians Muslims
% % % %
KPh 12.6 44.5 15.4 27.5
EPEK 22.6 5.0 30.4 16.3
LK 11.3 17.8 9.1 25.9
ES - - 15.3 9.0
Source: Data from Nikolakopou los 1991: p.195
Despite this growing popularity for the Modernists it would be
misleading to assume that the ‘Old-Muslims’ lost their power completely. On 
the contrary, the ‘Old-Muslims’ were still popular especially in the area of 
Xanthi. In the 1952 elections the Muslim candidate for SAE gathered just a few 
votes less than the ES ‘Modernist’ candidate, as can be seen in the following 
table. (Similar results for the SAE candidate in Xanthi had been obtained in the 
1951 elections, Nikolakopoulos 1991: p. 188).
Table 19: Parliamentary Elections 1952 -  Electoral region of Xanthi
Christians Muslims Total
ES 3,666 4,518 8,184
SAE 4,389 3,288 7,677
EPEK 2,378 311 2,686
Total 10,433 8,117 18,550
Source: data from Ni colakopoulos 1991: p. 194
This support for the ‘Old-Muslims’ can be seen also in the area of 
Rhodopi where the ‘Modernists’ lost the leadership of the Muslim minority. The 
main reason for this development was the establishment of the religious 
association ‘Renaissance of Islam’ (Intibah-Islam) whose leadership was 
attached to the traditional ‘Old-Muslims’. The candidate for the ES party in the 
1952 elections was drawn from this association. The ES won the 1952 elections
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and continued to be re-elected until 1967, thus preserving the ‘Old-Muslim’ 
votes.
The political mobilisation of the old-Muslims was also assisted by 
external factors. First, with encouragement from the general Western Thracian 
administration and second by the election of the Democratic Party in 1950 in 
Turkey which weakened the power of the Kemalists. This last factor gave the 
opportunity to the old-Muslims to look for ideological and political association 
with the newly elected party and created two new tendencies within the Intibah- 
Islam. On the one hand, part of the Muslim minority relied on the support of the 
Greek State and on the other, there were those who looked for support to 
Turkey. But in general, following the overall good relations between the two 
states at the beginning of the 1950s the two tendencies did not create any 
hostilities at the time (Nikolakopoulos 1991: p i97).
Thereafter the support of the ‘Old-Muslims’ remained popular within the 
Muslim minority for the period 1952-1967. Greek-Turkish relations during this 
period went from initial friendship to a trying phase over the issue of Cyprus and 
the persecution of the Greek minority in Istanbul. Both ‘Modernists’ and the 
‘Old-Muslims’ condemned Turkish aggression but by 1965 a split appeared in 
the Modernist support with the creation of an extreme Turkish nationalist 
movement also backed by Turkey (Dodos 1994: p.37).
3. Section II
3.1 The post-dictatorship Muslim voting behaviour
The collapse of the dictatorship marked a new era in Greek political life with the 
reestablishment of democracy. The first democratic elections took place in 1974. 
The main parties that participated were: Nea Demokratia (ND-conservative 
party); Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Pasok -the socialist party); an alliance of 
centre parties, the newly recognised Kommounistiko Komma Ellados (KKE -
219
communist party) allied with other smaller left wing parties, and the National 
Front Party (known then Ethniki Demokratiki Enosi - EDE).
In the area of Western Thrace all political parties included Muslim 
candidates. The main feature of this period is that the majority of Muslims 
supported their candidates in ND but also in EDE. The latter gathered about 
13% in Xanthi and 6% in Rhodopi. It is noteworthy that the national share of 
EDE was just over 1% (Dodos 1994: p.31). The same pattern was followed in 
the 1977 elections when the National Front (now known as Ethniki Parataxi -  
EP) achieved its highest result since the 1950s gaining 11.8% in Thrace, as we 
can see in the following table (Featherstone 1987: pp. 46-48).
The electorate profile of the region is shown in the following table for 
the election results in Western Thrace compared with the national average 
during the period 1974-1981.
Table 20: Election results in Western Thrace and National average, 1974-1981
1974 1977 1981
W.Th Nat W.Th Nat W.Th Nat
ND 55.1 54.4 46.4 41.9 41.6 35.9
PASOK 26.6 20.5 20.5 25.3 47.2 48.1
CU 9.5 13.6
EDK 17.1 12
UL 2.8 9.5
KKE 2.9 9.4 4.6 10.9
KKE (es) 0.7 1.3
NF 10.2 1.1 11.8 6.8
Source: Data from Featherstone 1987: p.46 and Dodos 1994: p. 31
Notes: a. the table uses National Front for both the 1974 and 1977 elections 
although in fact it is EDE in the first elections and NF in the second b. KKE and 
KKE (es) -  European left party after its split from KKE in 1968 -  participated 
together as the United Left in 1974 elections but separately in subsequent 
elections c. The same in true of the Centre Union (CU) which changed into
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Enosis Demokratikou Kentrou (EDK) d. the reason that some data is not 
provided is either because the party or union of parties did not participate in the 
equivalent elections or because the percentage it received was insignificant.
This Muslim preference for the National Front parties appears 
contradictory; after all the ideology of these parties was based on extreme 
nationalistic aspirations with racist connotations. If we take a closer look 
however, this result is not so unexpected as it seems. We have seen earlier 
examples of Muslim support towards currently powerful parties as well more 
personalist/patronage voting patterns.
It can therefore be argued that Muslim support for the NF stems from 
these two factors. On the one hand, Muslims could fear voting against the party 
that ‘governed’ (under dictatorship) Greece for seven years and on the other they 
showed their support to their local candidate. In addition, it should be noted that 
memories of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus were still fresh and generated 
significant anti-Turkish propaganda in Greece (see p. 166).
For similar reasons the Muslim minority elected two Muslim MPs who 
stood for the ND Party, the most popular party at the time. When PASOK’s 
popularity started to rise in 1977 the Muslims of Xanthi elected an MP from this 
party. The second Muslim MP in the 1977 election was from NF who was 
elected in Rhodopi (Dodos 1994: p.32). As we can see, while it was the Muslims 
of Xanthi in 1974 elections that gave a high proportion of their vote to the NF, in 
1977 the support for this party came from Rhodopi. In 1981 when PASOK won 
the elections Muslims in Rhodopi elected one MP from ND and one from 
PASOK (ibid.). Again this irregularity in Muslim voting patterns can be 
attributed to the lack of ideological attachment of Muslims to Greek political 
parties.
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3.2 The creation o f Muslim parties
The next important period for the political representation of the Muslim minority 
starts with the 1985 elections and continues until the election of the two Muslim 
independent candidates in 1989. The main feature of this period is the creation 
of the short-lived Muslim parties, first in Xanthi and then in Komotini.
Initially, this appears to be a turning point in local political affairs but we 
have seen that in the past Muslims voted in separate electoral colleges or stood 
as independent candidates. Muslim voting patterns, throughout the century 
however indicate that there was little ideological attachment to the parties for 
which Muslims voted.
Therefore, although we can say that there was always an ethnic division 
in the voting behaviour of the population in Western Thrace, this period 
represents a more organised effort to prove this point. The creation of the 
Muslim parties also signifies the promotion of a more unified and more 
ethnically aware Muslim population. Since the 1970s the terms ‘Old Muslims’ 
and ‘Modernists’ are rarely used, indicating the change to an ethnic self- 
definition.
The first Muslim party was created in the area of Xanthi under the name 
iEirinV (Peace) and its candidates had previously stood in national elections for 
different parties. At the same time in the electoral area of Rhodopi, there was an 
independent Muslim candidate who had also participated in previous elections in 
major Greek parties.
The newly created Eirini party collected 16.8% of the vote and the 
independent candidate of Rhodopi 14% (Dodos 1994: p.32). The results were 
not adequate for the election of an MP. As the party attracted little support, most 
of the Muslim votes went to the other Muslim candidates that stood for the 
national parties the PASOK candidate in Xanthi and the ND candidate in 
Rhodopi.
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The Eirini Party dissolved after these results but the idea for separate 
Muslim parties was not abandoned altogether. In the second elections of 198910 
the Empistosyni Party (Trust) participated in Rhodopi and successfully elected 
an MP for the prefecture. In the following elections of 1990 another Muslim MP 
was elected in Xanthi for the newly established Pepromeno Party (Destiny).
The following two tables detail the election results for Muslim parties in 
contrast to the two main national parties, i.e., ND and PASOK in the period 
1989-1990.
Table 21: Election results for ND, PASOK and Pepromeno 1989-1990, Xanthi
Prefecture of Xanthi -  Election Results
June 1989 November 1989 April 1990
ND 44.1 47.6 40.86
PASOK 34.9 29.76 28.43
Pepromeno 14.5 18.06 25.53
Source: Data from Dodos 1994: pp.44-5 0
Note: an average of 25% is needed for the election of an MP
Table 22: Election results for ND, PASOK and Empistosyni 1989-1990, 
Rhodopi
Prefecture of Rhodopi- Election Results
June 1989 November 1989 April 1990
ND 34.06 39.8 36.1
PASOK 31.3 29.6 27.66
Empistosyni 27.7 24.66 29.53
Source: Data from Oodos 1994: pp.44-5 0
Note: an average of 25% is needed for the election of an MP
The above tables show there is a gradual increase of support for 
Pepromeno during this period. In Rhodopi there is a small decline in Muslim 
votes in the second election11 that increases again to almost 30% in 1990. Not all
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of the Muslim vote went to these parties, for example in areas with entirely 
Muslim population there was support for the other two parties who also included 
Muslim candidates12.
Muslim support for these two parties came at a critical moment in the 
national elections. As we have seen, in all three elections there was no clear 
majority, a fact that also explains the regularity of the elections. In 1990, ND 
won the elections but gained only 150 out of the 300 seats in the Parliament 
(Clogg 1997: p. 264). This increased the suspicion towards the Muslim MPs; by 
not being ideologically tied to the main parties, they could act independently.
The role of the Muslim MPs this time was more significant. Increasing 
calls were made for an ethnic rather than religious recognition of the Muslim 
minority; a shift that would have meant including the Pomaks and Rom under 
Turkish ethnicity. Muslim candidates both during their electoral campaign and 
after their election reiterated the issue of ethnicity and demanded the right to be 
recognised as Turks rather than Muslims. This created an upheaval in the Greek 
political life at the time leading to a conviction that was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1989. One of the Muslim MPs later appealed to the European 
Commission of Human Rights.
Since then the Greek electoral system has changed in a way unfavourable 
to small parties (with the introduction in 1990 of the 3% vote threshold). 
Afterwards, both Muslim parties were dissolved and did not participate in the 
following national elections of 1993. Thereafter, Muslim candidates again stood 
for national parties and have been elected accordingly.
Before concluding this section it is worth considering the international 
developments that influenced matters to a certain degree. At the end of the 1980s 
the international political landscape changed radically with the collapse of 
Communist countries. During the same time European unification intensified. 
Both events gave emphasis to issues of ethnicity, nationalism and minority
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rights and representation, and the consequences affected the Balkan Peninsula in 
the disastrous events that followed during the 1990s.
In the Bulgarian region neighbouring Western Thrace, the local Turkish 
minority that also included Pomaks and Rom likewise intensified its own calls. 
As a result, a policy of ‘regenerative process’ was introduced during the 1980s 
in order to contain what was perceived as a Turkish threat (the Bulgarians 
fearful of a repeat of the Cyprus crisis). The severe treatment of the Turkish 
population in Bulgaria and the regenerative policy were condemned by the 
Islamic Conference Organisation, the European Court of Justice and the UN 
(Crampton 1994: pp.383-384).
Against this background the Muslims of Western Thrace also intensified 
their call for ethnic recognition, disputing the terms of the Lausanne Treaty as 
outdated. This growing ethnic consciousness was expressed in everyday life 
through the issues of education and religion and found its political expression in 
the above mentioned Muslim parties.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has considered the voting behaviour of the population of Western 
Thrace from the beginning of the century until 1990. It has examined and 
compared data from various elections during this period and has looked at the 
processes that led to the creation of minority parties in the electoral areas of 
Xanthi and Rhodopi.
The main features of Muslim political life can be mapped onto the two 
ideological trends of ‘Old-Muslims’ and ‘Modernists’ that influenced Muslim 
affairs and voting behaviour throughout the century. In post-dictatorship Greece 
Muslims became more unified with a developed ethnic (Turkish) consciousness. 
The results of this unification were seen in late 1980s and early 1990s in 
educational, religious and political aspects and led to the creation of Eirini, 
Empistosyni and Pepromeno: the short lived Muslim parties.
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The establishment and success of the Muslim minority parties revealed a 
new voting profile for the Muslim population during this period, although the 
electoral history of the area revealed examples of similar character. The election 
of the Muslim MPs came at a critical electoral period for Greece when no party 
gained an absolute national majority. In turn, these events triggered a political 
debate and further stirred passions in Western Thrace’s local politics (as we have 
seen, similar examples can also be found during the 1910s).
The events that took place during this period in Western Thrace cannot 
be seen independently of international developments. With the collapse of 
Communism and the further unification of the European Union, issues of 
nationalism and ethnicity became current once more in the European history. 
Furthermore, the measures introduced by Bulgaria proved to be destabilising.
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Notes
1. The Old-Muslims opposed contemporary Turkish developments, whereas 
the ‘Modernists’ were directly influenced by them.
2. Macedonia before the Balkan Wars had been inhabited by many nationalities 
(Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians, Slavomacedonians and Jews) and this was partly 
the reason behind the bitter fighting for control over the area between 
Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. In the area of Macedonia that became part of 
the Greek state after the Balkan Wars, Greeks became the majority 
population only after the departure of Turks and Bulgarians and the 
settlement of about 600,000 Greek refugees from Asia Minor following the 
Lausanne Treaty. (Pentzopoulos 1963: pp.125-140). For the area of Western 
Thrace, the total Greek population comprised only 20% of the total 
population which was primarily Muslim before the exchange of populations. 
After 1923, the percentage of Greeks increased to 60% following the 
settlement of the refugees from Turkey (Clogg 1995: p. 109).
3. Some of the local agas exerted power over the agricultural and tobacco- 
factory working population. There are reports that this particular elite co­
operated with the Greek industrialists and functioned as ‘spies’ for the 
tobacco industry (Nikolakopoulos 1991: p. 183)
4. In an effort to weaken the power of the ‘Modernists’ and to strengthen the 
old-Muslims, the Greek government re-located to Western Thrace certain 
Circassians and Turks who had co-operated with the Greek government in 
Asia Minor and had joined forces with the Greek army in 1922. The most 
important of them was the last religious leader of the Ottoman Empire, 
Moustafa Sambri. When he came to Xanthi, Moustafa Sambri mobilised the 
Muslim priests and established a small centre for the old-Muslims. However, 
with the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations in 1930, Ismet Inonou 
asked for 150 ‘unwanted’ members of the Muslim minority to be re-located 
to a different part of the country. Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister at the 
time, accepted. Despite the removal of those old-Muslims, their influence
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remained and some fanatical members of the old-Muslim ideology continued 
to live in the area. These people later became the leading officers of the 
‘Old-Muslim’ organisations that they went on to establish.
5. After the end of the Civil War the political system was against the 
communists. The official Communist Party was banned until 1974. EDA 
therefore had very limited room to manoeuvre (Featherstone 1987: p.35)
6. For more on the Greek Political parties of this period see Clogg 1987: pp. 
22-26.
7. For the period of Bulgarian occupation there is no data to show political 
developments in the Muslim minority population. It seems to be, however, 
that changes did occur in the political structure of the Muslim minority. 
During 1941-44 Xanthi and Rhodopi belonged to Bulgaria and the Treaty of 
Lausanne was not therefore valid. (Nikolakopoulos 1991: p. 185)
8. From 1946 to 1951, the progressive elements within the Christian population 
expressed themselves politically through EPEK (the centre/left party) whose 
support among Muslims was very limited.
9. From 1958 onwards there was some support for EDA in Western Thrace. 
One of the candidates was a Muslim, Kerim Sali. However, the percentage 
of the vote for the party was too low to be considered here.
10. There had been an election earlier in 1989 but as there was no clear majority 
the elections had to be repeated later in the year. Again, there was no 
majority leading to a coalition government (oikoumeniki kyvernisi) and 
elections were repeated again in April 1990.
11. According to Dodos, there were administrative efforts in the November 1989 
elections to undermine the candidacy of the Empistosyni party. Efforts 
included the increase of Christian votes by the electorate transference of 
army departments, taking advantage of Christian soldiers’ vote, and the
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rejection of candidacy due to administrative faults (Dodos 1994: p.68).
12. For example in the area of Xanthi, the areas consisting of entire by Muslim 
populations gave 31,5% for ND, 26% for PASOK and 37,8% for Pepromeno 
in the July 1989 elections. In the 1990 elections, when the candidate for 
Pepromeno was elected the voting pattern in Muslim areas was: 18,4% for 
ND, 11.2% for PASOK and 67.2% for Pepromeno.
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PART III
Chapter 8
Regional Policy and The Muslim minority of Western Thrace
1. Introduction
This section of the thesis attempts to bring together some of the findings from 
the previous parts in order to understand the effects of the recent regionalism on 
the population, both Christian and Muslim, of Western Thrace. The main belief 
that will be highlighted throughout the chapter is that, in the short-term, Greek 
regional restructuring caused grievances in terms of local and ethnic perceptions 
of the population. In the long term however, greater regionalism has brought 
financial (new incentives) and political (higher participation) benefits to the 
local population.
Most of the findings in this chapter are supported by already existing 
data from official organisations, interviews with local representatives of the 
regional structure who were contacted during the study and relevant quotations 
from political speeches. In addition, as the last decade (1990s) witnessed the 
establishment of subnational structures, the chapter will concentrate on this 
period unless otherwise stated.
The chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section 
considers the regional policy in Western Thrace in terms of economic viability, 
new administrative structure and the culturally diverse human factor. More 
specifically, in the last decade there has been significant investment in the area 
with some successful results; in particular, Western Thrace is no longer 
characterised as the poorest European region.1 However, the still weak 
administration and the particular character of the population call for future
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research, planning and training in order for the region to benefit in the best way 
from the development programmes.
The second section of the chapter focuses on the regional policy with 
respect to the Muslim minority population. As has been already mentioned in 
Part II, the historical memories, geographical position and mixed population of 
the area have given grounds for the development of both Greek and Turkish 
nationalism. In addition to strong ethnic affiliations, the different religions have 
also played a role in maintaining and fuelling contradictions within the society.
The beginning of 1990s witnessed the peak of these social differences, 
which also coincided with the time of regional restructuring in Greece. The 
chapter highlights the way the two issues were connected and expressed in the 
press at the time and draws a comparison with feelings held today. Moreover, 
this section shows how ready the Western Thracian society was to accept the 
regional changes and the European challenges presented at the time.
The final section of the chapter concentrates on the two concepts of 
regionalism as analysed in Part I: democratic representation and the effects of 
centralisation/decentralisation. These two concepts are examined as to their 
applicability in the case of Western Thrace and the way the local population is 
affected by their benefits or otherwise. In addition this part draws some 
conclusions with respect to the need for a regional social policy which takes into 
account the ethnic level of diverse communities such as Western Thrace.
2. Section I: Regional Policy and Western Thrace
2.1 Economy
One of the major effects of regionalism in the area of Western Thrace are the 
new high levels of investment the area has attracted. However, it would be a 
mistake to assume that regionalism alone is the main factor for economic
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prosperity. There have been recent changes overall in Greece that have 
influenced such developments. First, membership of the European Union has 
brought extra funding from the European structural funds - a substantial amount 
of which is used for assisting the Greek regions.
Second, the collapse of Communism in the Balkan states2 has given 
Greece a new role in the Balkan Peninsula and has enabled more development in 
the otherwise neglected Northern Greek regions. More particularly, in 
neighbouring Bulgaria, Greek economic investment has increased to reach 
almost 100 million dollars and around 700 Greek companies operate within the 
country (Athens Academy 1994: p.73). Although most of this investment 
originates from the area of Thessaloniki, the geographical position of Western 
Thrace accompanied by the development of the necessary infrastructure presents 
a future potential for the area as a whole (ibid: pp. 78-80).
Finally, the recent good relations between Greece and Turkey (although 
still cautious, especially as a solution to the Cyprus issue has yet to be found), 
also means further economic expansion, something particularly true for the 
north-eastern regions.
As has already been argued in previous chapters, Western Thrace is 
located in an area of strategic importance for Greece. From the end of the 
Second World War to the mid-1990s this geographical position had negative 
effects on the economic development of the area and contributed to its relative 
isolation with analogous consequences for the local population. This was 
especially true for the Muslims (the ‘Other’ within), who due to historical 
circumstances and their association with Turkey, Greece’s traditional enemy, 
found themselves in a less privileged position.
In general, the local population, which is relatively smaller than other 
regions, ethnically and religiously diverse (with problems stemming from this 
diversity as we have already seen in Part II) and not adequately educated, has 
had difficulties meeting the new economic conditions. Additionally, the
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previously negative climate has meant that many young and university-educated 
people (both Muslim and Christian) who would otherwise have been an asset for 
Western Thrace, did not return to the area after completing their studies 
(Interview, Komotini July 2001). This was partly due to the unemployment 
levels (of about 7%) among mainly young and university educated people 
(Athens Academy 1994: p i7).
Apart from the particularity of the local population, the study of the 
development of Western Thrace conducted by the Athens Academy in 1994, 
noted three other factors responsible for the relative ‘backwardness’ of Western 
Thrace (Athens Academy 1994: pp. 1-5). First, there is a sense of historical threat 
perceived in different ways by each section of the population as mentioned 
earlier in Part II. Overall this leads to segregated markets and the generation of 
less capital than in other areas. In some of the interviews which were conducted 
as part of this thesis it was mentioned by both Christian and Muslim 
interviewees that Muslims tend to invest their money in Turkey partly because 
of this threat and partly because of deprivation. Many Christians for the same 
reason tend to invest in land or property in other areas of Greece.
Moreover, this idea of ‘threat’ is often emphasised as an obstacle to 
further development. For example, one of the problems for investment in 
Western Thrace highlighted by Mr Romaios, the deputy Minister of Economy at 
the time, is ‘the feeling of insecurity created by the national problem of the
(Muslim) minority and the proximity with Bulgaria and Turkey Perhaps this
is the number one problem faced by businessmen in Thrace’ (Romaios 1994:
p.60).
A second factor is not unique to Western Thrace but is applicable to most 
Northern Greek regions. The underdevelopment of such regions is partly due to 
the intensified investment and development of the Athens-Thessaloniki axis, 
which took place after the Second World War. At later stages priority was also 
given to overall regional development. However, Western Thrace still remained 
relatively isolated mainly due to its border with Turkey and the then Communist
234
Bulgaria. As the Athens Academy study phrases it, Western Thrace remained a 
‘border economy’. (Athens Academy 1995: p. 10)
Finally, the lack of local infrastructure does not allow the area to take 
advantage of seasonal profits. For example, the lack of a proper road system or 
seaside/mountainous resorts fail to attract the mass tourism achieved in other 
areas of Greece. In this respect however, as we have seen in the area’s profile, 
Western Thrace does have the capacity for future development in this direction 
especially with regard to the rich ecosystem and relatively unspoilt environment 
that the region possesses.
Despite these factors of negative development and contrary to the 
common view, Western Thrace did receive economic incentives from the Greek 
state, especially during the 1970s (Anagnostou 1999: p. 109). The main reason 
for such assistance was again the sensitive situation characterising Western 
Thrace as a region for which aid was a ‘national priority’. Being mainly an 
agricultural economy, the idea was to boost the secondary and tertiary levels of 
production. These public efforts came in the form of public investment, 
agricultural loans and special projects as well as subsidies for industrial 
investment.
The relative ‘backwardness’ of the region was advantageous for such 
investment. Although the infrastructure was - and still is to an extent -  poor3 the 
region possesses favourable labour-market conditions: cheap labour, lack of 
unionisation, non-skilled labour etc. As Adrikopoulou argues, the low-cost and 
controllable character of labour in the region is considered as a major asset for 
capital investment (Adrikopoulou, 1987: p.9). Furthermore, the local social 
structure and its fragmentation (in terms of class and ethnicity) was considered 
as another asset for future investment in the area for the same reason (ibid.).
The fact remains however that the economic upgrading of the region was 
not achieved by the mid-1990s. According to the 1991 National statistics records 
on economic performance, Western Thrace is the least economically advanced
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region in Greece as it produces only 2.5% of the Gross National Product (GNP). 
The following figure shows its declining share of GNP for the period 1981- 
1991.
Figure 1: Western Thrace 1981-91: share of GNP
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Source: National Statistics, Section of National Accounts, 1992 data from 
Athens Academy: 1994 p. 19
As can be observed in the figure, the first half of the 1980s showed an 
increasing share of GNP in the region of Western Thrace, but after 1985, there is 
a continuous decrease. In actual fact, even at its peak, the share of Western 
Thrace in the Greek GNP was low at only 2.65%.
In terms of economic levels, the economy of the Western Thrace depends 
mainly on primary production such as agriculture, dairy farming and fisheries. 
Secondary and tertiary levels are less significant despite state policies aimed at 
higher industrial investment. In terms of data, according to the National 
Statistics figures, the Regional Gross Product derives from: 40-45% primary 
sector, 28-30% secondary and 30-32% tertiary. The following table also reveals 
the stagnation of the industrial sector.
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Table 23: Distribution o f  employment in Western Thrace 1981-91 in %
Year/
Economic sector
1981 1986 1991
Primary Sector 63.6 55.3 50.6
Secondary Sector 15.5 15.7 16.3
Tertiary Sector 20.8 29.1 33.1
Source: National Statistics Service 1992
According to the above data, there is a slight decrease in employment in 
the primary sector, which seems to have been absorbed by the tertiary sector. 
For the secondary sector there is only a very slight increase in terms of local 
employment.
To summarise, the economic performance of Western Thrace up until the 
mid-1990s seems to follow an ambivalent trend. On the one hand, the region 
presents low levels in its share of the Gross National Product and on the other 
special state assistance was provided for its development. The arguments for 
both cases concentrate on the issue of the region’s geographical position. Thus, 
although there are low levels of development because of the region’s ‘physical’ 
isolation combined with Greece’s external relations, opportunities for 
investment were encouraged precisely because Western Thrace was designated 
as a region of ‘national priority’.
There are several reasons for the relative failure of such development 
projects. Briefly, the end of the subsidy programmes by the mid-1980s in 
combination with the poor infrastructure led to the closure of many newly 
created factories.4
But most importantly and more relevant to the purpose of the present 
thesis, there has not been adequate economic planning in order to attract more 
appropriate investment. As Anagnostou argues “(grants)...channelled to projects 
often unrelated to the needs of the regional economy, and to unaccountable 
investors who often failed to contribute to the latter, the allocation of resources
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as such distorted development. Indicative of the fact that grants have been 
allocated on premises unrelated to regional conditions and economic needs, is 
the persistent problem of extremely low completion rates of state-subsidised 
private investment projects” (Anagnostou, 1999: pp. 109-110).
This lack of planning led to the sort of investment that the region was not 
prepared to absorb and was based on a lack of understanding of the social 
conditions of the regions of society and more particularly those of the Muslim 
minority. As an ex Muslim MP said in an interview, Thrace does not have a 
tradition either of industrial production or the infrastructure to support it 
(Interview, Komotini 2001). Instead the region could have benefited further by 
supporting the culturally diverse local population, as well as subsidising the 
internal market.
2.2 Regional Policy and Administration in Thrace
The regional changes that took place in Greece during the last ten to fifteen 
years introduced the different system of government and democratic 
representation fully explored in Part I. Largely due to the European cohesion 
policy and its emphasis on sub-national levels of government, Greece sought to 
reorganise its territorial structure and reconfigure the centre-local power 
dynamics.
Briefly, according to the new system there are two levels of local 
government. The first level includes the election of mayors and municipal 
councillors for each municipality (Dimoi) in every prefecture. The second level 
includes the election of one prefect and the prefectural council for each 
prefecture. In addition there is the state appointed Regional Governor who is 
responsible for the entire region in terms of budget and economic development. 
Before the 1990s the first level was the only elected tier of local authority and its 
power was very limited, while the prefect, who had most of the authority was 
state appointed.
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Part of the new system for local government was the administrative re­
arrangement of the Greek regions. Under this scheme, Western Thrace joined 
Eastern Macedonia as one regional body (Perifereia Anatolikis Macedonias & 
Thrakis). Today, this new region consists of the three Thracian prefectures plus 
two from Macedonia: Xanthi, Rhodopi, Evros, Drama and Kavala. The reason 
for this re-arrangement was the move to attract higher economic funding for the 
enlarged area. Despite recent efforts to develop the region, East 
Macedonia/Western Thrace is still one of the poorest European regions in terms 
of Gross Domestic Product.5
For Western Thrace there have been few changes relating to the first 
level of local government. In order to create sufficiently large municipalities for 
the election of mayors, many of the villages joined together to become one 
administrative body. Today, there are six municipalities in Xanthi, nine in 
Rhodopi and thirteen in Evros. There are only a few communes left (communes 
were part of the old local government system under which they had very limited 
power).
At the second level, the number of the prefectures remained the same 
(three), each represented by one elected prefect. However, in the case of 
Western Thrace and more specifically Xanthi and Rhodopi, the law of 
prefectural self-government was modified (law 2218/94, Article 40) to enable 
the creation of ‘enlarged prefectures’ (dievrimenes nomarhies). Accordingly, 
Xanthi was joined with Kavala and Rhodopi with Evros. Some argue that this 
rearrangement was for the area to attract more funding. There is, however, the 
argument that by following this path there would be a very limited possibility of 
electing a Muslim prefect.6
It is important to note, as has been previously mentioned, that 
regionalism and the drive for regionalism were concerned with economics and 
specifically to facilitate investment in the region. On the other hand the 
introduction of tiers of local government were not specifically connected with 
economics. They were the result of political and administrative modernization
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associated in the minds of Greek political elites with the process of 
Europeanization.
The culturally diverse population of the area presented a challenge for 
the newly formed regional policy for two reasons. First, the formation of the 
new municipalities bought together Christian and Muslim populations. As we 
have seen earlier, with the exception of the mixed population in the towns or 
large villages (komopolis), most villages are inhabited solely by either Muslim 
or Christian populations. For example in Xanthi most of the mountainous area is 
inhabited by Muslims. With the new obligatory merging of municipalities and 
communes (law ‘Capodistrias’ 2539/1997) came the creation of ethnically 
mixed administrative areas. For the first time at the local level people were 
called on to cooperage and elect a representative for their area.7
There was also a challenge for the local government candidates -  
Christian or Muslim -  who had to approach the local community and attract 
votes from both communities. The new manifestos and political campaigns had 
to take place in such a way as to represent this diversity. In the 1998 elections 
Muslim and Christian mayors were elected to represent mixed communities, one 
in Xanthi and the other in Rhodopi, while a few municipal councils consisted of 
mixed members.
The same two reasons also apply in the case o f the prefect and the 
prefectural council whose role is the economic, social and cultural development 
of the area. The fact that this is now an elected body means that it is in the 
interest of the candidates to include policies attractive to all sections of the 
population. For example in the interviews -  with officials from both levels -  the 
diversity of the population was emphasised both as an advantage for the area and 
as a fact which would play a major role in future development. In addition this 
tier of government is open to both Muslim and Christian candidates; in 1998, 
although no Muslim prefect was elected, a number of Muslims were elected to 
the prefectural council.
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These challenges however advantageous or not for the local population, 
are certainly of interest to the social scientist. Western Thrace’s society is not a 
straightforward case for policy or policy-making in terms of the diverse religious 
and ethnic affiliations. As we have seen in previous chapters, it is an arena 
where Greek and Turkish nationalisms are tested and therefore any institutional 
change or introduction of new policy creates a controversy that implicitly or 
explicitly refers to the ethnic factor as evidenced by the rival political platforms 
mentioned above. As with the economy, the politics of ethnicity are present in 
every aspect of the local society. It is not therefore the regional policy that 
creates oppositions, it is rather a vehicle to express them.
3. Section II: Regional Policy and the Muslim minority
Until the mid-1980s when it was first discussed and the 1990s when it 
materialised, local government in Greece was almost non-existent. There were 
the prefectural divisions but these were mainly decentralised forms of central 
power rather than bodies of regional authorities. As chapter two indicated, the 
municipalities and communes were the only elected forms of local government 
but their activity was very limited as all their actions and budgets were under the 
management and control of the prefect. During this period for both the areas of 
Xanthi and Rhodopi (as in the rest of Greece) a prefect was appointed by the 
state while the mayors and the president of the communes were locally elected. 
In Muslim villages, therefore, there was elected Muslim presidents and in 
Christian villages, a Christian counterparts. The prefect was always Christian.
Western Thrace was treated as an area of strategic importance by the 
state and as has been mentioned before, there was an evident lack of any long -  
term planning for the region’s economic and social development. In the absence 
of regional policy-making bodies two central institutions came to play an 
important role in terms of inter-ethnic relations, both constantly reinforcing the 
existence of different communities. The first was the Office of Cultural Affairs, 
a unit set up by the Greek Foreign Ministry to handle all Muslim minority
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issues. Many complaints have been made by the Muslims against the operations 
and the role of this unit. The most serious accusation put forward concerned the 
development of a strong local network (a clientele) which became an obstacle 
for the everyday transactions of Muslim citizens.
Examples of such difficulties experienced by Muslims included 
obtaining driving licences, buying property and receiving planning permission 
for their houses, all of which were coupled with the existence of restrictions of 
movement for the population of the mountainous areas that were lifted only in 
the last decade. Another example was the existence of Article 19 of the 
Citizenship Law, which allowed the withdrawal of Greek citizenship if the 
person concerned left the country with no intention of returning. Under this law 
a Greek Muslim who decided to reside in Turkey for many years could lose
o
his/her Greek citizenship. This law was also abolished during the last decade.
The second institution that played an important role in the issue of ethnic 
relations of the area was the Turkish Consulate in Komotini. The Consulate’s 
existence and involvement in Muslim minority affairs supported the demands 
being made for the ethnic self-determination of the Muslims. In addition to the 
ethnic Turks there was an effort to include the Pomaks and Rom under the term 
‘Turkish identification’ -  a move that found general acceptance in the two 
communities. The Turkish Consulate granted many scholarships to Muslim 
students for university education in Turkey and it was generally viewed as being 
the manipulating power behind any Muslim demands. Moreover, its existence 
determined the Muslim minority as the ‘voice of the other’ associated with the 
enemy state.9
During the years from the 1920s onwards and especially after the 1960s, 
the Muslim minority was transformed from being a religious community 
attached to the old Ottoman values to an ethnically-aware community 
demanding ethnic recognition. As already mentioned the argument revolved 
around religious and educational issues but underneath was an increasing ethnic 
consciousness. Taking advantage of Greece’s EU membership, the Muslim
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leaders appealed to the European anti-racism forums to increase awareness about 
the Muslim issue in Western Thrace.
The reasons for this shift can be found, in part, to be due to historical 
circumstances and in part due to the extremely centralised power exerted by the 
Greek government which encouraged the isolation of the two communities but 
also of the region as a whole. Through the years, the gap between centre and 
periphery had widened, leading to a weak local administration unable to express 
the real problems faced by the local population. As local government had no 
authority over the decision-making processes, power over social/ethnic issues 
was left in the hands of central government and it was either due to its physical 
distance from the area or to political interests that central government allowed 
the problem to perpetuate. Greek-Turkish relations were another obstacle for the 
development of more fruitful ethnic relations in the region. The Cyprus problem, 
the persecution of the Greek minority in Turkey during the 1950s, and the 
constant suspicion of irredentist Muslim plans only served to complicate the 
situation further.
The lack of democratically elected representation at local level was 
experienced by both Christians and Muslims. Christians, through membership of 
various associations or political parties could have their voices heard to a higher 
degree than the Muslims. The latter were the ones who were deprived and 
hesitant to form or become members of groups and associations whilst at the 
same time having little involvement with the existing political parties. (This 
conclusion was borne out by both the existing literature and the interviews). 
Therefore, it can be stated that the Muslim views were not adequately 
represented in Greek society. Considering the social gap between urban and 
rural Muslims, the linguistic difficulties (at all levels as shown in the chapter on 
education), as well as the low educational levels among the Muslim population, 
the task of making one’s voice heard became almost herculean. It was partly as a 
consequence of this that the Turkish Consulate and the local Muslim elites 
actively took up the role of intermediaries.
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Furthermore, as we have seen in chapter 2, there was (and still exists) a 
high degree of clientelism existed within Greek society, political parties and 
political authorities which the highly centralised state enabled to continue and 
flourish. This clientelism became a fertile ground for the perpetuation of 
nationalistic feelings fuelled occasionally by Greek-Turkish relations. 
Traditionally, in both Greece and Turkey political networks and nepotism in all 
aspects of political and social life was the typical way for an individual or a 
group to conduct their affairs. The new administrative structures and modem 
political reality, guided particularly by the EU, have left the Greek state with the 
huge task of eliminating the old system and introducing more transparent 
methods of the policy-making and its implementation. As we have seen in the 
theoretical section for regional policy, clientelist systems existed in both Italy 
and France but new structures were introduced in order to limit their power. The 
Greek state is now called upon to introduce this degree of accountability.
During the 1990s as the new regional reforms were introduced by the 
government both the Christian and Muslim communities were quick to show 
their strong opposition. Despite the general approval of Greece’s EU 
membership, there was strong objection to the state’s decentralisation attempts. 
From the Christian point of view a decentralised state was a weak state and 
therefore Western Thrace was under threat. As Papagiannis argued in his 
editorial column in Topiki Aytodioikisi journal, “hysterical voices were heard for 
‘the general destruction of the state’ on the one hand and ‘parapolitics’ on the 
other, and ‘we are going for elections and...it is not time to disintegrate the 
state’ and that ‘decentralisation and human and minority rights’ became a 
maximum national threat”. He continued “... true democratisation process (but 
even the basic modernisation) involves the further re-structuring of the self- 
government in all levels of social political and economic life and the abolition of 
the power-monopoly centres” (Papagiannis: September 1994: p.3).
Many newspaper and magazine articles during that period depicted this 
notion of ‘threat’ and argued accordingly. For example an article entitled 
‘Superficial, useless and nationally dangerous’ argues that the new reform of
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prefectural self-government could enable the election of a Turkish prefect with 
serious consequences for the region (Oikonomikos Taxydromos 7.7.94: p.35). 
Objections were even raised against the enlarged prefectures as a creation for the 
benefit of the Christians. Hence when it came to prefectural self-government law 
it was argued that the ‘joining together of the Rhodopi and Evros prefecture 
would lead to the Turkification of the second’ (ibid.: p33).
Within the Muslim section of population, the reactions were similar. For 
the general Muslim population the new reforms were to be mistrusted especially 
after the introduction of the ‘enlarged prefectures’. Their reservations were 
justified considering certain of the Christian reactions. However, the more 
radical opinion of Turkish nationalists was very similar to that of Christian 
nationalists: they feared the opportunity of closer co-operation between the two 
communities, which they perceived as a threat to their influence. As a 
consequence, the Turkish nationalists argued against the reforms. (Anagnostou, 
2000).
In general, opposition to the reforms has been expressed all over Greece 
mainly because of local vested interests and the breakdown of previously well 
established local structures and relations. The new system also aimed to 
distribute power at different levels through elections and to introduce more 
transparency to the methods of local government operations. This attempt at 
modernising and upgrading an archaic system of local government inevitably 
raised controversy.
What was different in Western Thrace -  although not unexpected -  was 
the reference to the ethnic issue that seemed to undermine most of the affairs of 
Western Thrace. When asked whether the Thracian population was ready to 
accept the regional changes, most interviewees thought that the population was 
ready but not adequately informed. Most thought that Western Thrace had coped 
much better with the new regional policy structure than other areas in Greece 
although there were ongoing controversies over the way the obligatory merging 
of various communes and municipalities took place.
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Despite these local oppositions, decentralisation was favoured by 
business and by political parties who defended the EU policies. The new profile 
of PASOK (during the 1990s) as a pro-European and pro-modernisation party 
proceeded with the changes. Significant funds were allocated to Western Thrace 
with the introduction of the new development law 2234/94. As a consequence 
special subsidies were allocated for the promotion of investment in Thrace in all 
three levels of production. (Romaios 1994: p.62). The region of Eastern 
Macedonia and Western Thrace benefited substantially from EU funding, much 
of which was given for the development of the infrastructure. Western Thrace 
attracted about 12% of the 1st European Community Support Frameworks funds 
for the period 1989-93, the third largest portion after the areas of Attica and 
Central Macedonia (Oikonomikos Taxydromos 25.2.93: p.67). This funding was 
further supported by a supplementary subsidy of the 2nd European Community 
Support Frameworks for the years 1994-1999 (European Commission 1995: 
p. 15). The municipalities and prefectures received substantial amounts of extra 
funding and those with a mixed population were assisted with an additional fund 
(interview, Xanthi, July 2001).
The affairs of the Muslim minority have been transferred from the 
Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior while the role of the Cultural 
Affairs Office has diminished. And as Simitis, the current Greek Prime minister, 
emphasised in one of his visits to the area, “the Greek state will guarantee the 
participation of both Christians and Muslims in the process of regional 
development. As part of this development Thrace will become the example of 
equality, multicultural activities, religious freedom and participation in the 
common prosperity ... the local society can only exist, co-habit and progress 
peacefully with respect for the different cultural and religious models and 
traditions” (Komotini, 2.5.96). To a large degree this terminology of 
multiculturalism, cultural diversity, its benefits and the protection of the 
different cultural traditions, has entered into the language of the local press, of 
the official representatives and of the people of Western Thrace and has featured 
in all the local interviews conducted for this study. (There is a plethora of
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examples for the current increasing use of ‘multiculturalism’ in the region. To 
name but a few: the local daily Paratiritis in Komotini, published also in Turkish 
is committed to promote the ‘multicultural element’ of the region, the local 
Delta TV programme entitled “multi-cultural Thrace every Tuesday”, the local 
daily Chronos’ article of 21/10/1999, and the daily Eleftherotypia 6/4/2001)
3.1 Managing ethnic relations
In order to look at the present day situation, three aspects of social life will be 
examined: first, economic development; second, both levels of local 
government; and third, the Muslim minority. All three have been analysed above 
as being the main components contributing to the regional policy in this area that 
focuses on social aspects and inter-ethnic relations.
3.1.1 Economy
In the area of economic development there has been a marked improvement 
during the last years. The European Union developmental funds of the 1st and 
2nd European Community Support Frameworks were aimed at particular areas of 
development for the region. Initially these were the exploitation of the region’s 
geographical position and the improvement of its transport infrastructure 
connection it to its neighbours, Bulgaria and Turkey, and the rest of Greece. 
Specific finance was allocated for the opening of new international and domestic 
roads, and the modernisation of airports and seaports.
The most important public work was the construction of the Egnatia 
motorway that runs for a total of 687 kilometres beginning at the Turkish border 
(Kipoi) and continuing throughout most of North Greece, finishing at the 
Egoumenitsa port of Epirus where ships depart for Italy and other Mediterranean 
ports. Local roads have been constructed and/or improved reducing time and 
costs of transportation but also greatly enabling the region to come out of its 
isolation. In addition to the road system, funding has been given for the
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improvement of industrial zones, support for small-medium enterprises (SME) 
and for the exploitation of the area’s natural resources.
The second aim included the development of the primary level of 
production which traditionally for this region was agriculture (tobacco, cotton, 
sugar beat). However, the area has also the natural environment for extensive 
dairy and fish farming. To support these industries an irrigation system totalling 
435 km in length, including a dam has been constructed. Roads for agricultural 
purposes were built and money was given for specific public works to support 
the cultivation of fruit trees and flowers.
The third aim involved the development of tourism, the protection of the 
natural environment and the increase of the standard of living for the residents. 
Funds were specifically allocated for the encouragement of alternative forms of 
tourism such as mountaineering, therapeutic spas, walking, and cultural and 
historical pursuits. Local historical institutions and the protection and promotion 
of archaeological areas were also singled out to receive financial support. To 
raise the standard of living, money was set aside to provide environmentally 
friendly treatment of waste, sewage system and the building of modem 
hospitals. Particular treaties such as the Treaty of Ramsar were drawn up to 
protect the local environment where rare species of flora and fauna are to be 
found.
The final aim of the EU programmes was the education and 
employment/training of the local population. Funding including the construction 
of specialist high schools, for example, for music and technology, and the 
enlargement of the Democritus University whose departments are dispersed 
within the three prefectures in Western Thrace. Special educational programmes 
were offered to people with special needs and to the new population of Pontian 
Greeks who were being settled in the region following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.10
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The construction of the new infrastructure gave a fresh impetus to the 
area, reflected in a slight change to the region’s economic position in terms of its 
Gross Regional Product (GRP). Before this change Western Thrace had 
previously been one of the five poorest European regions (precise figures have 
been provided above). Whilst it is no longer on that list the area is still amongst 
some of the poorest in Europe and Greece (European Commission 1999: p. 17). 
Another indication of the positive but relatively slow progress is the degree of 
decrease in size of the region’s population. According to European statistics 
there was a 0.8% decrease between 1981-1991 and this decrease seems to 
continue to today (ibid.). It could be argued however that as most of the public 
works are either only nearing completion or have just been completed, it is too 
early to judge the future regional prosperity based on the new infrastructure.
Whatever the cause there is a new optimism expressed in the interviews, 
informal discussions with local people and in the local and national press. Both 
Muslim and Christian local government representatives express the hope that 
Western Thrace will begin to play an important role in the future 
economic/social and cultural affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor and the 
newly created Black Sea states.
3.1.2 Regional Policy
Both levels of local government are newly established and are still undergoing 
changes to their composition and function. General arguments about external 
threats or a weakened Greek state are no longer at the centre of political debate 
and do not feature in mass media reportage. Instead, to a large degree both the 
Thracian and the wider Greek society have come to appreciate the positive 
effects of a local government system, which for the moment mainly derive from 
the economic benefits they are experiencing. Present day emphasis is placed on 
ways to improve the existing institutions and overcome the current operational 
obstacles.
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Decentralisation was a policy followed by the Greek state as part of a 
general effort towards the country’s modernisation. As Mouzelis argues, the 
introduction of new institutional frameworks coincides with the creation of a 
new political climate in Greece. The general approval of closer Greek 
integration with the EU, together with the political changes in East Europe and 
the demise of New Right liberalism affected the trends in Greek society 
(Mouzelis 1995: 29). In this context a new environment free of political/party or 
ideological interests where political power is also exercised from ‘below’ offers 
new prospects for the Greek society. However, what is fundamental to the 
success of this process is the break-up of the present well-established system of 
clientelistic and populist ways of contact, (ibid.).
The tremendous regional disparities that exist today in Greece are the 
inheritance of a highly centralised power and clientelistic network that defined 
the shape of the state and the form of political authority. This archaic system of 
power relations managed to survive the 170 years of the independent Greek 
state. (Topiki Aytodioikisi, journal, 1999: p i2). As a result most of the 
development took place around the region of Athens which also absorbed almost 
half of the population.
The new local government reforms signify only the first steps towards a 
framework of institutional pluralism where the different levels of power interact 
in the policy-making process. Although decentralisation was achieved to some 
degree, further planning is needed for its realisation. In a study of the new 
reforms undertaken by ISTAME11 and highlighted in a Kathimerini newspaper 
article, it is emphasised that there are many problems currently created by the 
increased power of the local government. To name two, local antagonisms have 
developed, and an inability to manage the public money due to either corruption 
or mismanagement has emerged. (Daily, Kathimerini 16/2/01). Although most 
of the interviewees disagreed with this article, they confirmed that whilst there 
were problems and obstacles to be overcome these were ‘early days yet’ to be 
talking of an advanced, decentralised system.
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Prime Minister Simitis acknowledged, in his speech addressing the 1998 
Panhellenic Prefects meeting, the importance of local government and the need 
for further steps to be taken. He argued: ‘...we feel justified because we 
contributed to the change of the states and public policy image, introduced the 
prefectural administration and we extended the participation of society in the 
political and administrative system, we promoted the participatory democratic 
administration while limiting the traditional centralisation...for a modernised, 
upgraded, participatory and effective prefectural self government more needs to 
be done. (Prime Ministerial speech, 22.5.98).
In the area of Western Thrace there is general satisfaction with the 
reforms. The main reasons for this of course are the economic benefits received 
by the region and the distribution of funding, some of which went to the 
prefectures but a large amount went, for the first time, to municipalities. 
Responsibility for the financial management of these funds, which are directed 
towards the particular needs of each area, rested with the mayors. Problems still 
existed, however, such as the lack of appropriately trained people that the local 
authorities need. The question of course remains what will happen when the EU 
structural funding comes to an end. Whatever the outcome, the area of Western 
Thrace does fulfil some of the requirements (mainly with regard to the new 
infrastructure) for further development.
As to the prospects for the area as a whole, there is optimism in 
connection with the important role Western Thrace will be called upon to play. 
Decentralisation and a modernised form of public administration, together with 
the diminished climate of ‘Turkish threat’, enables the area to prepare for future 
challenges. This optimism exists at all three levels of policy-making (EU, Greek 
central government and Western Thrace local authorities) and there is the belief 
that the geographical position of the area will secure future economic and social 
prosperity.
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3.2 Regional Policy and the M uslim minority
Within the Muslim minority, despite initial suspicions about the reforms, the 
general view is that there is a definite improvement both for the area of Western 
Thrace and for the Muslim population. Although local government (at both 
levels) cannot interfere with major issues concerning the Muslims -  including 
education, the election of the Mufti and the management of the religious 
property -  they feel their community has benefited from the reforms especially 
in the economic sector. As with the Christian population the reorganisation of 
the municipalities has not satisfied everyone, in as much as some Muslims 
would have preferred the formation of an extra Muslim populated municipality.
There are today Muslim mayors and Muslim members in both the 
municipal and prefectural councils. The increased power of these bodies gives 
more authority to the opinions and ideas of their members. In addition - and 
perhaps as a result of higher participation in the society -  the Muslim 
community has recognised the degree of educational disadvantage found within 
the Muslim community and there have been more calls for the upgrading of the 
educational system. On this last point, it has been observed that the increasing 
Islamic influence, which calls for stricter religious Muslim education, is in 
conflict with the modernised section of the Muslim community (Interview, 
Komotini July 2001). It will be interesting to follow this situation as it develops 
over the next few years.
In this new political environment both the Christian and the Muslim 
community have become closer and now take common decisions on local issues. 
A positive step, which to a large extent has been attributed to the European 
Union, is the increasing acceptance by both Christians and Muslims of the 
multicultural character of the region as an asset for its future development. The 
advantages deriving from this cultural particularity have been positively 
depicted by the national press. For example, an Eleftherotypia article on an arts 
exhibition of primary school students from Thrace that took place in the
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Parliament is entitled: ‘Thrace, History and cohabitation’ and highlights the 
following: “Christians and Muslims lived, live and will live peacefully in 
Thrace, writes Impade Oskan under his painting from Komotini. Katerina 
Florokati, from the primary school of Dialambi draws a Christian church and a 
Muslim minaret” (Daily, Eleftherotypia, 6.4.01).
Despite the general positive atmosphere the relations between Christian 
and Muslim communities remain tense. An important observation can be made 
regarding the two mixed municipalities: the one in the prefecture of Xanthi with 
a Christian mayor and the other in the Rhodopi with a Muslim mayor. Despite 
the present positive climate, both communities show that the climate of mutual 
suspicion, ethnic antagonisms and nationalistic platforms still exists. The 
problematic long-term coexistence, and the differences between religions (there 
are very few mixed marriages) have all contributed to a gap that is not easy to 
narrow.
Two examples illustrate the ongoing tensions in the mixed community. 
The first is found in the case of the mixed municipality in the prefecture of 
Xanthi. Funding has been given for the creation and operation of public 
kindergartens; however Muslim families do not send their children despite 
encouragement. Added to which there are efforts from within particular sections 
of both the Christian and Muslim communities to keep the populations apart and 
any attempt to counter this raise complaints. Christians within the same area 
even commented on the fact that a Muslim minaret figured in the official 
municipal poster for a local festival. And an ethnic disagreement arose following 
other efforts to improve a local road used by school children when actions of 
both Muslims and Christians led to the involvement of the Turkish consulate and 
local newspapers. (Interview, Xanthi, July 2001)
Similar problems are faced by the other mixed community in the 
prefecture of Rhodopi. In the municipal initiative, a cherry festival was 
organised as a way of marketing the fruit to both external and internal markets. 
The festival did not have a strictly commercial character and was accompanied
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by cultural events such as music concerts. Some of the participatory groups were 
from Turkey and performed contemporary Turkish music. The event, although 
unique and multicultural, received negative reviews from the local press mainly 
because of the extensive use of the Turkish language. In addition, most of the 
coverage concentrated on the cultural events while neglecting the cherry 
marketing campaign. (Interview, Komotini July 2001).
These are but a few examples of the difficulties faced today with regard 
to the Muslim minority. As a local journalist emphasised, more work is needed 
in the mixed areas. The active participation of the younger generation could 
solve many of the obstacles and more information could be made accessible to 
all people. An important omission is that some of the positive steps being taken 
in the area are not covered in the Turkish-speaking press. For example a large 
fund was provided by the state for the redecoration of Muslim schools, but this 
regional development effort was not featured in the Turkish-speaking press 
(interview, Komotini 2001) while only selective information appears in the 
Christian newspapers. In short, the local press remains to a large degree 
nationalistic. (Interview, Komotini 2001).
To conclude, the present situation indicates that despite the regional 
efforts, the new state policies for equality and the relative calm in external 
relations, there are still areas where tensions easily develop. Moreover, there are 
still sections of both communities that fuel any possible tension at local expense 
as illustrated in the above examples. The need to strengthen the local civil 
society is very appropriate in the case of Western Thrace given the 
“authoritarian or despotic tendencies of the huge state bureaucracy and the self- 
serving, particularistic orientations of the major parties” (Mouzelis 1995: p i9). 
A shift towards a more civic rather than ethnic identity, which is among the 
modernisation plans of the current government, could encourage greater 
participation in both local and wider society.
However, this last effort has met with great opposition, as shown by the 
example of the proposed changes to the national ID cards announced last year by
254
the government. The new cards would not contain information on the religious 
beliefs of the individuals as do the current ones. There was great controversy in 
Greece about the issue, focused on the undermining of the Greek ethnic identity 
which is closely connected with Orthodoxy. In contrast, the move was 
considered positively by non-Orthodox groups -  such as Catholics, Jews and 
Muslims -  who felt discriminated against as Greek citizens.
The present form of local government could play a positive role in such 
developments as it allows policy-making from ‘below’. Despite criticism the 
institutions of the local and regional governments could bring higher co­
operation among ethnically diverse societies: “local government, even with the 
enlarged prefectures, has a determinant role in peace. It is a cell of democracy; 
here problems could be expressed and solved” (Papandreou, Foreign Minister, 
Komotini: March 2000).
4. Section III: Democracy -  Decentralisation -  centre-periphery relations
Continuing the analysis of the present situation with regard to ethnic relations 
and local government, this section will concentrate on the two most important 
issues in the literature of regionalism: democracy and decentralisation. As local 
government in Greece has only developed in the last ten years it is difficult to 
accurately evaluate the significance of the two concepts. This is an area of study 
that for the Greek reality marks fundamental changes in terms of the distribution 
of power and the modernisation of the political institutions within present day 
Greece. Nevertheless, there are current trends that can act as indicators for the 
future.
Although reservations about the future integrity of the Greek state were 
expressed at the time that the new institutional changes were discussed, today’s 
attention, as we have seen, is concentrated on ways of further improving the 
system. That in itself constitutes an example of the general acceptance and, to an 
extent, approval of the intermediate forms of government. There is strong 
criticism expressed that local government does not fulfil its role adequately but
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whilst there are discussions for ways to improve on this there are no calls for 
abolition. For example, according to a recent study on the evaluation of the local 
government system “ ...the new reforms of the prefectural self-government and 
the ‘Capodistrias’ programme (the new changes introduced for the first tier of 
local government i.e. the municipalities) become acceptable as a mature 
institutional achievement, but what is not acceptable is their effects on important 
areas of the political system. In short they (the new reforms) have not been 
consolidated”, (in Daily, Kathimerini: 16.2.01)
4.1 Democracy
The concept of democracy is embedded in the institutions of local and regional 
governments. Both are cases of intermediate policy making institutions. To draw 
a parallel with the concept of civil society, local government is the intermediate 
level between central government and the people; its role is the decentralisation 
of the political government. The new bodies are more directly accountable for 
their actions to the people they represent. In addition, local government, due to 
the smaller scale society for which it is responsible, has the opportunity to take 
greater notice of public opinion. In this way it can be argued that the people have 
greater access to participate in the decision-making mechanisms affecting them.
For the area of Western Thrace, as in the rest of Greece, the initial 
reactions against the new self-government institutions have not been repeated 
despite the fact that there was an extra ethnic factor of concern. Here, local 
government becomes not only the intermediary between the central government 
and the people but it also acts as a regulator of local ethnic issues. This role is 
not an easy one as because of the rapid developments, there is not enough 
experience within local government to either deal with minority/majority issues 
or to avoid the nationalistic traps involving particular interests.
Although still at an early phase, the sort of democracy offered by the 
local government, has, in general, been applicable to the local population, both 
Christian and Muslim. As the local self-government candidates need the wider
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support of the community special efforts are made to include policies which are 
attractive to all. For the local population too, it is the first time for greater 
participation in the issues of society and the recognition of each other’s thoughts 
and ideas. Therefore, it can be argued that although the new reforms are not the 
cause of the present positive relations (it is rather a result of a combination of 
factors as has been mentioned above), the new form of local government today 
has provided the means for greater co-operation between the Christian and 
Muslim communities in Western Thrace.
4.2 Decentralisation
Decentralisation in Greece is a process that involves two concepts, the first of 
which is ‘physical’ decentralisation, a term describing the movement of 
population from the centre to the periphery. This is an important issue for 
Greece and more specifically Athens, where almost half of the population is 
concentrated. This concentration of the populace followed years of highly 
centralised policies and an emphasis on the economic development of the centre. 
As the centre prospered more people started to move inwards from the regions, 
mainly in search of employment, creating on the one hand very congested living 
conditions within the capital and on the other perpetuating the system of 
underdevelopment for the regions. In an effort to find a solution to the problem 
the previous Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou introduced, specific measures 
to encourage decentralisation but these met with low levels of success.
The second form of decentralisation includes the government and its 
institutions and is closely related to the current government whose main aim is 
the modernisation of the Greek state and its administration. It is not simply a 
matter of an ideological trend, it is rather a requirement for Greek society as it 
becomes a more integrated member of the European Union. Part of these efforts 
was the introduction of the new local self-government reforms12.
Western Thrace has experienced the negative effects of a population 
highly concentrated in the centre. Geographically isolated, the area witnessed a
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mass wave of both external and internal emigration not only from university 
educated students but also from other sections of society. Employment and not 
ethnicity was at the heart of the population movement. Both Muslim and 
Christian people emigrated to Germany and Australia during the 60s and 70s 
and in the case of the Muslims also to Turkey. On the eve of the new changes, at 
the beginning of the 1990s, Thrace was the poorest and most sparsely populated 
region of the European Union. It is due, in part to this reason, that there is still 
some difficulty in catching up despite the new economic incentives.
In parallel to the notion of civil society, a truly decentralised system 
means the dissemination of political, economic and social sectors from ‘above’ 
to ‘below’. (Mouzelis 1997, Topiki Aytodioikisi November-December 1999: 
p.31). According to Mouzelis this form of decentralisation protects the citizen 
from “the state despotism...avoid the monopoly control of ...a  small political 
elite...employees are involved in the decision-making of a company, 
unionisation is strengthened with the development of consumer 
associations...the socially marginalized people...have also ‘positive’ rights such 
as in employment, health, education...and in the cultural area there is the 
protection of ethnic, religious or other minorities from the possible tendency for 
the majority to impose its own cultural values”. (Mouzelis 1997: To Vima).
In all four respects discussed above, there seems to be some 
improvement as all issues, to one degree or another, are part of the local 
government system. These benefits are also enjoyed by the Muslim community 
whose cultural identity, as already seen, is being promoted as an asset for the 
distinctiveness of the region. The centre/periphery dynamics have been 
displaced from ‘above’ to ‘below’ to a certain extent. However, there are still 
some issues concerning the Muslim minority such as education and religion that 
are under the jurisdiction of the central state. As a consequence of this situation, 
and in contrast to other regional areas, Western Thrace has a continued 
connection with central government.
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In a long run however, the decentralisation process combined with closer 
European integration will give a new dimension and substance to 
minority/majority relations not only in Greece but also in other European 
countries. What is different in Greece is the relatively high homogenisation of 
Greek society and the recent efforts for modernisation. The outcome of both is a 
notable lack of experience in dealing with a growing multicultural society.
At a European level the argument for the Muslims still remains their 
ethnic recognition. Uneasiness about the use of the appellation ‘Turkish’ among 
the Greek political parties continues despite recent favourable comments by the 
Foreign Minister, who in an interview used the term ‘Turks’ in relation to 
perceptions of the Turkish origin population of Western Thrace (Interview in 
Klik Magazine, August 1999).
There are difficulties in predicting the future of ethnic relations in 
Western Thrace. As the thesis has shown, the issue depends upon not only Greek 
domestic policies but also: a. on general political developments in the Balkan 
Peninsula and b. Greek-Turkish relations13. However, both EU membership and 
recent reforms on local government provide an additional forum for the two 
communities to co-operate. Furthermore, there is opportunity for greater Muslim 
involvement in Greek society while the supra-national level of the EU provides 
an alternative to the antagonistic nationalist traditionalism and historical past of 
both Greece and Turkey. This is particularly true with regard to questions 
concerning ethnic recognition, which are beyond local government powers.
To conclude, the European Union has been the main driving force behind 
the attempts for greater decentralisation in Greece. For areas like Western 
Thrace with mixed populations, both the local and the EU supra-national levels 
of governance can function as an alternative for greater participation in the first 
case, and self-identification in the second. At present, increasingly Muslim 
society accepts the EU’s role in upgrading the area of Western Thrace whilst at 
the same time a small part goes even further and is happy to accept as an identity 
‘European citizenship’, as shown previously.
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5. Conclusion
The main aim of the this chapter was to synthesise the theoretical concepts and 
the practical research findings in order to give a fuller account of inter-ethnic 
relations and the role of local government in the area of Western Thrace. 
Regional reforms and the political expression of a rising ethnic consciousness in 
the form of Muslim protests peaked at the same time that Greece achieved 
greater integration with the European Union.
From the 1980s onwards, European Structural Funds were allocated to 
Greece in preparation for EU membership on equal terms with other nation 
states. To effectively absorb the funds the government had to accelerate and 
modernise the archaic system of local government. During the 1990s reforms 
were introduced to form the new levels making up the local government tier. As 
seen in Part I, three levels were created within this tier: the regional level with an 
appointed Regional Director, the prefectural level with the election of a prefect 
and prefectural council, and the municipal level with again the election of a 
mayor and municipal council.
Western Thrace as a region was initially the poorest in the EU and still 
remains one among the poorest today and it was as a consequence was given 
increased funding for economic and infrastructure upgrading. There was another 
reason for the allocation of extra funds, the regions’ geographical position at the 
eastern part of the European Union could be beneficial in any future EU 
expansion.
The new regional reforms, although welcomed by those sections of 
society that had long campaigned for decentralisation, were not without their 
critics in the area of Western Thrace. Once again Greek nationalistic voices 
warned about the weakening of the state and the Turkish threat. Muslims were 
suspicious of the reforms while nationalistic sections fearing the possibility for 
closer Christian/Muslim interaction also opposed the reforms.
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Regardless of the initial reactions the need for the EU’s structural funds 
outweighed these concerns and the government proceeded with the reforms. 
Since that time a decade ago, the situation in Western Thrace has changed 
significantly and the relations between the two communities have taken a new, 
more positive turn. Greek-Turkish relations improved and policies favoured by 
the Muslims were introduced. As has been argued, although it was not the 
regional policy that brought the changes in Christian-Muslim relations, the 
policy changes determined the new framework of co-operation between the two 
communities.
There are several conclusions to be drawn from these observations. First, 
in economic terms there have been rapid developments in the whole of the area. 
The new improved infrastructure favours both communities in terms of 
transportation, public health and agricultural public works. Although this 
improvement does not guarantee in the short term the economic prosperity and 
the social upgrading of the region, it nevertheless gives greater opportunities in 
the long run.
Second, at the community level there have been efforts for closer co­
operation. On the one hand the municipal and prefectural candidates have to 
attract Muslim votes in order to get elected and on the other, involvement in 
local issues brings the people together. There is also a general acceptance of the 
beneficial aspects of multiculturalism. However, these are but the first steps as 
has been illustrated by the examples above, and this is not an easy task. More 
work is needed in the ethnically mixed areas of the region if greater 
communication is to be achieved (see also Th. Tsikas’ article in Aygi, daily 
newspaper, 1/8/99).
Third, efforts for greater regionalism coincided with the attempts being 
made by the present government for the modernisation of society, namely the 
strengthening of the weak civil society. To succeed in that effort, reform of the 
political institutions is not enough. Decentralisation of political power and 
institutions has to be accompanied by economic, social and cultural
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dissemination. Although all of the above issues are included in the regional 
reforms of Greek society as a whole, for Western Thrace greater consideration 
needs to be given to the element of ethnicity for it to contribute to higher forms 
of both democracy and decentralisation.
Fourth, for the Muslim minority the decentralised role of local 
government and the existence of the supra-national level of EU politics present 
new opportunities for representation. On the issue of greater participation in 
everyday issues concerning local society -  such as health, schooling, 
employment opportunities, programmes for people with special needs etc. -  
local government can be the vehicle for acknowledging Muslim views. On other 
issues beyond the authority of local government the Muslims can refer -  and 
increasingly do -  to the EU. Bypassing the traditional forms of either Greek or 
Turkish identity, EU citizenship becomes an acceptable alternative.
Finally, the short time which has elapsed since the establishment and 
operation of local governments, gives future opportunities to social researchers. 
The three levels of government, local-state-EU, together with the social issues of 
ethnicity and nationalism are areas that can be usefully explored further in 
social, political and economic terms.
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Notes
1. In the 1991 European Union regional statistics, Western Thrace does not 
constitute one of the poorest regions in Europe. Although there has been a 
major investment in the area recently, it is nevertheless noteworthy that 
Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia were joined together into one 
regional unit. This latest statistics are based on the results of the economic 
performance of this ‘new’ region.
2. Excluding the temporary negative effects of the war in the former 
Yugoslavia and the reorganisation of the newly created states such as 
FYROM.
3. Poor infrastructure in the area includes elements such as the lack of a 
functional road system and transportation and the lack of irrigation systems 
which are vital for agriculture and ports.
4. Some factories opened only to take advantage of the subsidies and some 
could not continue to exist due to high costs of fuel for the transportation of 
products.
5. Eurostat recently published statistics showing the gap in prosperity between 
the 211 regions of the European Union in 1998. Based on per capita GDP, 
the ten least well-off regions are: Epirus (Greece, whose per capita GDP is a 
mere 42% of the Community average), Reunion (France, 50%), Extremadura 
(Spain, 50%), Guadeloupe (France, 52%), the Azores (Portugal, 52%), 
Western Greece (53%), the Peloponnese (Greece, 53%), Guiana (France, 
53%), East Macedonia and Thrace (Greece, 55%) and the Ionian Islands 
(Greece, 56%).
6. The population in both prefectures of Kavala (Eastern Macedonia) and Evros 
(Western Thrace) is Christian. Therefore there is always going to be a 
Christian majority.
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7. Co-operation used to exist for the national elections as both Muslims and 
Christians elected candidates from the main parties -  with the exception of 
the short period in the 1980s when the two Muslim parties were formed and 
participated in the elections.
8. See Anagnostou 2000: p. 16 note 5.
9. The first page of the Turkish Foreign Ministry official website stated that 
Greece denies the existence of minorities -  not only Turkish ones -  and 
violates Human rights.
10. As has been mentioned in previous chapters, the reasons for locating the 
Pontian Greeks in the area was to boost the declining numbers of the 
Christian population. As expected there was a controversy over this issue. 
Muslims felt that they were being marginalized and the local Christian 
population was not particularly happy for this accommodation due to 
cultural differences. The issue of the Pontian Greeks is quite complicated 
and therefore is only briefly mentioned where appropriate in the present 
thesis.
11. ISTAME: Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Andreas 
Papandreou. The study highlighted in the Kathimerini article (Daily, 
Kathimerini: 16/02.2001) is entitled: ‘reforms in the Local government -  
Effects in administration and the political system’.
12. For the decentralisation of power, in addition to the general criticism 
levelled at operational and financial management, there is still one further 
substantial issue that needs to be addressed: the existence of the state 
appointed Regional Director. Although his/her role is the general regional 
budget management, there is some controversy over the appointment. At the 
moment the Regional Director is seen as an extension of the central 
government.
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13. The present optimism in the region should be approached with a certain 
caution for three reasons. First, as I have argued in Part II of the thesis, 
Muslim/Christian relations in the area are directly affected by the Greek- 
Turkish relationship. The present situation is another reflection of Greek and 
Turkish foreign policies that are less hostile to each other, especially with the 
lifting of Greek objections to Turkish EU entry. Second, due to EU funding 
there is considerable investment in the region at present. This is beneficial 
for all sections of the population. However, the region is still one of the 
poorest in the EU, improving only slightly in comparison to its previous 
economic performance. When the EU funding expires there can be some 
scepticism about the future of the region’s ethnic relations. Finally, there is 
the international picture. As the recent events in the Balkans have unfolded, 
ethnically or religiously divided communities can experience serious 
instability with potentially disastrous results.
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Conclusion: Ethnicity and Regional Policy
The increasingly closer European integration has had a major impact on Greek 
domestic and foreign politics. As one of the most homogenous countries in the 
EU, the Greek state has assumed a ‘social primacy’ with an exclusive national 
identity (Featherstone 1996: p. 14). The traditional/ethnic affiliation to the Greek 
state coexists, and sometimes overpowers, the modem/civic attachment that is 
more common in northern European countries. This attachment strengthens 
Greekness in ethnic, religious and linguistic terms (Stavros 1996: p.l 17).
Such a homogenous and inclusive social environment has proved to be 
problematic for the small number of minorities that exist within the Greek state. 
The European Union can provide a new political forum for citizens’ appeals and 
a new European identity that, although still at early stage and not without its 
sceptics and critics, is one that the citizens can adopt.
At the same time, this relative homogeneity, combined with the 
development of an intense insecurity arising from historical circumstances and 
collective memories, has weakened the call for greater regionalism in Greece, as 
we saw in the second chapter. In fact, higher decentralisation has often been 
perceived as threatening to Greece’s territorial integrity (Vemey 1994: p. 167). 
As closer European integration became a reality, the promotion of EU regional 
policies influenced the recent development of stronger regional policies and 
local government systems in Greece. During the 1990’s significant changes took 
place that resulted in the restructuring of the Greek regional map and way of 
governance.
As emphasised in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis was to 
assess the recent regional developments in the area of Western Thrace where 
ethnic divisions and conflicts have been witnessed since the time the territory 
became part of the Greek state. More specifically, the thesis considered the way 
the three levels of government -  regional, nation-state and European Union -
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have affected the Muslim population and Muslim / Christian relations in the 
area.
Four questions were asked in the introduction upon which the succeeding 
chapters were based on and explored. To recap briefly, they were first, the extent 
to which EU regional policy influenced the national and sub-national levels of 
government. Second, the extent to which the greater regional power has brought 
higher participation, direct democracy and decentralisation for the area of 
Western Thrace. Third, the kinds of challenges that EU regional policy brings to 
ethnic relations in Western Thrace. Finally, how far a social policy which is 
more sympathetic to the sensitive issues and problems of the Christian/Muslim 
populations has been adopted for the area.
With respect to the first question, as explored in Part I, a centralist 
tradition can be found in Greece from the time of its formation as a modem state 
in the 1830’s. Until recently the only sub-national units of government were the 
prefecture, an extension of central government administration with appointed 
officials and the municipalities and communes, which although represented by a 
directly elected committee, had very little power. Two reasons can be identified 
for this centralism. First, an increased sense of external threat was countered by 
a powerful centre and second, a developed clientelistic system meant that most 
demands were met through access to various patrons in the central 
administration.
The influence of the European Union and its strong support for greater 
regionalism and decentralisation has had a considerable impact on Greek 
governance. Although most of the regional policy changes that followed were 
introduced in order to take the opportunity and better manage EU regional 
structural funds, they have nevertheless changed the Greek system of 
governance.
Despite the current weaknesses and obstacles there are now three tiers of 
government in Greece, all democratically elected: the first level of local
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government represented by the mayors and the municipal council, the second 
level represented by the prefectures and the prefectural councils and finally, the 
regions which can be regarded as decentralised forms the central government. 
Greece still remains overall a central state as most decisions are taken by the 
central government but these reforms represent the beginning of a greater 
decentralisation of political power.
For the area of Western Thrace - and to focus on the second question - 
the development of elected local governments in both municipal and prefectural 
levels has had a significant effect. The impact of the change was explored in the 
third part of the thesis. Although decentralisation can be seen as beneficial for 
most regions in Greece (there are still some opposing the reforms, for example 
in regions of Crete), in Western Thrace, with the existence of the Muslim 
minority population, regional reforms shed a new light on Christian majority / 
Muslim minority relations.
First, as has been argued in Part II and Part III, the existence of a Muslim 
minority in the area of Western Thrace has created an atmosphere of dispute 
between the two communities. Fuelled by the foreign policies of both Greece 
and Turkey, the region became an arena where both Greek and Turkish 
nationalisms met and were tested. The introduction of the new policies at the 
end of the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s became another source for 
such ethnic controversy, which was reported by the media at the time. Later, the 
policies became more acceptable and both Christians and Muslims now 
participate in local politics.
Second, the financial benefits brought to the area by the EU structural 
funds have created relative economic prosperity for the population. The newly 
improved regional infrastructure - together with the active participation of both 
Muslims and Christians in the local issues encouraged by decentralisation - has 
brought a new optimism to the area. Both sections of the population argue for 
the greater opportunities and the new role that the region will play in the 
changing situation in the Balkans.
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Third, on a smaller scale, the administrative unification of villages under 
the Capodistrias Programme, as analysed in Part I, has created mixed-population 
municipalities represented by common municipal councils. Although there are 
only two at the moment, one with a Muslim mayor and one with a Christian, 
their experience as ‘multicultural’ areas reflects the issues of majority/minority 
relations at a social level. Some of these issues were explored in Part III.
To summarise, it can be argued that the newly created institutions of 
local government, accompanied by the present boost to the regional economy, 
despite drawbacks, have enabled the two communities in mixed population areas 
to concentrate on and participate together in common local goals. This emphasis 
on civil processes can be seen as a first step to dialogue and co-operation. 
However, as the findings of the research have shown, the ‘ethnic question’ is 
still a strong element in both sections of the population and further effort is 
needed to approach it. That view is supported, as has already been mentioned in 
Part III, by most of the local government representatives.
This conclusion leads to the third question asked in the introduction of 
this thesis. EU Regional policy has influenced the process of restructuring local 
government in Greece. Nationalist voices were raised from both Muslims and 
Christians against the regional reforms. From one side some Christians were 
hostile to the idea and argued that the new system would enable the Muslims to 
achieve more power and authority. From the other, some Muslims were likewise 
adverse to the changes fearing the closer co-operation and interaction between 
the members of the two communities. However, the benefits brought by the 
reforms to both communities outweighed these and any further complaints.
The European Union did not bring only regional reforms that benefited 
the Christian/Muslim society of Western Thrace. As the union drew closer and 
Greece became a full member, the EU (together with international Human 
Rights organisations) was seen by Muslims as a ‘second’ forum to express their 
grievances - most prominent among which was the matter of ‘ethnic’ recognition
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as opposed to their ‘religious’ identity as defined by the Lausanne Treaty (see 
Anagnostou 1999: pp. 122-128).
In addition, for many Muslims of Western Thrace the idea of a 
‘European identity’ and ‘European citizenship’ became increasingly attractive 
alternatives to that of ‘Greek Muslims’ as characterised by the Lausanne Treaty 
and insisted upon by Greece. However, as a ‘European identity’ is not yet 
established, the campaign over ‘ethnic’ recognition still remains, albeit 
weakened in comparison to the 1980’s demands, as mentioned in Part II.
From the Greek state’s point of view the terms of the Lausanne Treaty 
define the status and conditions of the Muslim minority. Ethnic recognition is 
being hampered for the complicated reasons explained in Part II. The 
multicultural character and terminology of the European Union, as well internal 
political factors, have resulted in more Mushm-minority-ffiendly policies. These 
policies were analysed in the same section of the thesis. At a local level the term 
‘multiculturalism’ has been adopted by local people and institutions alike and 
has entered the official language of the local government representatives. Often 
there is a ‘desire’ to promote this multicultural element o f Western Thracian 
society.
To recap, for the Muslims of Western Thrace, the European Union is an 
institution to address in order to legitimate their claims for ‘ethnic’ 
identification. At the same time, European regional policies, which promoted 
political decentralisation in Greece, are viewed now as favourable by both 
Muslims and Christians (despite the initial reactions as we have seen in previous 
chapters). The new system of local self-government enables the Muslim 
population to further their economic, political and social development by 
directly participating in the decision-making mechanism of the local society.
Despite these optimistic overtones in the local community, as Part II and 
Part III of the thesis have shown, Western Thrace is a complicated society in 
terms of ethnic composition and religious affiliation. The lack of a consistent
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policy plan for the area, the effects of Greek-Turkish relations on the population 
and the relative economic deprivation are all factors that could contribute to 
future instability. Even in more cosmopolitan states with greater civic 
attachment to the nation, true multiculturalism can be a debatable concept. In 
more ethnic societies, like Greece, that are also relatively homogenous, it is 
problematic to apply the term multiculturalism, even to the Christian/Muslim 
area of Western Thrace.
This leads to the fourth question of the need for further social research 
and assessment of the needs of the local population. Many of the existing studies 
concentrate mainly on economic realities and policies or folkloric elements of 
the Western Thracian society while sociological research is quite inadequate. 
Local government institutions can be seen as appropriate bodies for initiating 
such research for two reasons. First, both levels of local government are closer 
to the people and their everyday problems and second, they have more 
experience of the mixed populated areas.
On a broader scale, specific funding for the social development of mixed 
communities like Western Thrace can be advantageous for the Greek society as 
a whole. As has been mentioned throughout the thesis, ethnicity is not the only 
divisive force in the local society of Western Thrace. There are also cleavages 
stemming from the urban-rural divide, religious tensions and the class structure. 
These divisions occasionally find expression in ethnic demands and claims. 
Social development can contribute to the easing of these tensions.
Overall it can be argued that the future development of the European 
Union can provide a supra-national opportunity and a possible forum for 
minorities to legitimate their claims and grievances. European Union regional 
policies can be a vehicle for closer co-operation and interaction in societies like 
Western Thrace.
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Appendix 1: Issues of controversy
To summarise the various issues highlighted throughout the thesis, there are 
three areas that have created controversy in Muslim/Christian relations in 
Western Thrace: the issues of ethnicity and ethnic recognition, Muslim religious 
matters, and Muslim education. Ethnicity is, however, the dominant feature of 
Muslim minority politics in relation to the Greek state and has been prominent 
since the 1950s. Consequently, calls for educational and religious changes also 
reflect the issue of ethnicity.
Ethnicity
As seen in chapter 4 of the thesis there are three ethnic groups that comprise the 
Muslim minority of Western Thrace: the Turks, the Pomaks and the Muslim 
Rom. The groups are distinguished from each other in terms of language, culture 
and ethnic background. What the three groups have in common is the religion 
that also legally defines their status according to the Lausanne Treaty (1923).
The relation between the three groups contributes to the changing 
attitudes of the Muslim minority and its demands for a Turkish ethnic 
recognition. The ethnic constitution of both the Turkish and Rom groups is quite 
straightforward but there is some ambivalence and controversy over the ethnic 
origins of Pomaks.
The Pomak population mainly inhabits the mountainous villages of 
Xanthi, with a fewer number living in the villages of north Rhodopi. In total the 
Pomak population accounts for approximately one third of the present Muslim 
population of Western Thrace (Athens Academy 1994: p.47). The location of the 
Pomak villages, close to the Bulgarian borders (see map), contributed to the 
relative isolation and underdevelopment of the area and the population. 
Restrictions on movement were imposed on both locals and visitors as part of 
national security concerns for Pomak collaboration with communist Bulgaria.
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These fears were in part explained by the existence of a large number of Pomaks 
(about 220,000) that inhabited south Bulgaria. (Konstantinov 1997: p.33) These 
restrictions were only recently abandoned.
During the 1950s there was an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations 
and some agreements on Muslim minority educational matters followed. As 
Bulgaria was considered more of an enemy at the time (following the Bulgarian 
occupation of Western Thrace during the Second World War), Greece agreed to 
adopt the Turkish language in all Muslim schools and Pomaks were categorised 
as ‘Turks’, a policy also strongly supported by Turkey. (Poulton 1997: p 85)
Since that time, Greek and Turkish relations have undergone many 
changes, often turbulent as has been highlighted in Part n. During the 1980s and 
1990s there were increasing demands from Pomaks to be recognised as Turks, 
which sparked a debate over their ethnic origins. Similar debates were also 
taking place in Bulgaria that regarded the Pomaks as being of Bulgarian descent 
due to the closeness of the Pomak language to Bulgarian. In Greece, the Pomaks 
were proclaimed as the ancient (hellenised) Thracians who converted to Islam 
during the Ottoman Empire. Equally, the Turks claimed a Turkish origin for the 
Pomak population (Turkish Pomaks) as a pre-Ottoman nomadic tribe that came 
to inhabit the area of Thrace (the geographic area now divided between Greece, 
Bulgaria and Turkey). (Konstantinov 1997: 36)
Today, many Pomaks living in Greece, especially the younger 
generation, tend to identify with the Turkish group and consider themselves as 
Turks. While there was some prejudice in the past from the Turks who regarded 
the Pomaks as an inferior people (Poulton 1997: p 85), since the 1930s there has 
been intermarriage between Turks and Pomaks, notably in more mixed 
populated areas. This tends to strengthen the Turkish identity within the Muslim 
minority. All Greek attempts to distinguish ‘ethnic’ groups within the Muslim 
minority are sceptically regarded by the minority’s members as attempts to 
break up its solidarity (Anagnostou 1999: p. 230)
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Recent initiatives (in the late 1990s) by the Greek government have 
sought to improve Muslim education, to encourage the entrance of the Muslim 
students to Greek universities, to lift restrictions on property acquisition by 
Muslims and to expand the economic activity for both Muslims and Christians 
in the area. The issue of Turkish ethnic recognition is still present in the Muslim 
minority political agenda but is not as strongly voiced -  Greece is also more 
relaxed with the ‘unofficial’ use of the term Turkish for the Turkish origin 
Muslim minority population. In addition, there is a view albeit weak among 
some members of the Muslim minority that the acquisition of European identity 
that has accompanied the strengthening of the EU could bring an alternative 
solution to the debate over ethnicity.
Religion
The Lausanne Treaty safeguards the rights of Muslim religion in Western 
Thrace. There are about 258 mosques and 78 religious institutions functioning. 
The administrative authority for all religious matters lies with the Mufti (the 
Muslim religious leader), who is also responsible for marriage/divorce matters, 
inheritance issues, pensions, the appointment of imams (clergy) and the 
management of the vakoufia (the religious property) (Rozakis 1996: p. 106, 
Anagnostou 1999: p.212).
Religion became an issue of dispute between the Greek government and 
the Muslim community of Western Thrace over the issue of the selection of 
Muftis. Under the 1991 Law the Greek government appointed with consultation 
of some members of the Muslim community, two Muftis for a ten-year term. 
The appointment of the Muftis was not accepted by all Muslims. A large section 
of the Muslim community (mainly from the modernist movement) reacted and 
claimed the right to a community selection of the Muftis and proceeded to elect 
alternative Muftis. The ‘unofficial’ Muftis have been subsequently convicted by 
Greek courts for obstructing the law. (Department of State Human Rights 
Reports for 2000: 2001: p l0 -ll) . The Greek government insisted on the
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appointment arrangements and justified its actions by arguing that as the Muftis 
perform some judicial duties they need to be government appointees, a practice 
also followed by Muslim countries.
As the Mufti has further administrative responsibilities, the controversy 
included the management of the vakoufia. The religious property is managed by 
a twelve- member appointed committee. Through the years, the replacement or 
new appointments of members to this committee by the Greek government, it is 
argued by some Muslims, took place without any prior consultation of the 
Muslim minority. As a result, there were complaints of property 
mismanagement resulting in a lose of value (Anagnostou 2000: p.213).
Education
The issue of Muslim education has been examined in detail as a separate chapter 
in the second part of the thesis. To recap briefly the controversies between the 
Muslim minority and the Greek state are focused primarily on two issues. First, 
is the role of the Special Pedagogical Academy of Thessaloniki, which was 
largely perceived by the Muslim community as an effort by the Greek 
government to control Muslim affairs. Consequently, the graduate teachers 
although also members of the Muslim minority and residents of Western Thrace, 
were often viewed with suspicion by their fellow members. The issue of this 
Special Academy faded however during the 1990s due to wider reforms 
introduced by the Greek government for Muslim education and when it became 
clear that the government had been unsuccessful in isolating the teachers from 
Turkish influence.
The second educational issue of controversy is that of school textbooks 
in the Turkish language. During the 1990s the Greek government proceeded in 
the authoring, publication and distribution of Turkish language textbooks for the 
Muslim schools. It was claimed that Turkey failed to upgrade the books (as they 
were written in the 1950s) and therefore the Greek government took the 
initiative to do so itself. Noteworthy was the absence of Muslim academics or 
pedagogues from the committee that initiated the project.
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The books were immediately rejected by the Muslim minority and many 
protests were organised in response. As concluded by the interviews, some of 
the voices pointed to the cultural bias of the books, for example the use of 
Christian names instead of Muslim ones, and some expressed dissatisfaction 
with the fact that the Muslim community was excluded in the writing of the 
books. But the main opposition was focused on the fact that the books came 
from Greece and not from Turkey.
In the cases of both religion and education the controversies continue 
although diminished in tone. This is partly due to a more tolerant approach by 
the Greek government and greater participation of the Muslims in local authority 
councils. The optimism for the new approach can be summarised by V. 
Papandreou’s (the current Minister of Interior) statement on the reforms of 
Muslim education:
“the policy that has been followed in recent years aims at the equal incorporation 
of the (Muslim) minority in the local society without the exclusions and 
distortions of the past. With particular interventions we have made it possible to 
lift the reasons that led the minority to the margins of the social developments in 
Thrace” (from Eleftherotypia 7/05/2001).
What both cases highlight however, is the increasing realisation of ethnic 
self-consciousness and call for self-determination. The call for an ethnic as 
opposed to the existing religious recognition is an evident part of such demands. 
It can be concluded therefore that the last part of the 1980s and the 1900s have 
witnessed a prominence placed by the Muslims on the importance of the self 
management of Muslim minority affairs.
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Appendix 2: List of Interviewees and List of Questions
The interviews took place in the area of Xanthi and Komotini during summer 
2001. In addition to the formal interviews the thesis benefited from the opinion 
of many informal conversations with both Christian and Muslim local 
population. The interviews were unstructured and the list of questions that 
follows is only a reference guide to the questions involved.
List of Interviewees
1. Mr Panagiotis Sgourides, MP for Xanthi and Second Speaker of the Greek 
Parliament
2. Mr Mehmet Ahmet, MP for Rhodopi, and previous member of Prefectural 
Council
3. Dr Moustafa Moustafa, previous MP for Rhodopi
4. Mr Georgios Paulides, Prefect for the prefecture of Xanthi
5. Mr Georgios Papadrieles, Mayor of Komotini
6. Mr Erdogan Sait, Mayor of Sostis, Rhodopi
7. Mr Vasilios Tsolakides, Mayor of Vistonida, Xanthi
8. Mr Ekrem Hasan, member of the Prefectural Council and ex-Deputy 
Mayor of Komotini, Rhodopi
9. Ms Dilek Habip, Sociologists and Journalist in the local daily Observer, 
Rhodopi
10. Mr Serif Mehmet, T.V. Journalist for ET3 (National Greek Television 3)
11. Mr Sami Karambougioukoglou, Journalist for ERA (National Greek 
Radio)
12. Mr Abdulhalim Dede, proprietor and chief editor of the local weekly paper, 
Trakya’nin Sesi
13. Mr Tzemil Kapza, editor/journalist of the local weekly paper, Gundem
14. Mr Moutzahit Miimin, proprietor and chief editor of the monthly 
cultural/literature journal §afak
15. Mr Hakan Miimin, philologist/linguist/joumalist for the monthly 
cultural/literature journal §afak
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List o f Questions
Regional Policy and the Muslim minority
1. The recent decentralisation reforms have given political power and increased 
responsibilities to local government. Do you believe that there is room for 
greater regionalism in Greece?
2. In the region of Western Thrace the new reforms met the reactions of both 
Muslims and Greeks. Do these reactions continue?
3. For many years there was ‘strategic policy’ followed in Western Thrace. In 
what ways did this policy influence the development of the region with 
particular reference to minorities.
4. In comparison to other Greek regions do you believe that there has been 
enough incentives in Western Thrace? If yes are they adequate?
5. Are these incentives only for the economic development? What do you 
believe the incentives should be for the social and cultural development of 
the region?
6. Do you believe that all incentives and economic assistance received already 
by the region of Thrace has been used adequately?
7. For the Muslim minority these last years the state has taken some steps 
towards its social upgrading. Do you believe these steps are adequate?
8. How are these steps perceived by Muslims themselves?
9. What do you believe contributed to the development of nationalism (both 
Greek and Turkish) in the area?
10. Do you believe that the existence of nationalistic movements in the area 
create an obstacle to decentralisation?
11. How the new decentralised reforms are perceived by the 
Muslims/Christians?
EU and the Muslim minority
1. What do you believe is the position of Thrace in the ‘Europe of Regions’?
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2. In general terms how do you perceive EU policies in relation to the minority 
population?
3. How does the minority population perceive the EU. Does the minority feel 
part of the EU?
4. How do Muslims/Christians feel about Greek EU membership and why? Do 
they believe they have some benefits? In what area: political, social, cultural, 
financial? Specify.
5. What are the positive/negative effects of Greek EU membership for the local 
population?
6. In your opinion what is the percentage of Muslims who are pro-European? 
How do you evaluate the 1994 Euromosaic statistics?
7. When did pro-European attitudes start to appear within the minority?
8. To what extent does the minority population feel European citizens? In what 
area of their lives?
9. Is there a particular part of the population that feels more pro-European? 
That is according to age, gender, profession, educational level.
10. Do you believe that the EU provides extra legal protection for the minority? 
What do the people believe on that issue?
11. How do Muslims/Christians perceive a possible Turkish EU membership?
General Questions for regional policy
1. With the introduction of the new decentralisation reforms do you believe that 
there is greater transparency in the level of political and economic 
development procedures?
2. Do you believe that there is greater democracy after the new rights and 
responsibilities attributed to local government or do think that further 
emphasis is needed on this issue?
3. In general what sort of problems does local government face today in terms 
of a. competitiveness, b. management, c. lack of qualified personnel, d. 
financial control of the overall budget.
4. How do you think these problems can be resolved: by greater state 
intervention or greater decentralisation?
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5. In the area of Western Thrace do you believe that local government 
represents the voice of the people overall?
6. Do you believe that the idea of equality -  isonomia -  is strong enough? Do 
you believe for example that all of the population of Western Thrace has 
equal access to mass media, local government departments etc.?
7. Do you believe that the people of Western Thrace (in comparison with other 
parts of Greece) was ready to accept decentralisation? If yes, to what degree. 
If no, what should be done in order the people to have a better understanding 
of the new reforms.
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